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INTRODUCTION 
 
General characteristics of the dissertation research. In the proposed study, 
based on a wide range of sources, including official and documentary materials, a 
holistic analysis of the transformation of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy from 
independence to the present has been carried out. Particular attention is paid to 
foreign policy decisions and internal socio-economic factors, as well as the 
conceptual and legal foundations of the organization of state activity in order to 
implement the conversion of Kazakhstan from a small state to a middle power. 
Relevance. Kazakhstan has experienced a whole era of fundamental changes in 
its political and economic systems, becoming a full and active subject of international 
relations. The formation of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy is inextricably linked with 
the process of strengthening its statehood, implementation of socio-economic 
reforms, and building a democratic legal basis for Kazakhstan’s society. The task of 
determining Kazakhstan’s place and role in the world is projected onto the social 
mentality in new conditions. 
Over the years of independence, the diplomacy of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
has achieved tangible results, which have strengthened the position and reputation of 
the country on the world stage. Nuclear disarmament, a new model of interethnic and 
interfaith dialogue, a multi-vector foreign policy strategy have become hallmarks of 
state diplomacy. Kazakhstan has established diplomatic relations with almost all 
countries of the world, entered into all reputable international organizations. Projects 
such as the convening of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building 
Measures in Asia, participating in the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union have found a wide resonance. 
Occupying a unique geopolitical location between Europe and Asia, Kazakhstan 
seeks to ensure its strategic interests through precise foreign policy steps, as well as 
securing it with the internal socio-economic development.  
The new position at international arena challenges Kazakhstan into choosing an 
approach to the solution of international security issues. In other words, having 
achieved a new position, Kazakhstan meets the new challenges. Does this mean 
Kazakhstan needs to approach international security differently? What is the essence 
of Kazakh diplomacy and what are its main directions? What diplomatic means can 
and should be used to ensure national security of Kazakhstan? All these are complex 
issues that require a detailed scientific analysis and actualize the topic of this 
dissertation research. 
In this regard, the study of the development of interstate relations as well as 
fundamental review and analysis of Kazakhstan’s activities in the international arena 
affected by new global challenges is becoming an important area of research. The 
study of this topic will help, from scientific perspective, to understand how, in the era 
of globalization, a small state can transform into a middle power in peaceful terms. 
The relevance of the topic is also explained by the fact that today we are 
witnessing the formation of a new world order. A retrospective look at the 
development of Kazakhstan and the problems that it encountered in its 
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implementation, make it possible to evaluate the new challenges and threats of 
modernity, find patterns of international behavior of states and other actors in a 
changing world. 
Furthermore, it should be taken into account that importance of diplomacy in 
the world is increasing as they serve the art of resolving numerous international 
disputes. The power, significance and influence of any state now depend on its ability 
to take its rightful position in an interdependent world. Kazakhstan, not possessing 
powerful military forces, demonstrates its capability to find compromising positions 
for solving pressing problems.  
In modern world, where interdependence is strengthening and deepening 
exponentially, the majority of states rely on diplomacy, international law and equal 
cooperation. This is the world order that the efforts of Kazakhstani diplomacy are 
directed. Revealing and finding patterns for the use of such instruments is topical for 
both academic and practical circles.  
Since Central Asia is a traditional arena for the clash of major global players’ 
interests, it is expected that the intensity of the geopolitical struggle will be growing 
in the coming years. To withstand such difficult conditions and maintain its 
independent development course, Kazakhstan needs to continue to use political, 
conceptual and functional potential of its foreign policy. Providing evenly distant 
relations with major powers as well as meticulously placed foreign policy steps are 
able to guarantee the preservation of the sovereignty of Kazakhstan. For this reason, 
the Republic needs enhanced methodological support from both governmental 
institutions and expert circles. 
The degree of scientific elaboration of the problem. The transformation of 
foreign policy behavior attracts attention of both scientists and specialists in the field 
of history, international relations, political science, sociology, psychology, 
management, and the diplomats themselves [1-8]. It should be noted that historians 
are more engaged in studying the problems of the development of states and the 
latter, in turn, consider transformation from the perspective of their science’s role in 
making foreign policy decisions, the nature of the factors that caused these changes 
[9-12]. Therefore, the dissertation proposes the following classification of the 
literature. 
The first group of research is the work of the authors dedicated to the 
theoretical and methodological aspects of the stratification of the states in the system 
of international relations. Those are studies of defining size of nations through the 
problems of geopolitics, political science, national security, the theory of 
international relations, and foreign policy. Although one may not agree with their 
conclusions, but they were used to develop a research technique as well as serving as 
general guidelines for global processes taking place in the world.  
To be exact, Burchill and Linklater’s textbook Theories of International 
Relations [13] provides a systematic and comprehensive introduction to the main 
theoretical approaches in the study of international relations. While it focuses on the 
core theories, it also takes into account some major events and developments, 
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including new material on neo-realism and neo-liberalism, post-colonialism and 
cosmopolitanism. 
In this regard, the most referenced work in the contemporary research to define 
small states is the Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations reported by 
International Economics Association. Researchers such as Kuznets [14], Demas [15] 
and Jalan [16] employ the quantitative economic measures to define ‘smallness’ of 
states, while Taylor [17] Russet and Starr [18] suggest taking into account military 
potential, life expectancy of the population, the percentage of infant mortality, the 
number of doctors and beds in medical institutions per capita. Organski [19], Wood 
[20] and Holbraad [21] identify population, political development, and economic 
development as the most important determinants of national power. Likewise, Laura 
Neack [22], in her analysis of middle power behavior, uses cluster technique 
considering five national attributes (GNP per capita, military expenditures per capita, 
population, infant mortality rate, and adult literacy rate). Ross [23] scales sizes of 
states according to their population. Brown and Ainley [24] provide systematic 
coverage of power, national interest, foreign policy and war – alongside analysis of 
the impact of globalization on security, governance and the world economy. Sutton 
[25] suggests considering the geoeconomics of a country to define its position in the 
world arena.  
Other researchers consider that foreign policy behavior or international role are 
the main factors in identifying one a small or a middle power. Fox [26] argues that 
small state’s foreign policy is often concentrated on regional matters, while Rothstein 
[27] supports the idea that the small state is identified by the inability of a state to 
resolve a security dilemma on their own. East [28] bases his definition of small states 
by a range of foreign policy behavior patterns such as level of involvement in 
international relations; activity in intergovernmental organizations; support for 
international law and treaties; utilization of force; foreign policy vectors; the use of 
moral and normative positions in global issues.  
At the same time, Handel [29] attempts to shed light on five perspectives: 
definitions and feature of weak states; internal and external sources of weakness and 
strength; how weak states act within different international systems, and their 
economic position in the world. In Tetreault’s [30] opinion, some small states are 
seen to be guarded by a guardian neighbor which is known as ‘cliency relationship’, 
whereas Jazbec [31] reckons small states’ prerogative is an exclusive focus on 
survival, because of which they shall be manipulating as far as possible, the will of 
other more powerful states.  
Nossal [32] identifies that one of the functions that middle powers are often 
commit to is ‘internationalism,’ which has following features: (a) responsibility, (b) 
multilateralism, (c) participation in international organizations, (d) willingness to 
implement prior commitments. In this regard, it is fair to note that under these 
conditions, it is up to states themselves if they want to choose middle power role. 
Meanwhile, Ravenhill [33] argues that such factors as capacity, concentration, 
creativity, building coalition and credibility should be taken into account when 
defining one as a middle power. 
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Græger [34] focuses on the advantageous position of small states that are often 
seen to have more international credibility, having fewer hidden agendas and less 
ambitious national interests than more powerful states. In this regard, Behringer [35] 
agrees that middle powers are catalyst of innovations in international norms, 
mediation, multilateral diplomacy etc. 
At the same time, Gecelovsky [36] thinks middle power concept should be 
taken as determinant of state behavior, not a form of state behavior. Maass [37] pools 
both quantitative and qualitative criteria all together to compare all existing 
definitions and finds out common feature is that it tends to rely on international 
organizations, multilateral diplomacy and International Law. De Carvalho and 
Neumann [38] hypothesize that because there is no way for small powers to grow 
territorially, they seek status from higher moral involvement in international 
relations. Kurecic finds best [39] to retrieve the results using the combination of both 
quantitative and qualitative (relational) criteria to get a plausible solution.  
The aim of the work is a comprehensive study of external and internal factors 
that influenced the transformation of Kazakhstan into a middle power since 
independence. 
To achieve this goal, the following research tasks are distinguished:  
1) analyze theoretical framework of the behavior of states of different size in 
the system of international relation; 
2) reveal quantitative and qualitative criteria for defining the size of state; 
3) develop new methodology to measure transformation of states from small to 
middle powers;  
4) analyze the transformation of Kazakhstan into a middle power; 
5) identify internal variables in the evolution of Kazakhstan into a middle 
power; 
6) identify external variables in the evolution of Kazakhstan into a middle 
power; 
7) test Kazakhstan’s transformation through international case studies; 
8) study in depth and systematize the priorities of foreign policy of Kazakhstan 
as a middle power; 
9) develop practical ways and recommendations to improve efficiency and 
economic effect of the foreign policy of Kazakhstan. 
Object of study is foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan. 
Subject of study. The need for a political analysis of the changes in the 
geopolitical space associated with dawn of the information and digital age, overturn 
of the notion of power in international relations and emergence of new subjects of 
international relations, identifies the subject of study: the conditions of the 
implementation of foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in a changing world. 
The chronological framework of the study covers the period from 1991 to 
the present. This time frame includes the process of formation, development and 
improvement of forms, methods and means used by the government to transform the 
Kazakh state into a middle power. 
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The general research methodology is made up of scientific theories of 
international relations and political science schools that study the problems of modern 
political processes, the provisions of systemic and comparative historical approaches 
to the study of interstate relations. 
The main research methods were problem-chronological, case study, a method 
of comparative analysis, content analysis of documents, a method of using expert 
assessments. Along with traditional methods of a comprehensive analysis of 
historical phenomena, the dissertation uses a modern methodology for studying 
foreign policy and diplomacy, which requires attention to the personal aspects of 
diplomatic activity, such as the study of value system and political culture of the 
nation, state institution’s implementation of professional tasks.  
In addition, the study used empirical research methods: the use of data bases, 
statistics, reports, and analysis of foreign research center data. The principle of 
historicism allowed not only studying the internal factors for the formation of the 
Kazakh foreign policy position, but also the dynamics of its activities in a specific 
historical situation.  
In the study of the institutional structure of the government and foreign 
diplomatic missions, methods of functional analysis were used. The theoretical and 
empirical base of the research was composed through juxtaposition of the 
development strategies of Kazakhstan, the concept of the Republic’s foreign policy, 
legislative acts and international legal documents governing the activities of the state 
bodies in the field of foreign policy and diplomacy.  
The source base of the study. The range of sources used in the dissertation 
research is quite wide and differs in character. Therefore, they were categorized into 
the following groups. 
The first group of sources is represented by legislative acts of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan relating to foreign policy and regulating the governance [40-47]. This 
group of sources allows one to analyze the formation and development of the state 
policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan and its impact on the formation of the state’s 
foreign policy strategy. The fundamental documents of this group are: the law ‘On 
State Independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan’ and the Constitution of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan. Most of activities taken by state institutions including 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, foreign representative bodies have been regulated by the 
Regulation on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan. 
The second group of sources includes works, speeches, messages of the First 
President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev [48-69]. From the first years 
of Kazakhstan’s independence, Elbasy has played a key role in shaping the basic 
principles and components of Kazakhstan’s state and foreign policy. Therefore, 
scientific and practical importance in the study was the annual State of the Nation 
Addresses of President to the people of Kazakhstan. The addresses contain 
conceptual points regarding the foreign policy strategy of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan. The annual addresses of N. Nazarbayev, which were voiced in the form 
of strategies: Strategy Kazakhstan 2030 and Strategy Kazakhstan 2050, as well as 
other messages of the First President, were actively used in the dissertation. Also, 
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important conceptual provisions addressing the topic of dissertation research are 
contained in the writings and speeches of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
N. Nazarbayev: the Strategy of the Formation and Development of Kazakhstan as a 
Sovereign State, In the stream of history, Epicenter of the world, Five Years of 
Independence, Critical Decade, On the Threshold of the 21st Century, Kazakhstan’s 
Way and others [70-78]. 
To ensure a consistent, systematic review, in-depth analysis of the development 
of Kazakhstan, dissertation uses N. Nazarbayev’s Era of Independence whose name 
is inextricably linked the history of the formation of independent Kazakhstan. In a 
difficult period of transformation of the social system, cardinal changes in economic, 
political and social relations, the activity of the First President ensured the 
progressive advancement of the country and society. Written in the genre of historical 
journalism, the book reflects the author’s view of the country’s recent history and its 
future, characterizes the stages of construction of a sovereign state from the moment 
of its foundation, substantiates the internal logic and decision-making mechanism in 
response to internal and external challenges during the construction of sovereign 
Kazakhstan. 
The third group of sources contains materials on the official websites of the 
President’s Office, Prime Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs [79-81] regarding the 
strategic documents currently being implemented, functional responsibilities of state 
bodies, and information about missions at international organizations.  
The fourth group consists of materials of international conventions relating to 
internationally binding instruments and other agreements [82-94]. This group of 
sources is also represented by the documents establishing and developing bilateral 
relations of the Republic of Kazakhstan with the states of its geopolitical 
environment, as well as the international organizations. 
The next group of sources is represented by memoirs written by diplomats and 
political figures whose tremendous work has contributed to the establishment of 
sovereignty and the solution of tasks on ensuring the security of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan [95-99]. These works contain not only great factual material, but also 
new conceptual approaches to the study of bilateral and multilateral relations in 
Central Asia. The assessments and analysis of events that took place during the 
period of the 90s and 00s contained in these works provide an opportunity to 
understand in more detail not only the specifics of Kazakhstan’s development, but 
also the logic of geopolitical processes in the contemporary world.  
In particular, Truth about the State Border of the Republic of Kazakhstan with 
preface of Kasym Zhomart Tokayev [100], is devoted to the international legal design 
of the state border of Kazakhstan with neighboring countries. It sets out a detailed 
analysis of the delimitation and demarcation of the state border of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan,  specifies legal regulation of territorial issues, the nature and content of 
negotiations as well as historical and international significance of legal registration of 
the border.  
In addition, the book called Diplomacy on the way to Independence by Murat 
Almasbekuly [101] who based his work on diplomatic activities of the honored 
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worker of the Republic of Kazakhstan, first arabist Sailau Batyrshauly. This work 
gives a range of insights into diplomatic work of a new-born state, the difficulties and 
decisive measures taken to transform the country finding its own, Kazakhstani way.  
The next group of sources is the research of foreign, Russian and domestic 
researchers on the specifics of geopolitical, domestic political, socio-economic, 
demographic and other processes taking place in other middle powers. The study of 
this group of sources makes it possible to compare domestic political, socio-
economic, demographic processes in Kazakhstan with the development processes that 
took place in other middle powers during their establishment. Although it is not 
possible to use all the conclusions presented in these works, the factual material 
allows one to identify the trends and patterns of the development. 
One of the important types of sources is focused research centers, which quite 
often publish their databases. They can be attributed to the seventh group of sources. 
This group is of great importance for studying the topic of this study and acts as a 
kind of indicator of reflection in the public consciousness on various processes, 
including the big data analysis.   
In general, the above types of sources were a necessary and sufficient basis for 
an objective review and writing of this dissertation. These are gleaned and 
appropriately used. At the same time, this dissertation makes an in-depth analysis into 
political, economic and social changes accentuating on the progress made by 
Kazakhstan on the way to become a middle power. 
Key Points to Protect: 
1 Defining whether a state is small, middle or great power depends not only on 
its political, economic and social development, but also on its foreign policy 
behavior. 
2 Transformation of small states into middle powers goes through 
enhancement of economic, security matters as well as state’s foreign policy scope of 
operation and internationalization.  
3 Kazakhstan meets the definition of a middle power. 
4 Internal factors that contributed to the transformation of Kazakhstan into a 
middle power are natural resources, political stability and ideology, developed by 
Annual State of the Nation Addresses of the President. 
5 External factors that contributed to the transformation of Kazakhstan into a 
middle power are geopolitical position, international system, and international issues. 
6 Priorities of Kazakhstan as a middle power are to protect national interests 
and be a responsible player of international relations. 
Scientific novelty of the work is revealed by obtaining the following results: 
1 For the first time in a study of the theory of international relations the author 
has attempted to use a developmental approach in the stratification of states in the 
international system.  
2 The dissertation displays a model for the transformation of states from small 
to middle power in the international system. If previously other studies in this area 
were limited to merely defining states as small, middle and great powers, this 
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dissertation categorizes the criteria for transformation of a state from small to middle 
power.  
3 The dissertation defines Kazakhstan as a middle power. It also evaluates the 
conditions for the effective strategies used by Kazakhstan that combined soft and 
smart power. 
4 A comprehensive analysis of not only geopolitical processes, but also their 
interrelations with internal political, socio-economic and demographic processes in 
Kazakhstan is used. In other words, the research uses dependent, interfering and 
confounding variables to find out the patterns and mechanics of foreign policy 
decisions. 
5 While previous studies of foreign policy of Kazakhstan mostly inclined to 
use geographical approach or three level analysis, this study employed issue-based 
approach to reveal relevance of such external factors as geopolitical, international 
system and international issues to the transformation of Kazakhstan foreign policy 
behavior. 
6 Ways to increase the effectiveness of the foreign policy of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan are proposed. 
Theoretical and practical significance of the research. The main provisions 
and conclusions of the thesis can be used by a wide range of international experts to 
further study the Kazakh foreign policy. The research materials are of practical 
interest, as they can be used in the training of diplomatic personnel, in the process of 
teaching general and special disciplines in the specialty of ‘International Relations’, 
as well as in the development of textbooks in the social sciences and other related 
disciplines. Certain provisions of the thesis may be of interest in terms of the further 
development of foreign policy concepts. In terms of significance, certain provisions 
of the dissertation research may be useful to employees of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to carry out more effective activities. 
Testing the results of the study. The theoretical provisions of the dissertation 
were tested at international scientific conferences and seminars, both in Kazakhstan 
and abroad: International Scientific and Practical Conference ‘Republic of 
Kazakhstan and the Eurasian Space: Modernity and Development Prospects’ [102], 
Modern Eurasian Studies [103], International Conference dedicated to the 20th 
anniversary of Astana ‘Great capitals - Smart cities’ [104], International Round Table  
‘Actual problems of the foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan’ [105], III 
Conference of Youth as Protagonists of Change [106] as well as at meetings of the 
Department of International Relations of L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National 
University. A number of the main provisions of the dissertation research were 
presented in the following publications. 5 scientific publications were published in 
the journals recommended by the Committee for Control in the field of Education and 
Science of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan: 
Bulletin of Eurasian National University [107], Bulletin of Kazakh National 
Pedagogic University [108], Bulletin of Eurasian State Institute [109] as well as 
Society and Epoch [110] and Kazakhstan-Spectrum and by Kazakhstan Institute of 
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Strategic Studies [111]. 1 scientific publication included in Scopus database: Insight 
Turkey [112].    
The structure of the dissertation. The goals and objectives set in the 
dissertation research, determined the structure and logic of the work, which consists 
of introduction, three chapters, conclusion, list of sources used. 
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1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF STATE BEHAVIOR 
 
1.1 Mainstream Theories and States’ Behavior 
The events that take place around the world make political scientists, 
sociologists, and even psychologist permanently reconsider their views on the theory 
of international relations. So far existing variety of theories and views on 
International Relations can be summarized into four well-known paradigms: first is 
Realism (including classical Realism and neo-Realism), second is Liberalism 
(traditional Idealism and neo-Liberalism) and third is Marxism (including neo-
Marxism and World-systems theory), and fourth is Constructivism, each of which 
offers its own understanding of the nature and evolution of international relations 
(table 1.1).  
 
Table 1.1 – Summary of Mainstream Theories of International Relations 
 
Theories 
Factors 
Actors (1) 
International 
Environment 
(2) 
Policies Institutions 
(5) 
Goals (3) Means (4) 
 
Realism  
Neorealism  
State (Great, 
Middle, 
Small 
powers) 
Anarchic 
Conflictual 
Maximizing 
power 
Hard power, 
Economic 
coercion, 
Balancing, 
Bangwagoning
, Hedging 
Military 
Diplomacy 
 
Liberalism 
Neoliberalism 
 
 
States, 
International 
organizations
, Individuals  
  
Anarchic 
Cooperative 
Maximizing 
benefits 
Applying  
soft power, 
Legal 
regulation,  
Disarmament 
Joint Military 
Forces, 
Diplomacy, 
International 
institutions 
 
Marxism 
Neo-Marxism 
World 
Systems 
Theory  
Classes of 
states (the 
core, semi-
periphery, 
periphery) 
Imperialistic 
Exploitative 
Maximizing 
economic 
benefits 
Exploitation or 
Social 
revolution 
Transnationa
l 
Corporations 
(TNCs) 
Constructivis
m 
Social 
Structures, 
Identities 
Co-
constructing 
Interdependen
t 
Implementin
g ideas 
driven by 
political 
actors 
Regimes, 
Norms, Values 
Social 
agencies 
 
Of all theories of international relations political realism is considered the most 
profound and comprehensive tool emphasizing state, national interest and military 
power to be driving forces of international politics as they are all based on human 
nature. The work of G. Morgenthau [113], for example, looks at political relations 
between nations in “Politics Among Nations”, the first edition of which was 
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published in 1948, is still relevant to what all the statesmen, scholars and observers 
come across today.  
The following key provisions are common to representatives of political 
realism: 
1 The main participants in international relations are sovereign states. At the 
same time, states are considered as rationally operating homogeneous political bodies 
that have a common policy regarding other states, the participants of international 
relations. It is only states that have exclusive rights to use violence within its territory 
and have legitimate grounds and have necessary resources to conclude treaties, 
declare a war and do other actions constituting the essence international politics. This 
does not relate to all states, but only the powerful, conflicting or cooperative relations 
between which are the make-up of international politics. At the same time, the 
international political arena is represented by countries with different potential. In 
this respect, it should be noted that states can be categorized into smaller and greater 
ones. The Power Transition Theory is the concept developed by Organsky [114], 
which narrates on the cyclical nature of war associated with power in international 
relations as well as describes international politics in a hierarchy of 4 tier world 
system. Superpower has the largest share of the resources of power (population, 
production and political power in the meaning of coherence and sustainability). Great 
powers represent potential rivals of the dominant state, engaged in the preservation of 
the existing system and control over the resource potential. As a rule, they seek to 
expand their influence beyond the borders of their geographic region. Middle powers 
have powers of regional importance, are not able to challenge the dominant state and 
the existing structural system. Small powers are the rest of national states that have 
little power in their own geographical regions and have little influence and projection 
beyond their borders.  
2 The specificity of international relations is that they are anarchic in nature. 
The nature of international relations is that states are constant competitors. Each 
participant is guided primarily by their own interests. “National Interests” is the main 
category of the theory of political realism, the main motive and key stimulus of state 
policy in the international arena. In the absence of a rigid hierarchical system and a 
universally recognized supranational power, survival and struggle for better 
conditions of existence requires states to act on their own. Therefore, “self-help” is 
the basic principle of the behavior of states on the world stage. The state acting in an 
anarchic environment based on its own interests inevitably faces the fact that its 
interests’ conflict with the interests of other states participating in international 
relations. That is why, the international environment can be described as conflictual. 
3 The anarchic nature of international relations suggests that there is a 
constant threat to the public interest. That is why, the main goal of any state in 
international politics is to ensure its own national security. Naturally, the great 
powers have more resources for this than the others. However, they can never feel 
safe and constantly strive to maximize their power by increasing their own resources. 
In this respect, one should note that states of different size are thought to have 
different goals. In the political realism of Morgenthau [113, р. 23], the main 
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measuring value is the power, which allows to evaluate the position and will of a 
state in international politics. So imperialist state or any other greater power will 
always try to expand its influence to be sufficiently competitive with other states. At 
the same time, the threat to international stability is typically posed by the imperialist 
states themselves. Therefore, in his understanding, a policy aimed at opposing great 
powers by maintaining the status quo in the international environment benefits small 
states by protecting them from hostile takeovers. Waltz’s structural realism [115] 
shifts the emphasis from the balance of power system to the behavior of states, as in 
his opinion it largely depends on anarchy and international system. Meanwhile, Walt 
[116] argues that balancing is a country’s reaction to external challenges, is not 
caused by the presence of power potential of other players. Pape [117] assert the idea 
of soft balancing, according to which the balance can be created not by possessing 
economic, military or political resources, but by possessing high international status, 
prestige, participation in the activities of international institutions. Hey [118] 
specifies that smaller powers demonstrate a low level of participation in international 
affairs and deal with a narrow circle of foreign policy issues. They limit their activity 
to the nearest geographic space and use diplomatic and economic instruments of 
foreign policy rather than military. Small states adhere to neutrality and focus on the 
great powers in matters of security, resources, creating partnerships. In relationships 
with each other, they avoid conflicts and seek cooperation. Finally, they spend a 
disproportionately large amount of foreign policy resources to maintain their security.  
4 The most important aggregate resource (or mean) used by states is power, 
which is understood as the military and economic power of the state, providing 
security and prosperity, and possibilities for setting rules and norms, spreading values 
and ideas. But the main feature of power is the ability to control the behavior of other 
participants in international relations. “Whatever the material goals of foreign policy, 
such as acquiring sources of raw materials, controlling sea routes or territorial 
changes, they always imply control over the behavior of others by influencing their 
will” [113, р. 62]. Varying size of states is believed to influence the strategies they 
pursue as well. It is worth highlighting the theory of the balance of threats by Walt 
[116, р. 18], in accordance with which balancing is considered as a state’s reaction to 
external challenges, and not simply to the presence of power potential from other 
players. In Walt’s understanding, balancing could take place in the form of creation 
of an alliance against the source of the threat, and the bandwagoning would be a 
rapprochement of smaller state with the bigger one. Accordingly, the larger the state, 
the more likely it is to balance the threatening state, while smaller states are more 
likely to be forced to cooperate with it [116, р. 19]. Expressing a fundamental 
disagreement with the approaches of his predecessors, who associated bandwagoning 
with the form of diplomatic capitulation, Schweller [119] developed his own concept 
claiming that the main purpose of the adjoining countries is not to prevent an attack 
from a great power, but to maximize the benefits of working with a stronger player. It 
also demonstrates that the presence of a serious external threat is not a condition for 
bandwagoning. There is also a middle position called hedging which is to emphasize 
the readiness of a weak state to maximize profits from relations with major powers, 
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while maintaining a wide space for foreign policy maneuver without having to limit 
cooperation with certain states or alliances [120].  Russian researchers [121] note 
non-characteristic behavioral models of economic unions of states, increased 
independence and initiative of small and medium-sized countries. Russian scientists 
associate this fact with greater “freedom of action” and “the right to choose their own 
path of development” due to the decline in the value of the confrontational factor and 
military force. Moreover, their main behavioral models (balancing and 
bandwagonning) were transformed under the influence of new conditions, including 
integration processes. 
5 Using state’s foreign policy instruments (military strategy and diplomacy) 
for its narrowly selfish purposes, each state exercises its power contributing to the 
make-up of international relations, armed conflicts and wars. However, neorealists, 
such as Waltz [122], defines power through the concept of opportunities, including 
economic, military and other components. Power is understood as a tool of the state, 
which does not reflect the control over the results of interstate interaction but reflects 
the control over the resources with the help of which security is provided in an 
anarchic international environment. Power is, according to Waltz, a relative concept, 
which is to say, what is important is not possessing resources but having control over 
more resources than competitor (one way to do that is to increase the amount of your 
resources or reduce the amount of resources controlled by other states). The most 
important resources that a state should have to ensure its security are military, 
economic, geographic, and demographic resources. It is also important to distinguish 
between the concepts of “control” and “possess.” The possession of resources does 
not mean that the state can use them to ensure its security. The state should have 
exclusive rights to use these resources. 
While realists’ point is quite clear on how states behave depending on the 
nature of human beings and principles of rationality, there are other ways of thinking 
which have a right to live for several reasons. The key points of the liberalist 
paradigm are as follows. 
1 Participants in international relations are a wide range of actors, which 
includes not only states, but also international governmental and non-governmental 
organizations, public associations and groups, private enterprises and even 
individuals. Moreover, liberalists insist that the state cannot be regarded as a rational 
and unitary actor. The international policy of the state is the resultant of constant 
struggle, coordination and compromise of the interests of the bureaucratic hierarchy 
and individual power structures, civil and military systems of society, various 
political parties and movements, non-political associations and professional groups, 
etc. 
2 International relations are not anarchic and uncontrollable. They can and 
should be regulated, firstly, by means of international treaties, and secondly, through 
the establishment of special organizations regulating interstate relations. The 
expansion of the power of international organizations, the improvement of the norms 
of international law, the democratization of international relations, the extension of 
universal norms of morality and justice makes it possible for other states (not only 
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great powers) and non-state actors to equitably participate in international politics. 
Thus, liberals recognize only one aspect of the anarchy of international relations and 
deny another. Moreover, they only partially agree with the thesis that there is no 
central authority in international relations, which is empowered to make decisions 
that are mandatory for the full implementation by all actors. In other words, the 
implementation of the agreements is in the hands of participating parties themselves, 
which could be achieved through cooperation. International processes are diverse, 
and international relations cannot be reduced only to the state of peace and war, or 
even to cooperation and conflict. All this is taking place, and with the increasingly 
dominant role of international cooperation. But if we present the international 
processes in a generalized form as the dominant trend, then we should speak about 
the increasing interdependence and the formation of a unified global community, 
which is faced with common problems and therefore has common interests. 
3 The priority of universal human values and universal democratic principles, 
based on which one should move towards the formation of a new, consciously 
regulated world order that meets the common interests of all humanity. This way 
liberalists think it is possible to create a win - win situation, which should be able to 
provide an opportunity for everyone to maximize its own benefits. Like the concept 
of political realism, modern liberal theory recognizes human nature as the 
cornerstone of international relations. But unlike realism, making humans aggressive 
and uncontrollable, liberals think of such qualities as peacefulness, adherence to the 
ideals of cooperation, morality and mutual assistance. It follows that the purpose of 
foreign policy of states is the production of wealth based on mutually beneficial 
cooperation and the search for ways to expand it. The modern world is so closely 
interconnected that attempts by any single state to obtain unilateral advantages will 
inevitably entail destructive consequences for all. The desire to get benefits at the 
expense of others will mean the excess of costs over benefits for any state violating 
international law and the balance of interests. 
4 Although specific features of international relations are characterized by the 
absence of supranational power, according to the liberal idealistic paradigm, the 
world community of democratic states, with the support and pressure of public 
opinion, is fully capable of settling conflicts arising between its members by peaceful 
means, methods of legal regulation, increasing the number and role of international 
organizations that promote the expansion of mutually beneficial cooperation and 
exchange. One of its priority themes should be the creation of a collective security 
system based on voluntary disarmament and mutual renunciation of war as an 
instrument of international politics, a system that will allow to end world wars and 
armed conflicts between states. War is not an objective feature of world politics, but 
the adversity of mankind, which needs to be opposed to by means of disarmament, as 
well as the system of interstate treaties and rigid mechanisms of control over their 
implementation. 
5 Military force is an important tool of the state’s foreign policy, but it should 
be used out only in self-defense and upon the exhaustion of non-force instruments for 
the protection of national interests. An important condition for international peace is 
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the promotion of democracy [123], because democratic countries prefer to multiply 
their own wealth, rather than wasting energy on fighting against each other. The path 
to the promotion of national interests and the realization of the goals of participants in 
international relations lies through cooperation in the joint solution of these problems. 
The creation and strengthening of international institutions (through the strengthening 
and further development of the UN system), the further improvement of international 
law, the obeying generally accepted standards of morality. Even the largest and most 
developed states can no longer afford to solve their own and international problems 
solely by violent means. Firstly, due to intertwining economies, and the use of some 
forms of modern weapons, like nuclear ones, makes it pointless as it threatens global 
catastrophes for all mankind. Secondly, owing to growing globalism ideas and 
declining value of military in modern post-industrial societies, it is hard to justify 
anyone fighting against another nation. 
The key points of the Marxist paradigm (along with neo-Marxist and economic 
structuralism and World-systems theory) are as follows. 
1 The main actors in the Marxist paradigm of international relations are 
social classes: on the one hand, it is the owners of productive capital, exclusively 
holding and managing the means of production in the global economy and entering 
into a tough competitive (including armed) struggle; on the other hand, it is 
proletarians, oppressed and exploited by world imperialism. Therefore, the dominant 
processes in the international arena are inter-imperialist crises, contradictions and 
clashes between these main classes, between the rich and the poor. States as 
participants in international relations are secondary.  
2 Unlike supporters of realism and liberalism, the adherents of this doctrine 
believe that the nature of international relations is not anarchic but imperialistic and 
exploitative. Relying on Marxists’ ideas, one can claim that international relations do 
not differ from intra-social relations in anything but scale. They are one of the 
elements of the superstructure, determined by a set of dominant production relations 
or, in other words, the economic machine, and, secondly, reflect the peculiarities of 
the interaction of the bourgeoisie and the working class within the framework of 
national states [124]. Therefore, the main international processes are represented by 
class conflicts, crises, wars and social revolutions. Modern neo-Marxists [125] 
represent international relations in the form of a global system of diverse economies, 
states, societies, ideologies and cultures. The basic concepts of neo-Marxism are the 
“world-system” and “world-economy”. World-economy has three interrelated 
structures: a single global market, the political system of independent competing 
states and a three-tier spatial structure. According to representatives of the world-
systems approach, the capitalist system can be maintained and developed only in the 
form of a world-economy. Capitalism was able to flourish because the world-
economy included not just one, but many political systems. The existence of a system 
of interstate relations is a necessary condition for the development of capitalism. This 
is because capitalism requires a certain relationship between capital and state power. 
According to Wallerstein [125, р. 16], if the powers become too strong, as it was in 
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case of world-empires, their interests will outweigh the interests of producers, and the 
endless accumulation of capital will no longer be the main priority.  
3 In Marxists’ thinking, the goals of the main actors of international relations 
are radically opposite. While some (the world bourgeoisie) strive to maximize profits 
and accumulate capital, others (the international working class) seek to overthrow the 
ruling class and thereby realize the world-historic mission of the proletariat: to free 
all workers from exploitation and establish socialism and communism on Earth. From 
the world-systems analysis Wallerstein [125, р. 84] there are three levels within the 
framework of the modern geo-economic structure: core, semi-periphery and 
periphery. At the core, the world’s leading companies in key knowledge-intensive 
industries are concentrated. In the conditions of innovative technological race and 
patent wars, they retain exclusive or oligopolistic control over the main segments of 
the world market [126]. High-tech TNCs perform the function of creating commodity 
and managerial innovations, and the semi-periphery, through the branches of TNCs 
operating on its territory, ensures mass production of these technologies. Semi-
periphery includes some of the weaker, industrially developed countries that are not 
capable of sustainably specializing in the production and marketing of highly 
complex goods, but sporadically selling them in the periphery states, mainly in those 
“niches” that are not “occupied” by the “center”. It also includes the “new industrial 
countries”, which carried out modernization according to the model of the innovative 
type and orienting their exports to the “center” and oil-exporting countries [127]. 
Periphery of the system of world economic relations includes countries specializing 
in manufacturing in highly competitive industries. Their profitability is either low due 
to the presence of many manufacturers of similar low-tech products or depends on 
market conditions. These include the extracting industry, which is not directly 
involved in transnational production cooperation. Thus, the periphery, which mainly 
has export and specialization in raw material, is excluded from the world geo-
economic system. 
4 Neoclassical Marxism insists on the need to change logic of modern world 
development, along with the preferences and strategies of the main actors of 
international relations. They argue that the struggle of the peoples of “periphery” 
against the largest monopolies of the “center” for social justice and redistribution of 
wealth is completely valid and reasonable. The means to achieve these goals are as 
follows: on the one hand, increased exploitation, and on the other, the world social 
revolution. The struggle for a place in the hierarchy is carried out by various means - 
material, informational, cultural, and organizational. The stakes vary from period to 
period and are related to the balance of power between the world powers, as well as 
geographical displacement of centers of economic activity and capital accumulation. 
Consequently, the distribution of niches in the hierarchy can periodically be changed 
at various scales. 
5 The most powerful TNCs form the core of the world geo-economic system, 
which ensures the interests and goals of these corporations. TNCs in turn serve as a 
source of economic, financial, technological, and, consequently, military and political 
power of their home countries. 
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The key points of the Constructivism, despite all its internal heterogeneity, has 
a general content, the main elements of which can be summarized as follows: 
1 The main objects of analysis of international relations are states. However, 
it is assumed that non-state actors can play an important role by articulating the rules 
and norms, which is possible, however, only if the activity of these actors is 
recognized as such. In other words, states are the product of humans’ thoughts, 
beliefs, ideas etc. That is why the identity and interests of the state are largely 
constructed by these social structures, and not the result of the exogenous influence 
of material entities.  
2 Constructivists see the interstate system not as material one, but as 
intersubjective structure. Anarchy is not an inherent attribute of the interstate system, 
but a product of faith and the will of decision-makers [129]. The main problems of 
international relations are not determined by the interests, power and authority of 
states, but by the norms and beliefs that guide their political leaders. Therefore, 
sovereignty, security, defense, etc. depend on a culture understood in a broad sense. 
In this regard, Constructivists insist on interdependence of world society and its 
components (first of all, the states); the continuity in the evolution of the international 
system, which, however, is capable of undergoing revolutionary changes. At the same 
time, the reason for the change in international relations lies in the transformation of 
identities emanating from the societies themselves, which replace the previous 
dominant ideas with new ones. The dependence of elements in international relations 
takes place not only because of the processes and interactions happening there, but 
also because of its conceptualization. 
3 The main goal of states is not limited to the issue of security. States may 
have long-term common interests and actively influence international system. The 
interests of the state are formed in the process of “constructing” its identity. All 
political actors change over time, giving rise to a new identity. In turn, this has a 
significant impact on political processes. Constructivism stresses on the active role of 
political actors who are able, through their interactions, to change the structure of 
international relations. Unlike neo-Realism, which considers conflict to be the 
product of anarchic structure, Constructivism asserts that the problem of peace and 
war depends on how close cultures and social practices of people, nations, and states 
are. International politics is not governed by any objective laws. Policy is influenced 
only by ideas, norms, values and knowledge possessed by political actors. 
4 Constructivists emphasize that, in addition to the power component, the 
influence of culture, language, ideology, knowledge is essential. All of them are 
alternated through proceduralism, variability and mutual influence. The consequences 
of a lack of supranational power can be overcome, in particular, with the help of 
international regimes, laws, norms, economic interdependence, education or 
institutions. International cooperation is seen as the result of a similar social impact 
of the external environment and the similarity of national identities shared by states. 
Thus, constructivists think “inter-identity” cooperation can achieved more easily, 
because it is not constrained, by and large, by the framework of state sovereignty. 
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Interstate cooperation is achievable, and can be the result of the mutual adaptation of 
the identities of the contracting parties. 
5 Social agencies create international norms that have a powerful self-
sufficient influence on states. From the point of view of constructivists and historical 
institutionalists, norms are not necessarily created with the direct participation of 
states and under their control, and therefore, should be investigated as a substrate 
independent of the state. Constructivists are convinced that the norms should be 
linked not with political content of legitimacy, but with social processes developing 
in international relations and with the strength of the social fabric of these relations. 
States may not be consciously aware of the existence of social norms, which does not 
negate their actions and significance. Norms are informal, mobile and plastic, and 
international politics is the result of constant interaction and interpenetration of 
international and national norms or identities of states regarding their role and status 
in the world. Therefore, world politics is a reality, constant in its openness to change, 
and states are the units open to the reformulation of their identities. 
Considering all four paradigms above, a number of general provisions can be 
developed: (1) although no one denies the anarchy of international relations, the 
possibilities for its regulation do exist; (2) the number of actors in international 
relations is expanding, including not only small or middle powers and 
intergovernmental organizations, but also new, non-traditional actors - international 
governmental and non-governmental organizations, transnational corporations, 
numerous businesses and other associations and unions, as well as individuals; (3) 
recognition of the worldwide stratification of states which implies both their status 
and function in the world system. 
In contemporary circumstances, all theories could agree that states have 
different power and can be distinguished from each other depending in certain 
criteria. Moreover, every state is forced, in one way or another, to follow certain 
foreign policy strategies depending on their power, role and place in international 
arena. Broadly speaking, each state strives for national expansion or self-extension, 
including territory, influence, resources, allies, etc. It may be concerned with self-
preservation i.e. the protection of its own space and its national interest. Finally, 
states can reject any direct benefits in favor of strengthening peace and solidarity in 
interstate relations which is called self-abnegation.   
Indeed, although having formal legal equality, states cannot ignore the fact that 
they differ in their territory, population, natural resources, economic potential, social 
stability, political authority, arms, etc. These differences are summarized in the 
inequality of states in terms of their national power. The consequence of such 
inequality is the need to act actively or passively in international arena. Thus, there is 
an international stratification, with its characteristic actual hierarchy of states in the 
international arena. 
Exploring the international stratification from the standpoint of historical 
sociology, Luard [129, р. 358] comes to the conclusion that at all stages of its 
existence, from the Roman Empire, where the tribal states depended on the central 
power, and the Chinese multi-state system, where power was unevenly distributed 
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groups of states, up to modern times – international relations have always been 
stratified by one or another grounds. In international relations, there are two main 
directions [130] to explain the causes of social stratification and its consequences on 
the behavior of actors. 
One of them, the “conservative” direction, considers stratification as functional 
specialization: society is stratified because the positions to which great value is 
attributed provide those who occupy them with power, privilege or prestige. From 
this point of view, the integration of society and social order are the products of 
stratification, and, moreover, the degree of social stability reflects the degree of value 
consensus of its members. 
Representatives of the second – “radical” direction – believe that public order 
is always based on coercion, and the stratification of society is always accompanied 
by a process in which the power, privileges and prestige of a certain social stratum 
are achieved and maintained through the systematic exploitation of other layers. 
Most of the ideas related to the stratification of international relations were 
borrowed precisely from a radical direction. Within the framework of the science of 
international relations, the literature on the issue of stratification is divided into two 
trends: “interactionism” and “structuralism”. The first considers the interacting states 
as autonomous elements of a stratified system of international relations, in which 
explanatory variable is their behavior [19, р. 21; 115, р. 16; 131]. The second comes 
from the fact that in the XX century when the states have no longer been 
autonomous, but play different roles in the global capitalist system, and this role 
depends on the place they occupy in this system - central or peripheral [125, р. 82; 
126, р. 44; 127, р. 78; 132]. Thus, if the state as an international actor is the main 
subject of analysis for interactionists, structuralists, who primarily consider the 
relationship between the center and the periphery in the world system, often do not 
take it as a unit of analysis. 
As noted above, one of the most widespread types of international (state) 
stratification is the unequal ability of states to protect their sovereignty arising from 
the inequality of their national-state power. From this point of view, superpowers, 
great powers, middle powers, small states and microstates are distinguished; the 
argument on how to define, compare and differentiate shall be discussed further on.  
 
1.2 Defining the Size of a State 
It is widely agreed that the notion of a size, status or role of a state in the world 
arena has a great importance. Yet, so far there is no clear understanding to what 
‘smallness’ or ‘greatness’ of states refers. Many researchers have been seeking to find 
a theoretical understanding of what constitutes ‘smaller or greater power’ and classify 
these features. The received wisdom in international relations suggests that there 
should be certain characteristics that make states belong to one or another category. 
However, with technological advancement and sharp development of specializied 
economies is making the matter of smallness and greatness increasingly relative 
making some countries more important in some issues and less relevant in another. 
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This is seen as an opportunity to find new prisms into how states’ relational power 
should be studied. 
According to traditional ideas, states express themselves in the international 
arena through their foreign policy, which can take place in two main forms: 
diplomacy and military strategy. Their purpose is to satisfy national interests, 
preserve the territorial integrity of the country, and protect their security and 
sovereignty. However, nowadays such understanding of foreign policy and 
international relations reveals its apparent narrowness, because foreign policy can no 
longer ignore the problems of ecology and scientific and technological progress, 
economy and the media, communications and cultural values. And most importantly, 
it cannot reflect both the fact that the traditional problems of international relations 
are undergoing significant modifications under the influence of all these new factors, 
and the actual role and true place of middle powers, small states and non-state 
international actors. 
Keohane [133], for instance, grades the states in 4 categories: system-
determining, system-influencing, system-affecting and system-ineffectual. A ‘system-
determining’ state is to play a critical role in shaping the system: the ‘imperial power’ 
in a unipolar system and the two superpowers in a bipolar system can serve as a clear 
example. As Tsygankov [130, р. 62] puts it, the superpowers are distinguished by the 
following features: a) the ability for massive destruction of a global scale, supported 
by the possession and improvement of nuclear weapons; b) the ability to influence the 
living conditions of all mankind; c) the impossibility of being defeated by any other 
state or their coalition, unless another superpower is included in such a coalition. 
‘System-influencing’ states are those which cannot individually dominate a 
system but may nevertheless be able significantly to influence its nature through 
unilateral as well as multilateral actions. Those would be great powers at the time of 
European concert, when Great Britain, France, Prussia, Austro-Hungary and Russia 
were the main decision-makers in International Relations. In particular, the great 
powers have a significant impact on world development, but do not dominate 
international relations. They often seek to play a global role, but the real possibilities 
that they have limit their role to either a specific region or a separate sphere of 
intergovernmental relations at the regional level. 
Some states that cannot hope to affect the system acting alone can nevertheless 
exert significant impact on the system by working through small groups or alliances 
or through universal or regional international organizations may be labeled as ‘system 
affecting’ states. The middle powers have a strong influence in their immediate 
environment. This distinguishes them from small states whose influence is weak. 
However, they have sufficient means to maintain their independence and territorial 
integrity.  
Meanwhile, some states that can do little to influence the system-wide forces 
that affect them, except in groups which are so large that each state has minimal 
influence and which may themselves be dominated by larger powers are ‘system-
ineffectual’. Those states are usually labeled as small and/or microstates and whose 
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opinion and role is typically neglected and are basically unable to protect their 
sovereignty on their own.  
Traditionally, theories of international politics have explored relations between 
large states focusing on security matters. A key factor in the development of world 
processes was considered a military force and the threat of its use, as well as the main 
object of study was the great powers or superpowers. Although the debates on the 
discrepancies between great powers and superpower still do exist, the area is 
considered well-researched. Small and middle powers, however, have attracted much 
less of scholar attention. Nevertheless, with contemporary development of economic 
and technological tools of influence, small and middle powers now require a closer 
look because of their increasing importance in both regional and global scale. 
Therefore, before we immerse into the question of how small states turn into middle 
powers, we shall explore what features should state have to be considered ‘small’ or 
‘middle.’   
Defining Small States 
The problem of defining small states is related to the lack of consensus on how 
far smallness and greatness of states are measurable and what should be taken as a 
measure. In doing so, the authors are typically classified into: (1) those who believe 
the there are certain parameters with the help of which states’ status can be directly 
measured; (2) those who suppose it is state’s own international behavior as well as 
perception the world community that regards one a smaller or greater state.  
The first group of researchers inclines to taking territory, population and 
economy as a measure. In this regard, the most referenced work in the contemporary 
research of small states is the Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations 
reported by International Economics Association [14, р. 24]. Economic Growth of 
Small Nations, a report written by Kuznets that recognized small states to be those 
with a population of less than 10 million. To support this, Demas [15, р. 22] and 
Jalan [16, р. 42] recognized small nations as those with a population of five million 
or less and a useable land zone of 10,000 – 20,000 miles2 and underneath 25,000 
kilometers2 respectively. Subclassification of small states was also proposed with a 
population of 400,000 or less, usable land of 2,500 kilometers2 or less, and GNP 
under US$500m.  
Taylor [17, р. 215] suggests a statistical technique to identify micro-states, 
setting a limit of 2,928,000 on population and 142,888 square kilometers on territory. 
Russet and Starr [18] suggested taking into account also military potential, life 
expectancy of the population, the percentage of infant mortality, the number of 
doctors and beds in medical institutions per capita, its racial composition, the 
proportion of urban and rural residents, etc. Ross [23, р. 412] scales small states’ 
population in between 1 and 5 million, while between 100,000 and one million are 
‘mini-states’ and those having below 100,000 people are reported to be ‘micro-
states’. However, in this case, there is a risk of losing decisive criteria and, therefore, 
the risk of drowning the problem in a huge mass of important, but still not decisive, 
signs.  
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International organizations take a closer look on the economy, although 
population and land area remain the main distinctive feature. To be precise, the 
Commonwealth defines small states as sovereign countries with a population of 1.5 
million or fewer. However, it also includes (Annex A) Botswana, Jamaica, Lesotho, 
Namibia and Papua New Guinea because of their small state features such as: (1) 
vulnerability to natural disasters and external economic shocks; (2) limited market 
diversification; (3) limited human and institutional capacity; (4) limited access to 
external capital [134]. 
These features are important, because small states are vulnerable to global 
economic crises. It takes a long time for them to recover from external economic 
shocks, which make them fail to meet development goals and get into higher foreign 
debts further leading to dependency on most strategic products such as food and 
energy resources. On top of that, most small states are prone to suffer from weather-
related disasters, a single case of which is able to cause damages that put 
development of the country in reverse for several years. Such industries as fishing, 
tourism and agriculture are extremely sensitive to weather changes, which then are 
exacerbated by limited institutional capacity to respond the challenges effectively 
[135]. 
The World Bank Group [136] defines small states as countries that have a 
population of 1.5 million or less or are members of the Small States Forum (Annex 
A). It includes 50 countries that relatively differ in land area, location, GDP, and 
economic structure. Several are landlocked, and some are island countries; only a few 
are high-income countries, while many have middle or low income; some of them are 
conflict-affected; and a few economies are oriented in exporting commodity, while 
others are based on service and tourism. 
Despite all this heterogeneity, they have certain feature which makes them fall 
into small states’ category: a small population, limited human capital, inability to use 
economies of scale, a constrained domestic market, and vulnerability to climate 
change and market shocks. Small states often have small land areas, and their 
population is generally under 1.5 million. There are also 8 micro-states, with 
populations of less than 200,000.  
The criteria such as population and land area are considered primary because it 
sets off all the other development constraints. For example, a small area gives few or 
no safe zones to which populations can during or in the aftermath of natural disasters. 
It causes competition for the use land as transport infrastructure, agriculture, and 
towns and cities so on. Although some of the listed countries have the opportunity of 
using all the benefits of the ocean, they have limited land area for economic activity. 
Small population limits the economy of scale in terms of low competition in economy 
and politics, lack of customers and high costs for basic services and products.  
Other features which small states can be characterized by most common 
economic constraints: Constraints in labor market and capacity; emigration of skilled 
labor because of few employment opportunities; difficulty of private-sector-led 
growth because of the lack of economies of scale; difficulty of diversifying economy 
due to limitations in productive base; few sources of revenue; endemic debt 
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challenges; remoteness adding economic cost; poor it connectivity affecting the 
service sector; high cost of providing public services to small scattered populations;  
exposure to climate change and natural disasters; recurrent financial, climate, and 
disaster shocks reducing the fiscal space. high fiscal costs of managing economic 
shocks leading to reliance on international finance; human development challenges: 
high infant mortality, low child immunization rates, diseases; few in-country 
educations facilities mean a dearth of adequate specialization. 
Despite all these systematic economic issues, countries such as Estonia, Malta, 
Bahrain, Brunei and Qatar serve as an example of economic success who not only 
achieved high income but also diversified their economies involving fossil fuel, trade, 
incorporating highly-skilled employees, strong legal and financial system. By this, it 
should be noted that not all small states are poor, and not all poor states are small. 
To find the answer to the question: what makes a state small? Sutton [25, р. 
145] suggests considering if what we are researching is an island, a sovereign country 
or a small economy because it makes a huge difference. It is also suggested that the 
developmental approach should be added as it may cause confusion when considering 
economic characteristics. In other words, developed small state may falsely seem 
superior than developing countries.   
Thus, although territory and population are undoubtedly significant composing 
parts of a state, these measures in investigating the smallness and greatness of states 
are sometimes ignored because a lot of small countries in their territory and 
population may have a great significance in special matters as well. 
The second group of researchers consider that foreign policy behavior or 
international role that small states choose to pursue is the main factor that associates 
them to this status.  
Fox [26, р. 14] argues that small state’s foreign policy is often concentrated on 
regional matters as they lack the power to successfully apply power or resist the 
effective application of power on them by other states, unable to pursue an agenda 
vis-a-vis other states – because they lack the power to do so. Rothstein [27, р. 229] 
supports the idea that the small state cannot resolve a security dilemma on their own 
using its internal actions, therefore they instead rely on external sources of security 
which he calls alliance-seeking behavior.  
East [28, р. 561] bases his definition of small states exhibiting following 
foreign policy behavior patterns: (a) low levels of overall involvement in 
international relations; (b) high levels of activity in intergovernmental organizations; 
(c) high levels of support for international law, treaties; (d) avoidance to utilize force 
or any kind of behavior that could alienate stronger powers; (e) narrowing down 
foreign policy vectors in terms of functional and geographic scope; (f) seeking to use 
of moral and normative positions in global issues. Some small states tend to have 
limited interaction with other states, make more use of verbal statements, rather than 
non-verbal, take fewer risks because of their limited capabilities.  
Handel [29, р. 5] attempts to shed light on five perspectives: definitions and 
feature of weak states; internal and external sources of weakness and strength; how 
weak states act within different international systems, and their economic position in 
26 
 
the world. It is found that (a) weak states are mostly passive and their foreign policy 
are mainly reactive; (b) they always opt to minimize the risk whenever it concerns 
stronger powers; (c) they are easily invaded or penetrated through other ways; (d) 
they seek support from international organizations and external actors.  
Some small states are seen to be guarded by a guardian neighbor, and in most 
of the cases it is its ancestor or metropolitan power from whom it succeeded self-
determination and independence. This is known as ‘cliency relationship’, a clear case 
for such relationship is between Kuwait and Britain/US [30, р. 569].  
Small states tend to exhibit an exclusive focus on survival. For this reason, 
diplomacy of a small state shall be to manipulate as far as possible, the will of other 
more powerful states. To offset the weakness, it seeks association with other powers. 
It might have to sacrifice autonomy in the control of national resources and loss of 
political maneuver and choice [31, р. 78].  
On top of this, because small state cannot obtain security primarily by use of 
its own capabilities, it must rely fundamentally on the aid of international institutions, 
processes, or developments to do so. In recent years, there is a clear tendency for 
small states to attempt to ensure their own security on the basis of international law 
and by supporting the negotiation of legally binding instruments under the auspices 
of international or multilateral organizations and institutions. Many of them have 
advocated and participated in regional co-operation and become members of 
multilateral organizations and alliances. Experience has shown that small states can 
successfully strengthen their positions by pursuing their specific interests, as in the 
case of Iceland, which participated actively in the formulation of the Law of the Sea, 
while at the same time extending its fisheries jurisdiction. Membership of 
organizations and institutions has given smaller states security and more political 
influence than their size might warrant on the basis of the principle of non-
discrimination, unity and solidarity; the European Union and NATO are prime 
examples of this.  
The advantageous position is that small states are often seen to have more 
international credibility, being understood as having fewer hidden agendas and less 
ambitious national interests than more powerful states [34, р. 415]. International trust 
and respect are desirable because they facilitate the protection of interests which is at 
the core of all foreign policy. Of course, all states want to be trusted and respected, 
but it is particularly important for smaller states who want to be serious participants 
in international affairs. Fundamental interests, such as peace and security and their 
derivative benefits, such as a sound economy, employment, a healthy environment 
and sustainable use of natural resources, cannot be defended except through 
international co-operation with most of the states in the world. 
Maass [37, р. 68] pools both quantitative and qualitative criteria all together to 
compare all existing definitions and finds out that although small state foreign policy 
behavior may be quite ambiguous because of geographical, demographic, economic 
and political circumstances, common feature is that it tends to rely on international 
organizations, multilateral diplomacy and International Law. He also confirms that 
there is a correlation between foreign policy behavior and the size of a state. 
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However, it is implied that they both can serve as independent variables, which 
means that size could be affecting small state’s behavior and vice versa. 
De Carvalho and Neumann [38, р. 16] hypothesize that because there is no 
way for small powers to grow territorially, they seek status from higher moral 
involvement in international relations. When they engage in seeking status, it is not 
the way to compete with great powers, they know their power limitations. Instead, 
small powers they compete to for the state of a good power and reliable partner.   
Retrieving results using the combination of quantitative and qualitative 
(relational) criteria appears to be a plausible solution [39, р. 138]. They classify states 
into small sub regional groups (such as Central Asia, Near East, Arabian Peninsula 
etc.) to make a comparative analysis of each state’s foreign policy behavior and 
achievements within the group (Annex A). The research finds that classification of 
small states requires accentuation various regionally determined features and the use 
of relational criteria because of high number and variety of data in quantitative 
characteristics to consider.  
Defining Middle Powers 
Generally, middle powers are described as relatively wealthy, have medium-
sized territory and have no nuclear weapons or permanent membership in UN 
Security Council [137]. However, the attempts to define middle powers vary 
significantly involving measuring national capabilities and foreign behavior as well. 
In particular, there are different approaches: (1) hierarchical, (2) behavioral and (3) 
functional. The hierarchical approach explores capabilities, self-positioning and 
recognized status of a state. The behavioral approach takes on ‘agential’ view and 
looks at how middle powers act and what instruments they use to achieve their goals. 
The functional approach asserts that middle powers exercise their peculiar influence 
in certain areas of interest, serving particular role in international arena i.e. they serve 
particular function in the world. 
One way is the hierarchical approach ranking states according to their position 
in the world. Organski [19, р. 6] identified population, political development, and 
economic development as the most important determinants of national power. 
Compiling all of these, Wood and Holbraad both adopt gross national product (GNP) 
as the main indicator while Holbraad combines GNP, population, and regional 
considerations. 
To be precise, in order to achieve a more balanced result, Holbraad decides to 
divide all countries in the world by regions: Africa, Asia, Europe, North and Central 
America, South America, and Oceania and Indonesia. He ranks states in order of their 
GNP (on based on 1975 data) each region separately first, draws a line of division 
looking the biggest gap in GNP and/or population size and then compares the results 
(Annex A). It is interesting to note that this approach involves high level of 
subjectivity making middlepowerness highly tied to regional development. This is to 
say, as a result of this research, Turkey did not get to be a part of middle power club 
because its GNP was only the 15th in Europe, while had it been included in the Asian 
league, it would have the 5th i.e. a part of middle power club.   
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In similar manner, Wood (1988) attempting to find the easiest way to differ 
small, middle and great powers, uses GNP as determining factor, ending up to 
include the countries between the 6th and 36th rank in GNP ranking as middle powers. 
As result, it contains the countries having between 40 and 400 billion USD in their 
GNP, which composes quite a promiscuous group. Also, his analysis does not 
provide any explanatory power into why certain countries engage in middle power 
behavior and other countries do not.  
Laura Neack [22, р. 8], in her analysis of middle power behavior, uses cluster 
technique considering five national attributes (GNP per capita, military expenditures 
per capita, population, infant mortality rate, and adult literacy rate). Cluster analysis 
is a statistical procedure which allows her to group political entities into relatively 
homogeneous groups. When using this procedure, it does not need to set critical 
values for group parameters, thus it avoids the need to predetermine the state group 
membership criteria. It is known as Ward’s Method which attempts to optimize 
variances within the groups. She performs the cluster technique for the years of 1960, 
1965, 1972, and 1980. The results are then combined to compose a final 
“membership” list for three state groups: great, middle and small states (Annex A). 
Such unsatisfactory results of mere ‘listing’ states according to certain 
attributes as well as lack of explanatory power of middle power concept have urged 
scholars to use other techniques and approaches into studying the concept. To some 
degree it can be agreed that the concept of middle power has always been promoted 
by Canadian scholars who attempted to clarify Canada’s position at the time of Cold 
War [138]. For this reason, scholar started to think not only in ‘positional’ terms, but 
also on the role or ‘function’ that middle powers play in the world. 
Thus, the second view is the functional approach which concerns a state’s 
foreign policy activism and the role of middle powers in international system. Middle 
powers, in this view, are those who occupy the position mediators or ‘like-minded’ 
states who work to ease tensions between conflicting parties. Middle powers can be 
featured by the strength they have and power they put on to use. If we consider the 
power as the ability to impose one’s will to other nations, and ability to reject the will 
imposed on itself, the power is defined by the means state uses to implement its will. 
It may contain military, moral and economic tools. 
Holbraat [21, р. 24] cites an unpublished address of R.G. Riddell called ‘the 
Role of the Middle Powers in the United Nations’ on June 22, 1948: The middle 
powers are those which, by reason of their size, their material resources, their 
willingness and ability to accept responsibility, their influence and their stability are 
close to being great powers. He also adds that ‘in a predatory world, the middle 
powers are more vulnerable than their smaller neighbors, and less able to protect 
themselves than their larger ones.’ 
Another is thing to point out is recognition. Holbraat narrates on how it is 
impossible to use the same measurements which scholars use to identify great powers 
to build a concept of middle powers. Military strength and economic resources of 
great powers and superpowers make them belong to special class of world society. It 
is acknowledged by international law, international organizations, conferences, etc. 
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For example, great powers and superpowers get to use privileges of being a 
permanent member of Security Council, while middle powers are deprived of that. 
However, great powers have not only rights but also responsibilities. During or major 
conflicts great powers gather around to arrange peace settlements to prevent such 
conflict from happening again and preserve balance of powers. 
In this respect, Mares [139] draws a line between capabilities of small and 
middle powers. In his view, middle powers possess sufficient resources to affect the 
group of limited number of states i.e. they are not mere ‘price takers.’ Meanwhile, 
small states feel obligated to ally in with a group losing its ability to influence 
otherwise. He also assumes that states often attempt to extend their influence over 
other states when it concerns maintaining their sovereignty and position in the 
international system.   
In this case, central idea of functionalism in defining middle powers is how 
certain skills or resources in certain areas make some countries take on responsibility 
in these areas [140]. Thus, middle power focuses on particular ‘niches’ in which they 
may make a maximum use of themselves [141].  They can even conduct “a leading 
position” in managing issues within its functional responsibilities [142]. 
Along with this, Nossal [32, р. 150] identifies that one of the functions that 
middle powers are often commit to is ‘internationalism,’ which has following 
features: (a) responsibility, (b) multilateralism, (c) participation in international 
organizations, (d) willingness to implement prior commitments. In regards with this, 
it is fair to note that under these conditions, it is up to states themselves if they want 
to choose middle power role.  
In this regard, Gecelovsky [36, р. 80] thinks middle power concept should be 
taken as determinant of state behavior, not a form of state behavior. He argues that 
functionalism and internationalism should be considered as causes of states’ actions 
rather than the results of actions. In such case, the consistency argument can be 
avoided, which allows scholars to compare and contrast middle powers in terms of 
conceiving ideas for change.   
The third view is the behavioral approach, which encompasses the shift 
towards agent-based featuring has inspired scholars to focus on individual 
characteristics of states, in particular, how they behave [143] in regional and global 
environment, what goals they pursue and what means they use.  
The feature that distinguishes middle powers from others is that they focus on 
keeping peace and stability in international system by participating in various 
international efforts [142, р. 77]. In addition to this, it is argued that psychological, 
behavioral and dimensional features should be fulfilled so that state can be 
considered as a ‘middle’ one. In this model, states are defined by the middle-sized 
capacity and commitment to implement international treaties, taking initiative in 
multilateral environment, focus on certain area where the power sees itself to be 
dominating and perceived to having necessary qualifications [143, р. 33]. Ravenhill 
[33, р. 12] argues that such factors as capacity, concentration, creativity, building 
coalition and credibility should be taken into account when defining one as a middle 
state. To be specific, in terms of ‘capacity,’ Ravenhill thinks that middle powers have 
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foreign services with higher level of analytical skills, which along with effective 
intelligence gathering and communication networks allows them to benefit from 
international cooperation more than small power counterparts.  ‘Concentration’ is the 
[in]ability of middle powers, as opposed to great powers, to apply high level power 
across numerous different areas of international political agenda. In other words, 
middle powers have limited number of objectives. ‘Creativity’ is understood under 
the notion of ability to compensate the lack of power by the force of ideas. That is not 
to say, it is only or necessarily middle powers that use creativity but to note that it can 
be employed. In this regard, Behringer [35, р. 3] agrees that middle powers are 
catalyst of innovations in international norms, mediation, multilateral diplomacy etc. 
‘Coalition-building’ is the enterprise taken by middle powers to impose their will at 
the time of lacking power to do so on their own. It is also worth mentioning that, 
middle powers engage in building coalitions, unlike small powers which merely join 
them. ‘Credibility’ is understood in two dimensions: first is trust gained through 
relative weakness and thus innocence of initiatives, unless they are promoting ideas 
for another weighty actor; second is consistency of advocated policies, or 
‘reputation,’ both domestically and internationally.  
This idea of including psychological and intentional dimension is further 
developed by the Connors [144] who, analyzing foreign behavior of Australia, argues 
that middle powers seeking multilateral solution to international problems set a 
precedent for building international order through cooperative institution building. In 
this regard, it is fair to mention Evans [145] who claims that GDP, population and 
territorial size as well as military capability serve as no more than starting point.  
Seeking to reason such behavior Nye [146] finds that middle powers tend to 
rely on ‘soft power’ because they lack coercive power instruments. In his view, they 
use persuasion and attraction instead of coercion and force. Furthermore middle-sized 
powers show particular interest in developing and thorough implementation of 
international law which should serve as a tool for encouraging great powers to behave 
in international arena.  
In addition, Matthew [147] and Rappert [148] claim that middle power have 
now exceeded their ‘role of lieutenants of great powers’ which allows them to look 
for their own ways to peace building and justice. To do so, they engage into powerful 
partnerships with non-state actors which are having tremendous effect on security 
architecture of the world nowadays.  
Middle powers and non-state actors have common goals in international 
politics such as developing international law, strengthening global justice, respecting 
human rights, protecting environment, find ways for economic growth etc. This ‘like-
mindedness’ allows them to use any tools at their disposal: governments operate 
through state-centric diplomatic channels, while non-state actors work engaging 
various civil society networks, NGOs to push the idea of the norm-based global 
politics [149]. It is also important to mention that middle powers and non-state actors 
widely use media campaigns and political mobilization. To influence people, states 
and institutions, middle powers use NGOs to expand its power.  
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Bolton and Nash [137, р. 183] explore the partnership between middle powers 
and NGOs deeper giving particular example of its success such as Ottawa 
Convention of 1997 which managed to ban antipersonnel landmines.  They also point 
out achievements of other international agreements on humanizing, stabilizing and 
pacifying international relations such as Rome Statute of 1998, Kimberley Process of 
2003 and Disabilities Convention of 2006. What concerns the providing security, as 
Lee & Park [150] put it, in order to assert their influence in regional scope middle 
powers use both their economic and/or military capacities.  
Summarizing all three approaches, it is fair to agree with the Coopers’ [151] 
criticism of definition of middle states as those which are not great powers but still 
have consequential role in its own region and exert some degree of global affairs far 
beyond that of small states. Such national attributes as geography, population, 
military, economic, technological and capacity, along with qualitative features as 
national reputation should be specified. Also, in order to achieve best results, it is 
suggested avoiding taking into individual countries features but rather take n-
groupings of states which should reflect certain aspects of ‘middlepowerness.’  
Moreover, Saxer [152] suggests that the middle power status should be 
explored from 2 dimensions. First is attribute or capacity which includes population, 
military and the economy. The second is intention which incorporates political 
leadership seeking to play a larger role in world arena thus requiring certain type of 
foreign policy behavior. Indeed, the global shift from security to economic issues, 
contemporary middle powers find themselves in a profoundly different environment 
than those ‘traditional’ middle powers did [153]. Globalization, rise of Asia as an 
economic core as well as development of technology is diminishing the importance 
of international structure in explaining international relations.  For this reason, the 
study of defining middle powers should incorporate both material attributes the states 
possess and structural context as well as the aspirations that political leadership 
pursue.  
 
1.3 Methodology to Measure Transformation from Small to Middle Power 
Scholars of international relations and political science have long been trying 
to rank states as small, middle, and great powers according to varying disputed 
criteria [28, р. 558; 154-156]. Although the position and attributes of superpowers 
and great powers has been relatively clear throughout the history due to their active 
participation in world conferences on such as Vienna Conference 1815, Paris 1919, 
Potsdam 1945, the essence and clearly-defined features of middle powers and small 
powers have remained undetermined.  
At the time when scholars were attempting to define, test and criticize the 
rankings of states from various angles, the states have been transforming from small 
to middle and from middle to great and vice versa. In this regard, it should be noted 
the studying such ‘transformations’ would be of more practical use for states and 
scholars as it would propose a developmental guideline for statesmen as well as input 
dynamic dimension into the research.   
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To introduce the developmental approach to the study of states’ ranking, we 
shall first glean each and every feature claimed in the literature to describe small and 
middle powers. These features are then clustered by categories they refer to. Unlike 
widely-accepted way of categorizing states’ features by research approaches, this 
study will be organized based on four following kind of features of small and middle 
powers: 
– economic, scope of operation, security, and internationalism (table 1.2). 
According to definitions of states ranking, it is assumed these are the basic areas 
where states have to progress in order to achieve the next level. However, it should be 
borne in mind that exceeding or lagging behind in one feature does not mean the 
country have excelled or fell behind the rank, it is rather aggregate of the feature 
completion that makes the country level up or down. 
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Table 1.2 – Comparative Analysis of Small and Middle Power Features 
 
 
Features 
Type of States 
Small Powers Middle Powers 
1 2 3 
Economic 
(1) Small population  
(2) low GNP  
(3) low military expenditure  
(4) vulnerability to natural disasters and external economic 
shocks 
(5) limited market diversification  
(6) limited human capital and institutional capacity  
(7) limited access to affordable finance  
(8) inability to use economy of scale  
(9) constrained domestic market  
(10) high infant mortality rate  
(11) low adult literacy rate  
(1) medium-sized population  
(2) medium-sized GNP  
(3) medium-sized military expenditure  
(4) relatively resistant to natural disasters and external 
economic shocks 
(5) sufficient market diversification 
(6) sufficient human capital and institutional capacity 
 
(7) sufficient access to affordable finance 
(8) efficient use of economy of scale 
(9) fully functioning domestic market 
(10) low infant mortality rate  
(11) high adult literacy rate  
Scope of 
Operation 
(1) concentration on regional matters  
 
 
(2) low levels of overall involvement in international relations  
 
(3) narrowing down foreign policy vectors in terms of functional 
and geographic scope  
 
(4) tending to have limited interaction with other states  
(5) being passive and their foreign policy are mainly reactive  
(1) focus on keeping peace and stability in international 
system by participating in various international efforts  
(2) having a range of international agenda, although 
limited number of objectives compared to great powers  
(3) focusing on particular ‘niches’ in which they may 
make a maximum use of themselves 
(4) expanding foreign services allowing to benefit from 
international cooperation  
(5) conduct “a leading position” in managing issues 
within its functional responsibilities  
Security 
(1) lacking strength to apply power or resist the application of 
power by other states  
(2) being unable to withstand security threats on their own  
(3) probability of being easily invaded or penetrated in any other 
ways  
 
(1) having strength to apply power or resist the 
application of power by similar-sized states 
(2) being able to withstand security threats from similar 
sized states 
(3) asserting influence in regional settings by the use of 
both economic and/or military capacities  
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Continuation of the Table 1.2 
 
1 2 3 
 
(4) reliance on external sources of security i.e. alliance-seeking 
behavior  
(5) having guardian neighbor  
 
(6) avoidance to utilize force or any kind of behavior to 
minimize the risk of alienating stronger powers (East 1973)  
  
(7) tending to focus on survival (Jazbec 2001); 
 
(8) sacrificing autonomy in control of natural resources and loss 
of political maneuver and choice (Jazbec 2001); 
 
(9) rely on ‘soft power’ because they lack coercive power 
instruments  
(10) having no privileges of being a permanent member of 
Security Council  
(4) possess sufficient resources to affect the group of 
limited number of states  
(5) engaging into powerful partnerships with non-state 
actors which have significant effect on global security  
(6) serving as mediators or ‘like-minded’ states who 
work to ease tensions between conflicting parties  
(7) intention which incorporates political leadership 
seeking to play a larger role in world arena  
(8) close to great powers in their willingness and ability 
to accept responsibility, influence and stability  
(9) rely on ‘soft power’ because they lack coercive 
power instruments  
(10) having no privileges of being a permanent member 
of Security Council 
Internationa
lization 
 
(1) high levels of activity in intergovernmental organizations  
 
(2) seeking support and reliance aid from international 
organizations and external actors  
(3) seeking status from higher moral involvement in international 
relations  
 
(4) high levels of support for international law, treaties  
 
(5) having more international credibility i.e. having fewer hidden 
agendas  
 
 (1) taking initiative in multilateral environment as well 
as imposing their will through building (not merely 
joining) coalitions at the time of lacking power to do so 
on their own  
(2) commitment to implement international treaties  
(3) creativity as ability to compensate the lack of power 
by the force of ideas, e.g. using media campaigns and 
political mobilization  
(4) catalyst of innovations in international norms, 
mediation, multilateral diplomacy etc.  
(5) credibility gained through ‘good’ reputation and 
innocence of initiatives  
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Economic Features  
Quantitative changes. The economic features of states are claimed to be the 
most important in defining its rank in the world system. To begin with, we draw 
attention on quantitative changes that have to occur before a small state can transform 
into a middle power. In particular, the population size appears to be determining if 
the country is small or middle. The Commonwealth Secretariat [134, р. 2] and World 
Bank [136, р. 4] have built their own lists of small states claiming the ceiling of 1.5 
million on population, although some exceptions are made for several 
underdeveloped countries. But a lot of researchers [17, р. 12; 23, р. 5] reasonably 
question the consistency of such a limit on population size because having just over 
1.5 million people, as in the case of Kosovo having only 1.8 million population, 
clearly does not make it a middle power.  
On the other hand, middle power researchers [20, р. 2; 21, р. 13] believe there 
should be a separation gap which can be drawn ‘wherever seems natural’ between 
small and middle powers, at least in regional level. As a result of such study based on 
1975 data, it is found that Australia had the lowest population of 13.5 million people 
to be included in the middle power club. Using the same technique, it is found that 
Finland is country with the lowest population to be part of middle powers. In a 
nutshell, small states have under 1.5 million population, middle powers have over 5 
million, and whatever country has the population of between 1.5 million and 5 
million is the country in transition. 
Another quantitative feature in determining whether the country is small or 
middle is GNP. Although researches use GNP and GDP per capita [157] 
interchangeably, GNP appears to be more frequently used to measure the ranking. In 
particular, many scholars [14, р. 24; 15, р. 12; 16, р. 42] agree that small states have 
as low GNP as 500 million, while middle power researchers use the same technique 
as in above-mentioned population quantification: first they set the countries in 
separate regional groups, then list them out from largest to smallest GNP, find the 
natural gap and draw the separation line.  
Using the data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [158, 
p.1] it is found that military spending of middle powers exceed that of small powers. 
Although the expenditure is elastic depending on country’s GDP, foreign policy 
priorities, and perceived threats, states’ status plays a significant role on how much 
they spend on military purposes [159].  It seems fair to count the expenditure based 
on share of GDP, which should minimize the significance of economic development 
imbalances among countries.  
Qualitative changes. In order to transform from small to middle power, it is not 
enough to fulfill only quantitative criteria of the middle powers, one should also be 
concerned over qualitative economic capabilities. The case in point is natural 
disasters and external economic shocks to which small states tend to be vulnerable 
[134, р. 3]. Conversely, middle powers demonstrate relative resistance and are able to 
avert the consequences of catastrophes by building proper infrastructures to protect 
its citizens. Along with this, external economic shocks do not have a deep domino 
effect on the whole economy of a middle power. 
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Limited market diversification, human capital and institutional capacity [134, 
р. 4] are the one the most typical causes of small states’ failure to manage the 
aforementioned threats. In order for the state to level up, it should make sure that it 
has put enough effort on diversifying the economy, having qualified human capital to 
employed in the country as well as well-organized bureaucracy to respond 
contemporary challenges.  
Limited access to affordable finance in small states [134, р. 4] prevents people 
form an opportunity to start their own business, which in turn, leads to unemployment 
and poverty of the majority of population. Unwillingness of external sources of 
finance to invest is exacerbated by small states’ inability to use economy of scale 
because of small population. This makes the production cost increase even higher 
creating dead-end situation in the condition of constrained domestic market [136, р. 
3]. To move along with middlepowermanship, small states need to break through the 
vicious circle of underdevelopment. To be a middle power, a state has to have a 
sufficient access to affordable finance, be able to use economy of scale efficiently, 
and provide fully functioning domestic market.  
Indicators such as education and healthcare are as important. To be exact, to 
transform into a middle power, the state has to achieve a low infant mortality rate and 
high adult literacy rate [22, р. 12]. These indicators are to emphasize the vitality of 
quality human capital in the development of the economy of the country as well as 
positioning of the nation in the world arena.  
Scope of Operation  
Another set of features that various researchers emphasize is small and middle 
powers’ scope of operation. It is interesting to note that small states and middle 
powers differ not only in their economic features but also in foreign policies, to be 
precise, its scope. For instance, Fox [26, р. 2] argues that small states’ foreign policy 
is highly concentrated on regional matters, while middle powers [142, р. 55] 
participate in various international efforts including keeping peace and stability in 
international system as a whole.  
It is also stressed that small states have only low level of overall involvement 
in international relations [28, р. 558], middle powers have a range of international 
agenda, although compared to great powers, it is limited in terms of number of 
objectives [33,                     р. 312]. It seems natural from practical point of view that 
smaller states cannot manage to deal with all international agenda around the world 
simply because they lack diplomatic channels and personnel dedicated to do so.    
 If small states tend to narrow down foreign policy vectors in terms of 
functional and geographic scope [28, р. 558], middle powers focus on particular 
‘niches’ in which they make a maximum use of themselves. The difference should be 
understood in the way that small states do not ‘choose’ any particular vector they are 
good at, or may master in the future, their choice is made by necessity. Meanwhile, 
middle powers have more freedom of choice assessing their own assets and 
liabilities; they select the best area for communication with outer world.  
International cooperation can be costly therefore several small states may be 
willing to limit their foreign representation to a minimum. Middle powers, in 
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contrast, expand their foreign services as much as possible to get benefited from 
international cooperation [33, р. 313]. 
At the time of emerging international issues, small states remain passive and 
mainly reactive [29, р. 5], whereas middle powers conduct a leading position in 
managing these issues within their functional capabilities [142, р. 11]. Thus, any 
state, wishing to become a middle power, should learn to take proactive measures to 
prevent upcoming issues. In a word, being the first to suggest solving the causes 
instead of fighting against consequences is thing that makes the difference.  
Security 
Whether it is national or international, providing security has always been 
considered very important when measuring states’ status in the world arena. 
Moreover, with the contemporary development, it concerns not only the citizens’ 
peaceful being, but also energy security, autonomy for the use of natural resources as 
well as the economic and institutional security. 
In this regard, first and foremost feature of small powers is that they lack 
strength to apply power or resist the application of power by other states [26, р. 34], 
while in contrast to that, middle powers have sufficient resources to do so when it 
concerns similar-to-its-own size states. It should also be noted that middle powers’ 
strategy may contain not only military opposition to an upcoming threat, but other 
‘creative’ ways as well [33, р. 320]. 
It is also highly likely that small states are easily invaded or penetrated in any 
other ways [29, р. 14], while middle powers assert their influence in regional settings 
by using both economic and military capacities [150, р. 23]. So countries, in 
transition to middlepowermanship, should upgrade tighter border protection and 
ability to withstand any kind of informational, religious, or any other imposition.   
Derived from these vulnerabilities, the states’ reliance on external sources of 
security, alliance-seeking behavior [27, р. 5] as well as preference to having a 
guardian neighbor [30, р. 14] makes it small. At the meantime, possessing sufficient 
resources to affect the group of several states [139, р. 20] as well as willingness to 
affect global security through engaging into partnerships with non-governmental 
organizations makes one a middle power [147, р. 12; 148, р. 62].  
At the times of crisis, small states minimize the risk of alienating stronger 
powers by avoiding using force and limit any kind of behavior that could be qualified 
as such [28, р. 562]. This is to say their focus is solely on survival [31, р. 42]. 
However, middle powers take on the role of mediators and engage ‘like-minded’ 
states to ease tensions between conflicting parties [149, р. 482]. This is the 
implication of the intention incorporating political leadership seeking to play a larger 
role in world arena [152, р. 323]. 
In addition, it is implied that small countries sacrifice their autonomy in control 
of natural resources and loss of political maneuver and choice whatsoever [31, р. 12], 
while middle powers are close to great powers in their willingness and ability to 
accept responsibility, influence and stability in the world [21, р. 284].  
Finally, despite these discrepancies, there are some features that small and 
middle powers share. They both rely on ‘soft power’ because they lack coercive 
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power instruments [146, р. 14] and have no privileges of being permanent members 
of Security Council [137, р. 24].  
Internationalization 
Although what makes small and middle powers distinct from great powers is 
often claimed to be ‘internationalization,’ it can be noticed that the level of 
internationalization differs among them as well. First, to clarify the meaning of 
internationalization, it should be noted that in economics, it means ‘increasing the 
involvement of enterprises in international market.’ In line with that, small and 
middle powers attempt to get engaged into international community, though it is with 
varying degree of success.  
For instance, small states are associated with active involvement in 
international organizations [28, р. 567]. However, to become a middle power, they 
need to take concrete initiatives as well as impose their will through building (not 
merely join) coalitions at the time of lacking power to do so on their own [143, р. 8].  
Being a part of international organizations, small states often seek support and 
rely on the provided aid [29, р. 21]. Middle powers, in contrast, attempt to expose 
commitment to implement international treaties and other liabilities [32, р. 150].  
Moreover, as there is no way that small states would grow in territory, they 
seek status from moral involvement in international relations, whereas middle powers 
employ creativity to compensate the lack of power by the force of ideas, e.g. using 
media campaigns and political mobilization [33, р. 2; 149, р. 481].  
If small states depict high levels of support of already existing international 
law, treaties, norms and procedures, middle powers are the catalysts of innovations in 
international norms, mediation, multilateral diplomacy etc. [160].  
The last but not least discrepancy is that small states get more international 
credibility from having fewer hidden agenda [34, р. 413], while middle powers gain 
it through ‘good’ reputation earned over the years [33, р. 323]. 
Transformation Model 
Defined criteria for transformation of small states into middle powers touch 
upon quite a range of governmental policy area. To make this study useful for 
policymakers, let us cluster out the actions that prospective middle powers should 
undertake into following areas: demographic policy, economic policy, government, 
education and healthcare, security policy, intelligence policy, military policy, foreign 
policy (table 1.3). Basically, this table represents the policy indicators that small 
states should achieve to become a middle power. However, it should be noted that all 
states have their own external and internal factors including historical background, 
(un-)availability of certain resources, type of regime etc. that affect the feasibility of 
such endeavor (figure 1.1)   
Another thing to point out is that the means to achieve these indicators may 
vary significantly both country-wise and time-wise. For example, setting a goal of 
increasing population might require the state to employ ‘repatriation program’ 
dedicated to immigration of nation’s Diasporas scattered around the world to come 
back to their home country. Alternatively, the state would need to initiate a ‘baby 
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boom’ with maternity grants, high levels of income across the country which is viable 
at the time of economic growth.  
To boost the economic growth, provided that the country has chosen a 
capitalist way of development, it would need to attract foreign direct investments. 
The investments should be able to supply not only the large businesses to create new 
jobs, but also bring affordable loans through second-tier banks for small and medium-
sized businesses to grow. The freedom of choice in starting a business allows citizens 
to diversify the economy as well as specialize in particular high-profit areas in a 
natural way. In this way, the matter of achieving autarky or at least relative 
independence of the economy is in hands of both government and society. If the 
population of the country is too small for the economy of scale to get efficient, 
logical way out of this situation would be to trade with neighboring countries which, 
in turn, should increase the GNP. This, along with aforementioned attraction of 
investment requires internal political and social stability as well as attractive 
international image. 
  The work of getting worldwide recognition or state branding is becoming more and 
more vital. The fight for consumers’ choice is not the concern of commercial 
companies only anymore. With multicultural companies having a budget comparative 
to small nations’ GDP or the case when one large corporation’s tax payment takes up 
the majority of nations’ budget is not a surprising fact for a long time now. Therefore, 
governments do not hesitate to help promote domestic corporations to expand in any 
way possible because it does have a significant impact on income and well-being of 
its citizens. Success of such corporation becomes success of the whole nation.  
In such circumstances, the role of foreign policy becomes even more 
important. Whoever wants to achieve a middle power status should take good care of 
its foreign services. It might consider expanding diplomatic representation around the 
world, as most of the work promoting the appealing image of the country should be 
done in foreign countries locally. 
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Table 1.3 - Explanations for Policies to Transform Small into Middle Power 
 
 
 
Socio-Economic Parameters Military-Political Parameters Foreign Policy Behavior 
Demographic policy 
Increasing Population; 
 
Government  
Well-organized bureaucracy;  
Developed institutional infrastructure 
 
Foreign policy 
Expanding foreign services;  
Taking concrete, proactive, innovative 
initiatives;  
Imposing will through building coalitions 
by using media and  political mobilization 
etc.; 
Focusing on particular ‘niches’; 
Taking leading position in resolving 
international issues;  
Mediating conflicts and cooperation with 
NGO to affect global security; 
Willingness to accept responsibility and 
commitment to implement international 
treaties; 
Gaining reputation of ‘a good citizen’ of 
international relations. 
Educational policy 
High adult literacy rate; 
Qualified human capital; 
 
Security policy 
Providing human, energy, economic and 
institutional security; 
Autonomy for the use of natural 
resources; 
 
Healthcare policy 
Low infant mortality rate; 
 
Intelligence policy 
Ability to withstand any kind of 
informational, religious, or other 
imposition; 
Economic policy 
Fully functioning domestic market; 
Affordable finance; 
Efficient economy of scale; 
Diversification of Economy; 
Higher GNP; 
Economic Independence 
 
Military policy 
Sufficient military spending; 
Having sufficient resources to apply 
power against or oppose attacks from 
similar-sized states; 
Border protection; 
Asserting influence in regional settings 
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Figure 1.1 – Model of Transformation from Small to Middle Power 
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It is also noteworthy to mention the role of international initiatives. Although it 
may seem like there is no place for small state’s ideas in international community, it 
is actually quite the opposite [137, p. 10]. When initiatives are concrete, proactive 
and innovative, they get a lot of support. With the help of creative approach e.g. 
media and social networking to affect the citizens of globe, the state may get an exact 
effect it wants. It might engage into mediating conflicts or cooperation with NGO to 
affect global security. In this way, the state takes a leading position in resolving 
disturbing issue as well as imposes its will on other states by building coalitions.  
Building a long lasting reputation of ‘good citizen’ of international relations by 
fighting for a good cause in its particular ‘niche,’ actually labels the state with pin of 
trustworthiness. Willingness to accept responsibility as well as commitment to 
implement international treaties and respect for international law at the state level 
makes potential investors and trade partners see the whole country’s citizens as such. 
Therefore, building an image of a trustworthy country is a one way to become a 
middle power.     
It is not all possible, however, without qualified human capital. Healthcare and 
education are the areas where governments’ attention along with sufficient funds and 
long-term plans should never be detracted. These are not the areas that could give 
immediate results, but they benefit tremendously in the long term. All the 
sophisticated development civil engineering plans and cutting edge technology 
adjusted to the needs of the local society is made by wunderkinds originated from 
local towns and villages. The interest to develop his/her own home country motivates 
people more than remuneration of those invited from abroad.      
On top of that, governmental institutions’ ability to plan, execute and think 
ahead in their respective areas and mobilize at the times of crisis should undergo a 
constant sharpening. Thorough implementation of all the undertaken initiatives both 
domestically and internationally are the responsibility of governmental institutions. 
Therefore, keeping the balance between excessive expanding and shortage or civil 
servants, governmental institutions should offer well-thought-out environment where 
society has an opportunity to develop the country.  
Another role of state bureaucracy in making its country a middle power is to 
provide national and human security. To be precise, providing human security 
involves economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political 
security.  They should also make sure to protect the rights of whole nation to control 
natural resources of the country autonomously and protect citizens from any kind 
economic and other disturbance.  
As a part of intelligence policy, the state should be able to protect its citizens 
from any kind of informational, religious, or other imposition. At the current 
circumstances of spread of terrorism, the work of intelligence services has become 
even more important.  
Finally, to become a middle power, the state should allocate enough on 
military expenditure. Being able to protect its border, assert influence in regional 
settings as well as having sufficient resources to affect to military coalition decisions 
is important for the state to become a middle power. At the times of crisis, such as 
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attacks from similar-sized states, it should be ready to apply power to oppose it. 
Although middle powers are known for their peaceful agenda, they attempt to get 
ready in case of attacks both militarily and joining armed alliances.  
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2 EVOLUTION OF KAZAKHSTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY 
 
2.1 Transformation of Kazakhstan into Middle Power 
Having established that in order to transform from small to middle power the 
state should undergo changes in the socio-economic, military-political as well as in 
its foreign policy behavior, this chapter checks the completion of these parameters by 
Kazakhstan. To trace the essence of the ‘Kazakhstan’s model’ of transforming into a 
middle power, changes in aforementioned parameters are studied.  
Socio-Economic Changes 
In the beginning of 1990s, Kazakhstan emerged as an independent state with 
neither the political institutions nor the staff needed to guarantee basic state’s 
functions. Demographic situation had been deteriorating with negative balance of 
migration of just over 175 thousand people yearly in average until 2002 to have 
nation’s lowest population of 14,851 thousand people [161]. However, as a result of 
tremendous measures on repatriating ethnic Kazakhs from around the world (mainly 
from China and Mongolia) as well as increasing living standards and other measures 
to boost economic growth, Kazakhstan managed to put the trend in reverse. To 
compare, in 2019 Kazakhstan’s population accounted for 18,592 thousand people 
having yearly natural growth of over 250 thousand people [161].   
Education is one of government’s highest priorities, which can be seen from 
data on the increasing number of students: 238,253 students in 1991, and 489,337 
students in 2017 got their education from colleges, while 288,400 students in 1991, 
and 496,200 students in 2017 studied at universities. In 2010, Kazakhstan officially 
joined the Bologna Declaration and became the first Central Asian state recognized 
as a full member of the European educational space. Thus, most universities joined 
the Great Charter of Universities, as well as completed the transition to a three cycles 
model of training ‘Bachelor – Master’s – PhD’ based on the principles of the Bologna 
Declaration. Moreover, there is ‘Bolashak’ international scholarship program aimed 
at training personnel and specialists for the priority sectors of the country’s economy. 
It includes both academic studies and research/production internships at leading 
companies and universities in the world. Over 24 years of implementation, 9,645 
specialists have been trained; today, there are 1,258 scholarship holders [162]. 
According to the report of the Global Competitiveness Index for 2017-2018, 
Kazakhstan ranked 57th in the ranking among 137 countries. According to the Health 
and Primary Education indicator, Kazakhstan ranked 59 out of 140 countries. 
According to the Human Development Index, in 2018 the republic was included in 
the group of countries with a very high level of development, taking 58th place out of 
189 countries. Kazakhstan’s healthcare has shown an enormous leap in developing 
the service which resulted in following results. Infant mortality has shrunk from 
28.10 in 1993 to 7.93 (per 1000 cases) in 2017. Coefficient of maternal mortality 
decreased from 77.30 in 1995 to 14.0 (per 1000 cases) in 2017. Lifespan has 
increased from 67.60 years old in 1991 to 72.95 years old in 2017 [163].   
In order to strengthen the primary prevention, the National Screening Program 
for 11 types of diseases was introduced, and the number of general practitioners 
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increased by 30%. Despite the reduction in bed capacity by 14 thousand units, in the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, the number of hospital beds is higher than in OECD 
countries by 20%, the longer average hospital stay (9.5 bed days (2014) versus 6.0 in 
OECD countries). The equipment of medical organizations with medical equipment 
increased by 25.5% (2010 – 43.2%, 6 months of 2015 – 68.7%): rural – 72.6%, urban 
– 74.1%.  
Gross national product has expanded from 11404.3m USD in 1993 to 
162 887.4m USD in 2017, and 696 USD per capita in 1993 and 9030 USD per capita 
in 2017. The amount of investments has been increasing annually from 1381.4m 
USD in 1993, to 26903.6m USD in 2017. Trade turnover in 1991 amounted to 
1 482.9m USD (910.3m USD for export, and 572.6m USD for import) and in 2017 to 
77646.8m USD (48342.1m USD for export, and 29304.7m USD for import) [163].  
The emergence of the Kazakhstan model of a mixed economy began in the 
context of an economic downturn caused by the rupture of traditional economic ties, 
price liberalization and other trends. In order to create a national structure of its 
economy, adequate to market requirements, Kazakhstan had to go a long way, to 
determine its priorities in all areas and at all levels of society and the economy. The 
imperatives of the Kazakhstani model of a mixed economy are: reintegration of the 
state and the market; property recombination; reintegration of the public and private 
sectors of the economy; social orientation of the economy; internationalization of the 
economy. 
There are several stages of the formation and development of Kazakhstan’s 
economy [164]. The first stage of economic development in Kazakhstan covers the 
period (1992-1993) from the moment of the declaration of sovereignty until the 
introduction of its own national currency. This period was marked by rather 
disturbing tendency: galloping inflation undermined the launch of market 
mechanisms and institutional transformation. The budget crisis, the disordered tax 
system, the uncontrolled outflow of capital and the aggravation of social problems – 
all this exacerbated inflation, depreciated savings and working capital of enterprises, 
thereby undermining the real base for investment and savings as factors of economic 
growth. 
The second stage of the formation of a transitional economy (1994-1998) 
began with the formation of an independent economic policy. The course on a tight 
monetary policy was used as a priority measure to stabilize the economy. A 
consistent monetary and fiscal policy was carried out, which made it possible to 
reduce the inflation from 2200% in 1993 to 7.3% in 1998 [50]. 
The main result of the second stage of reforms was a fundamentally new 
economic situation, as a result of which the transformation of a command economy 
into a market economy became irreversible on the basis of key systemic 
transformations. They include: reducing state regulation in economic life along with 
the increasingly widespread use of market regulators of socio-economic processes, 
liberalization of foreign economic activity, opening access for foreign capital, 
providing a relatively stable exchange rate regime, development of trade; practical 
implementation of the principles of free pricing using state regulation services for a 
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very limited range of products; changing the overall economic environment, creating 
conditions for the development of market-oriented economic structures, formation 
and expansion of the foundations of a mixed economy, development of 
entrepreneurship, small and medium businesses, formation of an environment for 
healthy market competition. 
The third stage of economic transformation in Kazakhstan (1999-2003) is 
characterized by the relative stability of the positive dynamics in the main 
macroeconomic indicators. The system of macroeconomic stabilization measures and 
successive market reforms along with favorable external economic factors allowed 
Kazakhstan to form the basis of a market economy. In other words, there was a 
radical change in the socio-economic system. The steady, dynamic development of 
the economy over the past five years reinforced the irreversible nature of market 
transformations. International financial centers have recognized Kazakhstan as a 
market economy country [55].  
At the same time, the world and Russian financial crisis of 1998-1999 had a 
negative impact on the progressive development of the economy of Kazakhstan. To 
solve these problems, it was decided to deepen institutional changes. Namely, 
regulatory and legal framework of economic processes has significantly expanded, a 
number of policy documents have been adopted to promote the development of the 
most significant sectors of the economy, and measures have been taken to bring the 
business environment closer to the standards of a developed market. The Republic of 
Kazakhstan has become one of the first among the republics of the former USSR, 
which managed to transform its economy in social terms:  
− powerful national investment institutions; 
− transition to market mechanisms in the sphere of housing and communal 
services which implies the full payment for cost of services by consumers, while 
remaining state support for low-income citizens; 
− introduction of market mechanisms in health care and education, 
stimulating the development of the private sector in these areas; 
− improving the processes of privatization and management of state property; 
− adoption of a set of measures to support domestic producers and the 
development of import substitution, which made it possible to begin the restoration of 
manufacturing enterprises; 
− deepening reforms in the financial sector, aimed at further strengthening 
the domestic banking sector and involving people’s funds in investment processes 
(creating a fund for guaranteeing deposits in second-tier banks, reforms in the 
insurance market); 
− decision on the formation of the National Fund of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, allowing to reduce the country’s dependence on adverse changes in price 
on world markets; 
− creation of Development Bank to expand the practice of long-term lending 
to investment projects; 
− adoption of new Tax Code, which forms a tax system aimed at stimulating 
domestic producers and revitalizing the economy. 
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The fourth stage (2004-2008) is characterized as a stage of ‘sustainable 
development’ of the economy. At this stage, Kazakhstan has taken course to socially 
oriented development: priorities for social orientation of property relations, income 
distribution, humanization of the economy, growth of national well-being. Economic 
priorities include increasing role of Kazakhstan in the global division of labor, 
industrial and innovative development, developing corporatization, entrepreneurship, 
public-private market, forming a progressive structure of social production based on 
the prevalence of the service sector, and ensuring economic sovereignty and security 
of the country [60]. 
The year 2006 gave a huge impetus to reforms in the country, becoming the 
beginning of a new stage in the implementation of the strategy, the main goal of 
which is to join the pool of 50 of the most competitive countries in the world. As a 
result of the reforms, large high-tech macro projects began to be introduced, which in 
the future will be able to change the structure of industry and exports, 30 corporate 
leading companies that are competitive on the world market began to be created. 
The global financial crisis of 2007 brought about changes in the development 
of the economy of Kazakhstan. In autumn 2007, Kazakhstan faced the first wave of 
the financial crisis. It should be noted that the Government of Kazakhstan promptly 
adopted a series of priority measures to mitigate the negative effects of instability on 
the international financial and food markets. The key areas of state support were the 
construction sector, lending to small and medium businesses, maintaining food 
security. 
The next stage (2009-present) is a period of adaptation to the new global 
economic realities, which inevitably required structural changes in the economy. At 
the same time, Kazakhstan continues to rely on building an innovative economic 
model that allows the country to emerge from the state of catching-up modernization 
and instead become regional economic leader. The emphasis is put on 
competitiveness which is understood as nation’s capacity to modernize rapidly and 
integrate into the global economic and political space. 
For ten years, Kazakhstan has been living in a dynamic economy. However, 
long-term strategy motivates society to set a new level of development, not to settle 
for what has been achieved. In today’s conditions, the risks of development as big as 
those at the first stages of formation. The higher the level of development, the more 
complex and difficult tasks come up to be solved. 
Having created optimal economic mechanisms, Kazakhstan began to accelerate 
political modernization. First of all, the country was faced with the task of adapting 
the political system to the level reached by the economy. Thus, economic success laid 
the fundamental foundations for accelerating the process of political modernization of 
the country. As a result, the evolutionary path of development ‘from economic 
reforms to political’ became the key formula for success, a feature of the Kazakhstani 
path of development. Kazakhstan today is a successful example of a country where, 
along with economic growth, political stability remains, where the restructuring and 
democratization of state power is not carried out against the background of 
upheavals, revolution and in an atmosphere of open dialogue, the balance of interests 
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of various representatives of society. It evidences the maturity and effectiveness of 
public policy, consistency and continuity of the reform process, and, therefore, of the 
possibilities to make real breakthrough as the most developed countries in the world. 
Military - Political Changes 
As regards the military-political changes that occurred in Kazakhstan to 
facilitate the transformation into middle power, it is important to note the work on 
developing governmental bureaucracy and quasi-governmental institutions. There is 
an Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan for Civil Service Affairs which is an 
authorized state body in the sphere of state service, compliance with the quality of 
public services. The agency has territorial bodies in regions, cities of republican 
significance, and the capital. The Agency manages 2 organizations: “National Center 
for Civil Service Personnel Management” Joint-Stock Company, as well as 
“Academy of Public Administration under the President of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan” Republican State-Owned Enterprise which are dedicated to preparation 
of new recruits for the governmental bodies.  
Agency had been working on the implementation of the first direction of the 
“Plan of the Nation – 100 concrete steps” to form a professional governmental 
apparatus. With the introduction of the Law “On Civil Service of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan,” the civil service of Kazakhstan is switched to a career model, according 
to which recruitment is carried out for lower positions, and promotion is only 
possible on a competitive basis. Thanks to this work, the principle of meritocracy is 
implemented. Selection for the civil service job is carried out through competence-
based approach, which shifted the emphasis from evaluating theoretical knowledge to 
measuring the personal qualities and skills of candidates necessary for effective work. 
In order to further improve the civil service, since 2018, in some state agencies 
(Agency, Ministry of Justice and Local Authorities of Nur-Sultan and Mangystau 
Oblast) a new system of remuneration for administrative civil servants is being tested, 
according to which the salary of a civil servant consists of a fixed part based on a 
factor scale and variable one called ‘bonuses.’ The system of regular training civil 
servants is now required by law, and has to be implemented at least once every three 
years. 
At the same time, work is going on to improve the quality control of public 
services. As a result of the systematic explanatory work on alternative ways of 
receiving services (such as E-Government) and the Agency’s proposals on integrating 
information systems of government agencies, the number of e-services provided 
increased by 13% (in 2017 – 50%, in 2018 – 63%), while public services received in 
paper form decreased by 10% (in 2017 – 27%, in 2018 – 17%). These measures 
allowed reduce violations in provision of public services by 3.7 times (in 2017 – 370 
thousand, in 2018 – 100 thousand) [165].  
In addition, to improving the interaction between the government and society, a 
lot of work has been done to orchestrate smooth communication among the bodies 
themselves to achieve the aims as efficient as possible. To be exact, the system of 
ensuring Kazakhstan’s national security is formed by the governmental forces, other 
state bodies and organizations within their strictly defined competence, on the basis 
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of the current legislation and unified state policy. The national security forces include 
the Armed Forces, other troops and military units of the Republic of Kazakhstan; as 
well as the bodies of national security, internal affairs, foreign intelligence, military 
and tax police, the security service of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 
the tax and customs services, emergency response services. National security forces 
interact with each other within the limits established by law, and inform each other on 
matters within their competence. Ensuring national security is obligatory for all other 
state bodies and organizations, which they carry out in their respective area as well as 
upon appeals from the national security forces. 
Governmental institutions such as General Prosecutor’s Office, Committee of 
National Security, and Foreign Intelligence Service are all engaged in the goal of 
providing human security which is achieved through protecting national interests 
determined by a set of balanced interests of citizens, society, and the state.  
From the moment of Kazakhstan’s proclamation of Independence, the task of 
ensuring the security and defense of a young sovereign state has become a top 
priority. On May 7, 1992, by the Decree of the President of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan – the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the Army of sovereign Kazakhstan 
was created. The Armed Forces of Kazakhstan are able to effectively accomplish 
tasks in accordance with the purpose of repelling aggression, armed defense of the 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Kazakhstan, protecting and 
defending state and military facilities, protecting airspace, fighting illegal armed 
groups, and performing tasks in accordance with international treaties ratified by the 
Republic of Kazakhstan. 
Kazakh army achieved its contemporary level due to the dynamic construction 
process in accordance with the views on ensuring the country’s military security, 
reflected in the State Development Strategies, the President’s Addresses to the people 
of Kazakhstan and Military Doctrines. The Kazakhstani army has gone through a 
difficult process of transition from a mass army to a compact, but well equipped, 
combat-ready Armed Forces. In the early 90s, the basis of the Armed Forces of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan was the formations and units of the former Central Asian 
Military District, as well as the garrisons stationed in the country. At that stage, the 
most important task was to preserve the existing personnel, weapons, and military 
equipment, to create the structures of the Ministry of Defense as well as chain of 
command to control the armed forces [166]. 
At the first stage, until 2002, efforts were aimed at ensuring the ability of the 
Armed Forces to solve problems of localizing and suppressing low-intensity 
conflicts. At the second stage, until the end of 2005, the goal was to ensure the ability 
of the Armed Forces to solve problems in a medium-intensity conflict, independently 
or jointly with the armed forces of the allied states. At the third stage, after 2005, the 
main task is a set of measures aimed at increasing the number of highly mobile 
military units in the Armed Forces, capable of solving complex tasks in important 
strategic areas. The budget of the defense ministries is directed to the modernization, 
restoration, overhaul and purchase of weapons, military and special rescue 
equipment, firefighting equipment, and modern communication means [167]. 
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As a result of the reforms, the size of the Armed Forces was significantly 
reduced. Their composition, location, and purpose were optimized. The ability to 
mobilize instantly and permanent readiness were taken as the basic principle. A 
regulatory framework has been developed to form three-species structure of the 
Armed Forces, including Ground Forces, Air Defense Forces, and the Naval Forces. 
Taking into account the geographical location and size of the country, regional 
commands of East, South, West and Astana were formed. This made it possible to 
create self-sufficient groups of troops in strategic areas to repel aggression and 
participate in solving problems in the event of crisis situations. 
For immediate response to any threats in the shortest possible time a group of 
Special Operations Forces has been created. In the interests of the efficient relocation 
of troops to all regions of the country, air transportation has been enhanced. To 
prevent info-psychological and cyber attacks in the Armed Forces, info-security 
(cyber) security units have been created. As part of the integration of the territorial 
defense system into the general system of ensuring military security and state 
defense, a territorial defense command body has been created as well.  
As part of the implementation of measures to develop the state and military 
command and control system to ensure military security and state defense, automated 
systems for managing troops, weapons, and resources are being introduced. Modern 
armaments and military equipment are being supplied to equip the Armed Forces, 
other troops and military formations, which makes it possible to increase the 
reconnaissance, attacking and transporting capabilities of the troops. 
In this regard, it is worth mentioning that military expenditure in Kazakhstan 
increased from 177.7m USD in 1995 to 1336.9m USD in 2017, although as a share of 
GDP it decreased from 1.0% in 1995 to 0,8% in 2017 [158, p.1]. Kazakhstani 
military use guaranteed program-oriented funding of the armed forces which provides 
a specific, time-bound, development strategy for the republic’s armed forces.  
At the same time, the funds provided for Armed Forces, other law enforcement 
agencies and intelligence is spent on the development of information systems and 
strengthening the material and technical base, rearmament, the construction of the 
border guard service of the National Security Committee, military hospitals, internal 
troops, etc. As part of law enforcement expenditures on the implementation of 
measures to ensure public safety in the event of a threat and crisis situations, fight 
against terrorism and religious extremism.  
For the sustainable and continuous support of troops in strategic areas, mobile 
and stationary components of material and technical support in the Armed Forces 
have been created. Work is underway to create integrated military logistics 
organizations of the Armed Forces, other troops and military formations on a regional 
basis. In the interests of the development of military education, the structure of 
military schools has been refined taking into account real needs. Modern educational 
technologies are being introduced into the educational process, military educational 
institutions are developing their educational and laboratory facilities, and advanced 
experience is being exchanged with foreign military educational institutions. The 
measures taken to ensure the state’s military security strengthened the defense 
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capability of the Republic of Kazakhstan and increased the readiness of the state’s 
military organization to counter military and security threats. 
Foreign Policy Behavior 
In the 1990s, the country had few diplomats; Kazakhstan’s diplomatic 
representation was initially handled almost entirely by Russian embassies. The 
government was facing absolutely new problems; first of all, the need to conduct its 
own foreign policy, create a foreign policy and defense concept, create a national 
security system, work out a foreign economic strategy, etc. Until 1991, Kazakhstan, 
for well-known reasons, did not deal directly with these problems. 
At that time, for Kazakhstan, as for all other small states, the international 
system appeared to be a determining factor. However, Kazakhstan has managed to set 
a right goal: create favorable conditions for its decent entry as a new sovereign state 
into the world community and determining its place. Therefore, the main tasks 
achieve this goal were as follows: 
− formation of the concept of national security; 
− development of foreign policy doctrine; 
− search for allies (in the sphere of international, military, defense policy, in 
solving problems of national and regional security), as well as trade and economic 
partners. 
To achieve these goals, the first initiatives of sovereign Kazakhstan was to 
show the peace-loving nature of the country’s foreign policy which is aimed at 
creating an atmosphere of mutual trust, cooperation at the regional and international 
levels, and developing equal relations with all countries and international 
organizations [45]. 
In particular, on December 2, 1991, at the press conference on the results of the 
presidential election, N. Nazarbayev for the first time outlined the contours of 
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, defining its multi-vector character noting that 
Kazakhstan should become a bridge between Europe and Asia. When asked about the 
orientation of Kazakhstan to the East or to the West, N. Nazarbayev said about the 
openness of Kazakhstan and stressed that the republic would like to have 
comprehensive (primarily) economic ties with all states of the world.  
The Kazakhstan government has shown a balanced approach on the issue of 
further developments in the post-Soviet space, preventing the former USSR from 
splitting into Slavic and Turkic unions. On December 21, 1991 a summit of the heads 
of eleven independent states was held in Almaty, as a result of which the Almaty 
Declaration was signed to establish Commonwealth of Independent States. 
Nevertheless, the concept of foreign policy was developed in a fairly short 
time. Considering geopolitical situation (including landlocked geographical position 
and trade routes), the ethno-social composition of the population, the level of 
economic development, military construction, it was decided to pursue a balanced 
diplomacy dedicated to ensuring security of Kazakhstan. In particular, the first 
Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan [1, p. 23] was dedicated 
to following areas to work on: 
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− Preserving common economic and cultural-humanitarian space within the 
framework of the CIS; 
− Entering the UN, the OSCE, and other international organizations to get 
access to international relations including achievements of world civilization in the 
political, economic, social, humanitarian, scientific, and educational fields; 
− Getting security guarantees from the United States, Russia, Britain, China to 
keep sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and inviolability of borders of 
Kazakhstan in case of refusal of nuclear status; 
− Joining main international organizations – International Monetary Fund, 
World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development – to attract 
financial resources for reforming domestic economy; 
− Activating cooperation on a bilateral basis focusing on the development of 
cooperation with neighboring countries – Russia, China, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. 
On March 5, 1992 Kazakhstan was admitted to the UN. At the 47th session of 
the UN General Assembly, the head of the Kazakh state launched an initiative to 
convene a Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia 
[168]. Kazakhstan became a member of the OSCE in 1992 and thus connected to a 
developed infrastructure of security and confidence-building measures based on the 
common value system recorded in the documents of this organization, which unites 
57 states in the area from Vancouver to Vladivostok. 
Respect and recognition of Kazakhstan by the world community led to the 
desire of Kazakhstan for a nuclear-free status and the signing by our country of the 
START I Treaty, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). In December 1994, in Budapest, a 
Memorandum on security assurances was signed in connection with the accession of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons. In accordance with this document, the United Kingdom, Russia, and the 
United States reaffirmed ‘their commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against the Republic of 
Kazakhstan except for self-defense purposes [169].’ 
On top of that, Kazakhstan paid great attention to the development of bilateral 
relations with foreign countries. In 1992, Kazakhstan’s embassies were opened in 
Turkey, the United States, and China. On January 9, 1993, the Head of State signed 
decrees on the opening of embassies in Germany, Iran, France, as well as in 
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, and Ukraine. By 1995, 111 countries of the world recognized the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, with 92 of them establishing diplomatic relations. 18 
Kazakhstani embassies were opened abroad; in turn, 36 foreign embassies and 
missions, 9 representative offices of international and national organizations were 
established in the capital of Kazakhstan [169, р. 18]. 
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At this point, in the first half of the 1990s, it could be seen that Kazakhstan’s 
diplomacy completed the main task: ensured the decent entry of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan into the world community as a new sovereign state. 
In the second half of the 1990s and the beginning of 2000s, the foreign policy 
of Kazakhstan started to play the role of a more significant player in the region. It 
was basically incentivized by international transformations associated with the 
deepening of globalization processes, as well as the growth of direct threats to the 
country’s national security emanating from the ‘southern arc of instability.’ However, 
the desire to get its own ‘niche’ could be seen quite clearly because of decisive 
actions taken by Kazakh diplomacy.   
Speaking at the Millennium Summit held in September 2000 at the 55th 
session of the UN General Assembly – the largest forum of the heads of 188 states 
and governments of the world in modern history, First President N. Nazarbayev drew 
attention to the fact that globalization, which dictates the contours of the new world 
order, can have quite a few negative consequences, largely due to the obvious 
inequality of the countries. Therefore, the Kazakh leader urged the UN to develop ‘a 
model of globalization, taking into account the interests of all, relatively speaking, 
disadvantaged countries as much as possible [52].’ 
 Therefore, in the opinion of the First President of Kazakhstan, the strategic 
task of Kazakhstan’s diplomacy now is to ‘maximize the positive aspects of 
globalization and neutralize or eliminate its negative consequences.’ At the same 
time, a special place is given to the preservation of multi-vector policy in the 
country’s foreign affairs. According to Elbasy ‘only through interdependence and 
sovereign equality of each member of the international community and unswerving 
implementation of the international law, can the potential of all countries be united to 
adequately respond to the challenges of modernity.’ 
At a meeting of the Security Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan on March 
15, 2001, at which issues of military, economic, information security, as well as 
strengthening of borders are discussed, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan 
Ye. Idrisov outlined the new Concept of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy [45], which 
took into account emerging global and regional trends. Priority areas of the concept 
based on vector diplomacy as follows: 
− developing integration processes, primarily, within the framework of the 
EurAsEC (since January 1, 2015 – Eurasian Economic Union), Shanghai Five (since 
June 14, 2001 – the Shanghai Cooperation Organization), CICA, Central Asian 
Economic Union; 
− bilateral cooperation, in which the main partners of Kazakhstan are Russia, 
China, the CIS countries, the USA, the EU countries, as well as Japan, India, Turkey, 
Iran; 
− resolving issues of the Caspian Sea; 
− working on the delimitation and demarcation of the state border; 
− development of transit transport potential; 
− resolving the problem of transboundary rivers; 
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− economic component of foreign policy, the essence of which is to facilitate 
access of Kazakhstani products to the world market, on the one hand, to attract 
foreign investment in such sectors of Kazakhstan’s economy as new technologies, 
engineering, infrastructure, agriculture, small business, on the other [45]. 
At the turn of the century, new disturbing phenomena of the time, such as 
international terrorism and organized crime, militant separatism, religious extremism, 
contradictions between and within confessions, interethnic conflicts, illicit arms and 
drug trafficking, promptly broke into lives of many people in the world. 
To counter international terrorism, religious extremism, and other dangerous 
phenomena that threaten stability and security in the Central Asian region, 
Kazakhstan has taken a number of practical measures to create mechanisms to ensure 
national security in the new environment. In this regard, foreign policy efforts of 
Kazakhstan’s diplomacy were aimed at creating effective institutions in the United 
Nations, in such influential international regional organizations as the EU, the OSCE, 
not only warning of impending conflicts, but also capable of eliminating the social 
and economic causes of conflicts at the initial stage. 
Furthermore, Kazakhstan has now admittedly become the most active 
supporter of integration on an equal and mutually beneficial basis, advocating full 
cooperation with other countries. ‘In the 21st century, as the President emphasizes, 
it’s impossible to live without integration, and we, the post-Soviet states that have 
much in common, now independent, need to think about how to help each other. And 
we can help only if we are integrated in the economy, in human relations.’ Taking the 
lead in integration, Kazakhstan drew the attention of the world community as a 
country which has its own view to the development and ready to pursue its own path 
[170].  
Speaking at the summit of the heads of state of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, President Nursultan Nazarbayev pointed out the main tasks of this 
organization: 
− ensuring stability and security in the region and in the SCO member 
countries, with particular attention being paid to countering the spread of terrorism, 
extremism, the drug business, illegal migration, and arms smuggling; 
− interaction in the economic sphere; 
− interaction in the environmental field, primarily in the border area; 
− consideration and resolution of transboundary socio-economic problems 
(transboundary rivers, migration, problems of diasporas, etc.) [105, p. 152].  
Thus, over the ten years of active and multilateral foreign policy, Kazakhstan 
has become a full-fledged respected member of the world community, developing 
comprehensive relations with almost all countries of the world, an active participant 
in major international structures and organizations, initiating many international and 
regional security and stability projects. 
To summarize, Kazakhstan’s foreign policy has made quite a few important 
steps to establish itself as a middle power promoting peace, security, and stability. 
First step was the establishment of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence 
Building Measures in Asia in 1992, the forum attempting to mitigate mutual distrust 
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among Asian countries. Second was the facilitation of Azerbaijan-Armenia Nagorno-
Karabakh negotiations and involvement of Kazakh diplomats in the settlement of the 
civil war in Tajikistan in the 1990s. Third, having received strong international 
security guarantees from the leading nuclear powers and playing a key role in 
creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, Kazakhstan actively supports 
the creation of similar zones in other regions of the world, primarily in the Middle 
East. Fourth, convening the Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions 
since 2003 which is attended by the authoritative representatives of Islam, 
Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, and Buddhism to conduct interfaith dialogue. Fifth, 
contribution to the comprehensive settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue by hosting 
in Almaty two rounds of negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 group in February 
and May 2013. Sixth, the role of President N. Nazarbayev in normalizing the 
Russian-Turkish tensions which were exacerbated after the “jet shoot-down” incident 
in November 2015. The latest is contributing to the settlement of the Syrian civil war 
hosting three rounds of peace negotiations in Nur-Sultan which included both 
political figures and representatives of the Syrian opposition [112, р. 122]. 
Thanks to such a responsible policy, Kazakhstan is rightfully recognized as the 
leader of the non-proliferation regime, a model for other states. The development of 
all political and socio-economic institutions has brought Kazakhstan to having 
diplomatic relations with over 139 countries at present [46]. The consistent and 
predictable foreign policy of Kazakhstan is a tool to promote its national interests and 
strengthen regional and global security. A balanced foreign policy means the 
development of friendly and predictable relations with all states that play a significant 
role in world affairs and are of practical interest to Kazakhstan. 
The concept of the foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan was 
developed in accordance with the guidelines set forth in the Message of the President 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan – the Leader of the Nation to the People of Kazakhstan 
Strategy Kazakhstan-2050: a new political course of the established state [64]. The 
concept reveals the strategic choice of Kazakhstan in favor of cooperation with the 
UN, which is regarded as a pillar of the modern system of global interaction, a 
guarantor of preserving and maintaining peace and a balance of interests in the 
international arena, the sustainability of the existing security architecture. 
Today, Kazakhstan is famous for not only with its uranium and hydrocarbons, 
but also as a regional leader, responsible partner and reliable neighbor. This is 
evidenced by the dynamics of relations between Kazakhstan and Russia, China, the 
United States, EU countries and Asia, and Central Asian states [65]. Another 
distinctive feature of the concept, which has a great intrinsic value, is an orientation 
toward conducting active economic diplomacy. Considering current conditions, the 
economization of foreign policy, the foreign policy strategy of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan requires modernization and promotion of national interests on the 
principles of pragmatism. 
The foreign policy concept clearly defines the foreign policy goals of 
Kazakhstan. In accordance with the national interests of Kazakhstan, the main foreign 
policy efforts will focus on achieving the following main goals [45]: 
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1) providing national security, defense, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of 
the country; 
2) strengthening peace, regional and global security; 
3) ensuring sustainable positions and the formation of a positive image of the 
state in the world community; 
4) the establishment of a fair and democratic world order with the central and 
coordinating role of the United Nations (UN); 
5) further integration into the system of regional and international trade and 
economic relations; 
6) creating favorable external conditions for the successful implementation of 
the Strategy-2050, achieving a high standard of living for the population, 
strengthening the unity of a multi-ethnic society, the rule of law and democratic 
institutions, the realization of human rights and freedoms; 
7) diversification, industrial-technological development and increase of 
competitiveness of the national economy; 
8) gradual transition of the country to the “green” path of development and 
entry into the top 30 most developed countries in the world; 
9) preservation of national-cultural identity and following its own path for the 
further development of the state; 
10) protection of the rights of citizens and legal entities of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, their personal, family and business interests abroad; 
11) support of the Kazakh diaspora and the Kazakh language abroad [44]. 
Throughout the entire period of independence, the Republic of Kazakhstan 
forms its own foreign policy strategy based on the principles of current geopolitical 
realities, existing norms of international law, the needs and conditions of a 
developing Kazakhstani society. Balancing five main vectors of its foreign policy, 
initiatives on disarmament and resolution of conflicts as well as prioritizing the 
domestic economy are the core of the Republic’s state policy for 28 years of 
independence.  
Finally, it can be claimed that Kazakhstan thoroughly matches all the 
parameters of middle powers in terms of socio-economic, military-political 
development as well as foreign policy behavior (See Figure 2.1). For this reason, it 
can be considered as a subject for further study on how one country transforms from 
small into middle power.  
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Figure 2.1 – Model of Transformation from Small to Middle Power 
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2.2 Internal Variables in Transformation of Kazakhstan into Middle 
Power 
Once it has been established that Kazakhstan did indeed transform into a 
middle power reaching all the parameters outlined in the previous chapter, it is 
suggested that reaching these parameters incorporates the influence of other factors. 
Although factors may vary from country to country, Kazakhstan’s experience 
evidences the influence of the following factors. Having natural resources, political, 
economic and social stability, as well as forward looking ideology are seen as internal 
factors contributing the transformation of Kazakhstan as a middle power.  
Resources 
In this respect, it is worth mentioning that Kazakhstan’s case of transformation 
of a small state into a middle power has been dependent on various internal and 
external factors such as the size of territory, geographical position, level and nature of 
economic development, socio-cultural and historical legacy, governmental culture 
and structure.  
In particular, territorial size appears to have influenced both public and 
policymakers’ psychological and operational environment. As is often agreed, nations 
with large human and non-human (natural) resources naturally make efforts to play a 
larger role in the world arena and they do have better chances to do so. Being 
relatively most permanent and stable factor of its foreign policy, territory determines 
both the needs and the capability to fulfill the needs of the people of a nation. It is 
suggested that availability of natural resources encouraged and helped Kazakhstan to 
adopt and pursue middlepowermanship. 
Kazakhstan is one of the richest countries in the world in terms of both reserves 
and diversity of minerals and natural resources. It is reported to have almost all 
elements of the periodic table. The republic ranks first in the world in explored 
reserves of zinc, tungsten and barite, runner-up in reserves of silver, lead and 
chromites, the third in copper and fluorite, the fourth in molybdenum, and the sixth in 
gold [9, р. 18]. Among the CIS countries, Kazakhstan accounts for 90% of the total 
reserves of chromite, 60% of tungsten, 50% of lead, 40% of zinc and copper, 30% of 
bauxite, 25% of phosphate, 15% of iron ore, more than 10% of coal. The Western 
region has significant oil and gas reserves, which make it possible to classify 
Kazakhstan among the ten largest oil-producing states in the world. This had a 
significant impact on the transformation of Kazakhstan into a middle power. 
According to Statistical Review of World Energy [171] Kazakhstan has oil 
reserves 30 thousand million tones, which accounts for 1.8% share of total world 
reserves. As reported in the estimates, resource/production ratio is 44.8 years. The 
amount of proved reserves of gas totals for 1.1 trillion cubic meters making up 0.6% 
of the world’s reserves with the resource/production ratio of 42.2 years. It can be 
evidenced by the figures for reserves and volumes of oil and gas production (tables 
2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4). 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
Table 2.1 – Confirmed Oil Reserves 
 
Countries 
1995 
mln. barrel 
2005 
mln. barrel 
2015 
mln. 
barrel 
Per cent of 
world’s total 
Reserves / 
Extraction 
Russia 113.6 104.4 102.4 6.0% 25.5 
Kazakhstan 5.3 9.0 30.0 1.8% 49.3 
Turkmenistan 0.5 0.5 0.6 Less than 0.05 6.3 
Iran 93.7 137.5 157.8 9.3% 110.3 
Azerbaijan 1.2 7.0 7.0 0.4% 22.8 
Note – Compiled from source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2016 [171] 
 
Table 2.2 – Oil production (thousand barrels per day) 
 
Countries 
2005 
thousand 
barrel 
2007 
thousand 
barrel 
2009 
thousand 
barrel 
2011 
thousand 
barrel 
2013 
thousand 
barrel 
2015 
thousan
d barrel 
Russia 9597 10043 10139 10518 10779 10980 
Kazakhstan 1294 1413 1609 1684 1720 1669 
Turkmenistan 193 199 214 220 240 261 
Iran 4216 4333 4250 4466 3611 3920 
Azerbaijan 445 856 1014 919 877 841 
Note – Compiled from source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2016 [171] 
 
Table 2.3 – Confirmed gas reserves 
 
Countries 
1995 
trln.cub.m 
2005 
trln.cub.m 
2015 
trln.cub.m 
Per cent of 
world’s total 
Reserves / 
Extraction 
Russia 31.1 31.2 32.3 17.3% 56.3 
Kazakhstan N/A 1.3 0.9 0.5% 75.7 
Turkmenistan N/A 2.3 17.5 9.4% 241.4 
Iran 19.4 27.6 34.0 18.2% 176.8 
Azerbaijan N/A 0.9 1.2 0.6% 63.2 
Note – Compiled from source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2016 [171] 
 
Table 2.4 – Gas production in billions of cubic meters per year 
 
Countries 
2005 
billion 
cub.m 
2007 
billion 
cub.m 
2009 
billion 
cub.m 
2011 
billion 
cub.m 
2013 
billion 
cub.m 
2015 
billion 
cub.m 
Russia 580.1 592.0 527.7 607.0 604.7 573.3 
Kazakhstan 9.0 9.0 10.7 10.5 11.9 12.4 
Turkmenistan 57.0 65.4 36.4 59.5 62.3 72.4 
Iran 102.3 124.9 143.7 159.9 166.8 192.5 
Azerbaijan 5.2 9.8 14.8 14.8 16.2 18.2 
Note – Compiled from source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2016 [171] 
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However, in the 1990s, Kazakhstan experienced enormous difficulties with the 
transportation of oil to the main sales markets, combined with the underdeveloped 
refining infrastructure of oil and gas production, linking Caspian oil to existing 
systems of pipelines, ports and terminals. Taking into account these conditions as 
well as the depth of oil in the shelf zone, large-scale and long-term investments, and 
expensive new technologies were required for the development of oil industry. 
Nevertheless, Kazakhstan managed to attract large foreign investments for the 
development of the oil and gas sector. Foreign capital was directed to the 
development of field exploration, reconstruction of refinery plants, transportation of 
oil and gas. In particular, in 1992, the government signed an agreement on the 
construction of a pipeline with a capacity of 60 million tons per year (Caspian 
Pipeline Consortium) between Kazakhstan, Russia, Oman, and the International Oil 
Consortium. In 1995, the state adopted the Law ‘On Oil’, signed an agreement on the 
principles of production sharing at the Karachaganak field with Agip, British Gas, 
Gazprom, Kazakhgaz. The national company ‘Kazakhoil’ and ‘KazTransOil’ were 
created to participate in the development of Kazakhstan’s largest oil and gas projects.  
Increasing oil prices and expanding export volumes enabled higher quality of 
life for the public. In particular, oil revenues rose from $6 billion to $41.5 billion 
between 2000 and 2007, making possible GDP growth at an average rate of 10% 
annually [172]. A growing share of spending (from around 4 billion USD in 1999 to 
25 billion USD in 2007) was allocated to social services, housing construction, 
transportation, and for fostering public employment [173]. Meanwhile, the population 
benefited from oil boom through other channels as well; the export growth allowed 
importing consumer goods in higher volumes [174]. Thus, the oil industry has 
become the main source of long-term economic growth in Kazakhstan. 
The growth, in turn, strengthened the credit for government policies. As 
government professionalism had advanced, it continued the work on building long-
run international investors’ confidence by safeguarding their interests against risk and 
uncertainty stemming from the oil market as well as employing the policy of what 
now can be called ‘Kazakh resource nationalism.’  
Kazakh resource nationalism is best understood as essentially economic in 
character. The rationale of this policy is to improve terms of international agreements 
for the public to obtain long-term economic benefit. In particular, it focuses on 
insuring timely construction of energy deposits; economic and social development 
which is independent of energy sector; public health as well as protection of the 
environment. 
Kazakhstan has done this in three ways: first, by increasing the state’s share of 
ownership in major projects; second, by rational use of profits to develop social 
infrastructure and implement social programs; and third, by tightening the laws 
placing more of the burden of cost overruns and delays as well as environmental 
violations on the international oil companies [175].  
Renegotiation of oil agreements had not been an easy task: actions of the 
government were alleged as attempts of nationalization, the public complained on 
low salaries for local employees. Increasing tensions between the government and 
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transnational oil companies mainly concerned three following issues: (1) forcing the 
entry of KMG national company into oil projects; (2) continuous amendment of tax 
laws; (3) compliance with environmental legislation. 
Thus, the revision of the agreements with transnational oil companies has led 
to enhancing KMG’s role as a player, increasing government oil revenues and 
ensuring the primacy of Kazakh law. The new government bargaining position and 
the reorganization of the national sector have expanded the state’s capacity to collect 
oil revenues. Generally oil companies working in Kazakhstan have to pay following 
taxes: bonuses for discoveries, mineral extraction tax, excess profit tax, payment for 
compensation of historical costs, rent tax on export, land tax, property tax, 
environmental fees, other fees (e.g., fee for the use of radio frequency spectrum, fee 
for the use of navigable waterways), value-added tax (VAT), crude oil export duty, 
and other taxes and payments [176].  
The twin goals of economic independence and development have driven 
Kazakhstan to encourage international competition both to produce and to export its 
oil and gas. First, competition to produce oil and gas enables the Kazakh government 
to maximize its share of revenue and to force firms into adopting strict local content 
policies, which are to benefit economic development. Second, competition for 
exports ensures that although Kazakhstan is landlocked, it is not forced by lack of 
substantial alternative export options to take a below-market price for its oil [177]. 
This pressure on international oil companies was driven by primarily economic 
concerns enabling Kazakhstan’s state companies to take a larger share in the industry. 
These changes did not represent a rejection of the multi-vector foreign policy that 
originally led Kazakhstan to welcome Western investment, but rather rebalance fiscal 
terms in view of changes in oil prices and rising project costs. 
Summing the section up, it can be noted that the importance of natural 
resources and oil and gas in particular has been paramount for the development of 
economy and vital element of transformation of Kazakhstan. However, this is not to 
say that the sole presence of fossil fuels is to guarantee the transformation. The 
importance of other factors should be considered as well. 
Stability 
Another factor that affected Kazakhstan to become a middle power is political, 
economic and social stability. Although it may seem like intangible factor, it did have 
an enormous effect on development of the nation. Neither international investors nor 
domestic businesses engage in any endeavor if they feel their capital is unsafe. 
Abrupt changes in the government and laws as well as social unrest discourage the 
business to grow, which, in turn, leads to growth of unemployment and other implied 
consequences.  
To avoid such a scenario, Kazakhstan has employed ‘economy first’ 
philosophy, which can be interpreted as willingness to develop the economy above 
any political or ideological preferences. This was particularly relevant in the context 
of ending legacy of communist propaganda, when the country was restricted in 
choosing trade and economic partners by their proximity to socialist ideology. Now 
Kazakhstan was finally free of any restrictions, and was strictly determined to avoid 
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the obligation to ‘choose sides.’ In other words, Kazakhstan was then, and still to this 
day is unwilling to tie itself to a single political power. For this reason, Kazakhstan 
has chosen its own way of development.  
To assure political, economic and social stability, it was not enough to win 
freedom and independence, it was necessary to defend and consolidate statehood of 
the new Republic. The main goal at dawn of independence was (1) national security, 
(2) territorial integrity, and (3) consolidation of statehood and sovereignty. Under any 
internal and external circumstances, the strategic course of Kazakhstan’s policy was 
meant to be directed at safeguarding these values. 
(1) To secure its nation, paradoxically enough, Kazakhstan has given up 4th in 
the world nuclear weapon arsenal. The first step that laid the foundation for the future 
non-proliferation policy of Kazakhstan was the closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear 
test site during the existence of the USSR on August 29, 1991. It was the first in 
world history case of closing a nuclear test site at the behest of the people. 
In 1991, as a part of Almaty Declaration on the Strategic Nuclear Forces the 
leaders of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine defined a mechanism for joint 
control over the functioning of the nuclear arsenal of the former USSR, preventing 
any failures in maintaining an adequate level of nuclear safety and reaffirmed the 
adherence of the USSR to international commitments to reduce strategic offensive 
weapons.  
On May 23, 1992, in Lisbon, representatives of these countries and the United 
States signed the five-sided Protocol, specifying their responsibility for implementing 
the provisions of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
Arms (START) in relation to those strategic nuclear forces that are deployed in four 
states. The Lisbon Protocol also contained the obligations of Belarus, Ukraine, and 
Kazakhstan to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as 
non-nuclear weapon states. 
On December 13, 1993, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). 
Kazakhstan’s accession to the NPT was an important step in the implementation of 
the country’s foreign policy. Becoming a member of the NPT, Kazakhstan strictly 
adheres to its obligations in connection with the Treaty, in accordance with which it 
has non-nuclear status [43]. 
On December 5, 1994, during the OSCE Budapest Summit, Russia, the United 
States, and the United Kingdom signed a Memorandum on the provision of security 
assurances to Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine in connection with their accession to 
the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. The signing of this document meant the 
recognition by the international community of the fact that Kazakhstan fully and 
strictly fulfilled its obligations to withdraw nuclear weapons from its territory. Later, 
guarantees of this kind to Kazakhstan were presented by China and France. 
This major gambit taken by Kazakh government has paid off. The security of 
the nation was insured by the most powerful nations in the world. The international 
image of the country transformed from an unknown ‘armed to the teeth’ country into 
an open democratic country willing to cooperate and trade with anyone. To take 
63 
 
advantage of this, Kazakhstan has been consistently pursuing multi-vector foreign 
policy. In his first Address to the Nation as a part of National Security Priority, 
President Nursultan Nazarbayev announces 5 main balanced vectors of Kazakhstan’s 
foreign policy: (a) strengthening of trusting and equal relations with Russia; (b) 
developing relations of trust and good neighborliness with the PRC; (c) strengthening 
relations with the countries of the Middle East; (d) strengthening ties with major 
democratic, industrialized nations, including the United States of America. Also, (e) 
full use of aid and assistance from international institutions and forums, such as the 
UN, IMF, World Bank, Asian, European and Islamic Development Banks [48]. 
While Russian vector remains the most important priority of Kazakhstan’s 
foreign policy in all fields, strengthening mutually beneficial collaboration with 
China is directed at economic and political cooperation. Facilitating trade is 
supported by active political dialogue on international security issues. Strengthening 
the high level of relations with the United States is characterized by a wide range of 
cooperation in ensuring international energy stability and security, fighting terrorism 
and religious extremism, and continuing democratic transformations. Kazakhstan is 
interested in developing the cooperation with the EU driven by regional and 
international security, economy, social and cultural development. Kazakhstan creates 
favorable conditions for European partners for investment activity, implementation of 
large international projects, attraction of advanced technologies and knowledge. 
Development of relations with the countries of Middle East is based on active 
participation in the structures of international cooperation and cultural exchange with 
the countries of the Muslim world, developing mutually beneficial bilateral relations 
with the majority of Islamic countries and countries of the Arab East [57]. 
(2) To insure territorial integrity of the country as outlined in the ‘Kazakhstan 
2030’ development strategy [48] there was a need to guarantee the preservation of 
state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and inviolability of borders.  
Kazakhstan began negotiations with China having formed its delegation on the 
basis of Resolution No.607 of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
of July 17, 1992 to mutually reduce armed forces and build confidence in the military 
field. Delimitation negotiations lasted from 1992 to 1998, and the demarcation was 
fully completed in 2002. The total length of the demarcated Kazakh-Chinese state 
border accounts for 1,783 km, of which the land border was 1,215.86 km, and water 
boundary is 566.89 km. The border line on the ground is marked with 688 border 
signs [45]. 
The process of delimitation of the Kazakh-Uzbek state border took place from 
2000 to 2002. Emerging problems on identifying border lines were solved on the 
basis of the principles of mutual respect and equality, taking into account the interests 
of the local population. These agreements entered into force on September 5, 2003. 
The demarcation process field work of the Kazakh-Uzbek state border itself began in 
April 2004 has practically finished.  
The agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan on 
delimitation and the demarcation process of the Kazakh-Turkmen state border was 
signed on July 5, 2001 in Nur-Sultan. The joint border demarcation activities began 
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in 2003. The installation of border marks has been completed. The total length of the 
demarcated Kazakh-Turkmen state border was about 458.3 km. The boundary line on 
the ground is marked with 330 border signs. 
Negotiations on the delimitation of the Kazakh-Kyrgyz state border were held 
from November 1999 to December 2001. The agreement on the Kazakh-Kyrgyz state 
border entered into force on August 5, 2008. The total length of the demarcated 
Kazakh-Kyrgyz state border is about 1,257 km with 683 border signs. 
Negotiations on the delimitation of the Kazakh-Russian state border continued 
from September 1999 to January 2005. In May 2009, the parties began installing 
border signs on the border between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian 
Federation. The process of demarcation of the joint state border continues. 
Thus, since independence, Kazakhstan has managed to delimit the border along 
its entire length of over 14 thousand km. This is seen as a serious guarantee of 
national security creating favorable conditions for the implementation of plans for 
state-building. 
(3) For consolidation of statehood and sovereignty upon an initiative of 
President Nursultan Nazarbayev, a new capital of Kazakhstan, Astana (now Nur-
Sultan), was built. The decision to transfer the capital from Almaty to Akmola was 
made by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan on July 6, 1994. The 
official transfer of the capital took place on December 10, 1997. By a presidential 
decree of May 6, 1998, Akmola was renamed to Astana. On 20 March 2019 Astana 
was renamed to Nur-Sultan. 
Nur-Sultan is the northernmost capital in Asia. Currently, the territory of Nur-
Sultan exceeds 722 square kilometers, the population accounts for about 1,030 
thousand people [161]. The location in the center of the Eurasian continent makes 
Nur-Sultan an economically advantageous for transport, communication and 
logistics, making it a transit bridge between Europe and Asia. 
Building a new capital gave a powerful impetus to the economic development 
of the country. The high growth rates of the city’s economy attract many investors. 
The share of Nur-Sultan in the republican volume of attracted investments is 10%, 
the share of the city’s GRP in the economy of the republic is 10.2% [68].  
The city has become one of the largest business centers in Kazakhstan. An 
entrepreneurial culture is developing dynamically; more than 128 thousand small and 
medium-sized businesses operate in Nur-Sultan. The capital is the leader in 
construction in the country; 10 million square meters of housing was erected in the 
city. 
Currently, Nur-Sultan has become the center of the Eurasian space, hosting 
various forums, congresses, and other events of international importance. Congresses 
of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions, Astana Economic Forum and other 
internationally significant events are held on a regular basis. The historic OSCE 
Summit was held in Nur-Sultan, the jubilee summits of the SCO and the OIC were 
held. In early 2011, the capital of the republic received participants and guests of the 
VII Asian Winter Games. In 2017, the international exhibition EXPO-2017 was held 
in Nur-Sultan [178]. 
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Further development of the state’s economy and the ability to quickly adapt to 
new economic conditions encouraged active participation in multilateral international 
economic projects that promote integration into the global economy, and relying on a 
favorable economic and geographical position and available resources. However, it 
was also important to put forward an idea that Kazakhstan should not be a country 
only using its resource base, but a country that absorbs everything new and advanced, 
occupying a ‘niche’ in the world economy system. To make it happen, Kazakhstan 
managed to employ the strategy of mental transformation to be discussed in the next 
section. 
Ideology 
The transition of Kazakh society from an authoritarian, one-party, 
administrative-command system to a democratic one began from the end of 1986, 
when questions of democracy, political pluralism, and sovereignty were acutely 
raised. It can be stated that it is at this time that the prerequisites for the emergence of 
civil society institutions are emerging, which allow articulating and aggregating the 
interests of society and forming the mechanism for communicating the requirements 
of society to government bodies. 
Right after getting the independence, the priorities were the construction of a 
sovereign state, the formation of civil society institutions, including the institution of 
political parties. Without serious quality changes in the political system it was 
impossible to achieve the goals of transformation. 
Strategy ‘Kazakhstan-2030’ [48] attempted to determine the role of the state in 
solving economic, social, political, ideological problems. Particular attention was 
paid to the transformation of the mass consciousness, while the main emphasis was 
placed on the younger generation, as part of society able to adapt into new conditions 
and, for demographic reasons, designed to implement strategic priorities. 
For many years, Kazakhstan has been searching for a national idea and 
prospects for creating a new state ideology. The reason for such extensive attention to 
this problem is obvious – having experienced a period of deep ideological crisis, 
Kazakhstan’s society is gradually returning to the awareness of the importance of 
state ideology as a socio-political institution uniting the citizens of the country into 
one people with their goals, values and interests. 
With the onset of the economic crisis, the ideology of ensuring a decent life for 
the people came to the fore in official discourse. It was documented in the 
Presidential Address ‘Growth of the welfare of the citizens of Kazakhstan – the main 
goal of the state policy’ in 2008, as well as ‘Through the crisis to renewal and 
development’ in 2009 [60]. 
In 2010, the Message ‘New decade of new economic growth of Kazakhstan’ 
was promulgated, which is, in fact, the Strategic Development Plan of the country 
until 2020 and, accordingly, an integral part of the Strategy ‘Kazakhstan 2030.’ The 
key priority of the Strategic Development Plan of the Republic of Kazakhstan until 
2020 is sustainable economic growth due to accelerated industrialization and 
infrastructure development. The basis of a sustainable and balanced development of 
the country in the next 10 years should be based on accelerated diversification, 
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increasing the competitiveness of the national economy, as well as a comprehensive 
increase in labor productivity. At the same time, the key factor in increasing labor 
productivity is the introduction of innovations [61]. 
On January 27, 2012, the President delivered the next Message to the people of 
Kazakhstan ‘Social and economic modernization is the main vector of development 
of Kazakhstan,’ where he noted a very important direction of modern reality. Today, 
the goal and meaning of social modernization is to prepare society for life in the 
conditions of a new industrial-innovative economy, find the optimal balance between 
the accelerated economic development of Kazakhstan and the broad provision of 
public goods, and establish social relations based on the principles of law and justice. 
An analysis of the last decade’s political life in Kazakhstan and the process of 
shaping the foundations of civil society show that the dynamics of political life in the 
country correspond to the global laws of democratized societies, although it also has 
inevitable specific features caused by the transition from totalitarian to a new system. 
The process of integration into the world economy implied the following areas: 
implementation of ‘breakthrough’ projects of international importance, the 
development of industries, production of goods and services; emphasis on the 
creation and development of production for export. 
To accomplish these goals, Kazakhstan has been focused on the renewal of 
human capital. This is because it is human capital that has a decisive resource of 
social and economic development in the conditions of the fourth industrial revolution. 
The development of human capital, in turn, requires the improvement of the 
education system, first-class healthcare and a healthy nation, and the further 
development of culture and ideology. This was the main point of the 2017 ‘Ruhani 
Zhangyru’ state program. In the view of N. Nazarbayev, the author of the program, a 
Kazakhstani should know his/her own history, language, culture, while being able to 
speak foreign languages and having advanced global views.  
As part of the implementation of the Third Modernization of Kazakhstan, three 
modernization processes will be carried out: political reform, the creation of a new 
model of economic growth, and the modernization of public consciousness. As the 
State Secretary of the Republic of Kazakhstan G. Abdykalikova [179] notes in her 
article ‘Spiritual revival is the priority of the Third Modernization of Kazakhstan’: 
Modernization of the spiritual sphere is fundamental. The success of both political 
and economic modernization depends primarily on the level of public consciousness, 
where spirituality is a priority. Therefore, the spiritual revival of Kazakhstan’s society 
today is the most important task. 
The main priorities of the national ideology of Kazakhstan are: 
1 To encourage the state authorities to pursue a policy of implementing the 
main strategic constitutional objective to assert Kazakhstan as a democratic, secular, 
legal and social state, the highest values of which are people, their lives, rights, and 
freedoms. Therefore, the constant ideological work is conducted to promote the basic 
constitutional values and national goals and objectives. 
2 To legitimize a policy of building a civilized society. It explains the 
difficulties of transition from one socio-economic system to another. It teaches to find 
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new ways to overcome difficulties associated with the transit stage of development of 
society. This ideology clarifies and reveals the meaning and content of the changes in 
all spheres of social relations. 
3 To inculcate ideas of morality based on three spiritual factors: 
First, the propaganda of national ideology, education of Kazakhstanis with the 
help of national pedagogy, stimulation of the development of national cultures, 
languages, customs and traditions, education of national patriotism on the example of 
the historical consciousness of the Kazakh, Russian, and other ethnic groups living in 
Kazakhstan. Educating young people with examples of the life and work of 
prominent historical and cultural figures is also the most important segment of the 
national ideology. 
Secondly, the national ideology forms a sense of community of common 
Kazakhstan interests. It means that the ideology will contribute to solving the 
problems of strengthening the political independence of Kazakhstan, the 
ethnopolitical and ethnocultural community of Kazakhstanis, and the moral, physical, 
and ecological recovery of the population. It actively opposes chauvinism, 
separatism, nationalism, manifestations of tribalism and ethnic isolation.  
Third, the semantic core of the national ideology of Kazakhstan consists of 
human values. Kazakhstanis, together with the world community of civilized nations, 
are striving to solve planetary problems. A philosophy of non-violence, compromise, 
tolerance is being asserted. The rejection of the war, violent methods of solving 
controversial international and inter-ethnic problems have become the imperatives of 
the outlook and thinking of Kazakhstani society. The people of Kazakhstan condemn 
any form of terrorism and extremism. 
The core of the ideology of Kazakhstan is the philosophical, spiritual and 
historical heritage of the Kazakh. It is enriched by using the humanistic, moral 
potential of the entire multi-ethnic people of Kazakhstan. Such an ideology of 
morality is an important stimulating factor in the construction of a legal democratic 
society with a socially oriented market economy.  
In general, consistency of approaches to the designed transformation of 
Kazakhstan into a middle power is inherent to the policy of the President N. 
Nazarbayev and his Annual Addresses to the Nation. The priorities of state policy 
receive a more complete, specific content each year aiming at further implementation 
of a balanced and responsible public and foreign policy that takes into account the 
interests of Kazakhstan, as well as the dynamics of regional and world development. 
 
2.3 External Variables in Transformation of Kazakhstan into Middle 
Power 
For any state, wishing to transform from a small to a middle power, the issue of 
ensuring national security and the protection of national interests in international 
relations is one of the strategic in the development of the country’s foreign policy. 
This is manifested and realized through protecting the sovereignty of the state, 
exercising its right to act as an independent subject of international relations, to 
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determine foreign policy in their own interests and independently solve international 
issues. 
It is certainly true that modern world surrounding the state carries a number of 
security threats associated with targeted impacts on the economic and military 
potential, social development, information space, the environment and other areas of 
government activity. The way how the state is capable of surviving all these security 
threats defines the place of state in the international arena. 
For this reason this chapter focuses on external factors such as geopolitics, 
international system as well as pressing international issues that affected Kazakhstan 
on its way to transformation into a middle power.  
Geopolitics 
For a comprehensive understanding of the transformation of Kazakhstan’s 
foreign policy behavior, it is necessary to analyze global, regional and national 
aspects of its formation. 
Due to the growing economic, political and other kind of interdependence 
among countries and peoples in the era of international integration and globalization, 
no country in the world can ignore the influence of external forces, regardless of its 
resource potential or degree of economic development. No country in the world is 
powerful enough to cope with contemporary problems in isolation from other 
countries. They can only be confronted within the framework of close international 
cooperation.  
For this reason, a young independent Republic of Kazakhstan chose to conduct 
a foreign policy that captures the challenges of the surrounding regional system both 
timely and adequately.  
It can be safely said that now the Republic of Kazakhstan is pursuing its 
foreign policy quite successfully. Today, Kazakhstan is a sovereign state, which is a 
full member of many international and interregional organizations, actively pursuing 
an integration policy and entering into bilateral and multilateral partnerships with 
many countries of the world. Thanks to that, today, the Republic is perceived as a 
country with a consistent and predictable foreign policy which priorities stability and 
constructive dialogue [180].  
Of all the Central Asian states, Kazakhstan appears to be the most equipped to 
integrate into world economic relations. The country occupies a leading position in 
Central Asia in terms of economic growth and accounts for more than 60 percent of 
the entire region’s GDP. Kazakhstan leads among the CIS countries in terms of 
foreign investment per capita. The republic is ahead of other post-Soviet states on 
such criteria as internal stability, the adequacy of the legal framework, the creation of 
a modern financial system. A powerful economic foundation, laying the foundations 
for a liberal market economy, timely modernization of the political system and other 
factors allowed Kazakhstan to take a worthy place in the world community and set 
ambitious foreign policy goals [181]. 
However, this is the result of the tremendous work that has been done by the 
state over the period of independence. After gaining sovereignty, the country faced 
many complex economic, environmental and political problems. So, it had to 
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determine its place in the system of geopolitical coordinates as soon as possible, 
formulate its national interests, and build a system of foreign policy priorities.  
On top of that, there were a number of problems that stand in the way of the 
development of a region. The closed geographic location makes the region vulnerable 
from a geo-economic point of view. The states of Central Asia do not have their own 
access to the seas and oceans, which hinders their dynamic interaction with the 
outside world. Central Asian states adhere to different models and rates of economic 
and political modernization [182]. The economies of the countries of the region have 
serious structural problems, and Central Asia as a whole is an insufficiently 
competitive region in the context of globalization [183]. There are many 
contradictions between the states of the region, including in the energy and water 
sectors. 
Another important issue in the Central Asian region (CAR) is the complex 
military-political situation, due to its geographical position, current geopolitical 
situation, and the latest domestic political events in a number of countries in this 
region. The political and economic interests of the leading world powers that intersect 
here also have a great influence on the situation [184]. The collapse of the USSR and 
the countries of the socialist community, which put an end to the rigid division of the 
world into two opposing camps, coincided in time with the onset of large-scale 
qualitative changes in the geopolitical structure of the CAR countries. 
In the states of Central Asia, the struggle for the redistribution of intensively 
spent natural and, above all, energy resources, spheres of influence and traffic flows 
is intensifying. The most attractive for the leading countries of the world in this 
context is the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is potentially a 
springboard for strengthening its geopolitical position in the region, an important 
source of energy resources, especially taking into account the unstable situation in the 
Middle East [185]. 
One of the major priorities of Kazakh diplomacy remained to be deepening and 
expanding friendly and mutually beneficial relations with the closest neighbors of the 
Central Asian states. At the same time, the country’s leadership intended to actively 
expand cooperation with other Asian countries and states of the Islamic world [186]. 
This is because Islam for many centuries has been the religion of the Kazakhs and 
many other peoples living in the country.  
There is no doubt that the success of the foreign policy largely depends on the 
prospects and practical use of regional cooperation. Through regional integration, 
small and middle powers get a chance to create a platform for the most valuable 
connections and have a voice in solving their key problems.  
At the present stage, Kazakhstan urges its neighbors to pay more attention to 
the economic, social, environmental and demographic problems of the Central Asian 
region. It strives to work out coordination of activities and achieve better compliance 
of national development programs with other countries in the region [187]. Only by 
pooling resources, coherence and compatibility of regional policies, especially in the 
area of trade, energy and transport, are Central Asian countries able to avoid 
becoming the objects of interests of leading world powers.  
70 
 
The creation of joint clusters in key sectors of the national economy based on 
mutual interests will help strengthen business ties [188], rapprochement and mutual 
understanding between Kazakhstan and Central Asian countries. Based on the 
progress achieved in various spheres of life, Kazakhstan is working to become a 
driving force for regional development and contribute to the modernization of all of 
Central Asia. 
On top of that, Kazakhstan comes up with a number of extraordinary initiatives 
that find wide response in the world community. And this quantity has transferred to 
a new quality. The Republic invariably pursues a policy of upholding its national-
state interests, implying, above all, territorial integrity and sovereignty, well-being of 
citizens and the protection of their constitutional rights. 
The case that illustrates the how Kazakhstan resolves issues at the regional 
level is the issue of Caspian Sea. At present, the value of the Caspian region in the 
global system of geopolitical and geo-economic coordinates is steadily increasing. 
The Caspian region is an interweaving of political, military-strategic and economic 
interests of many countries, and not only coastal ones [189]. The strategic importance 
of the Caspian Sea is determined by the presence of large reserves of minerals, as 
well as transport corridors that provide for the delivery of energy resources [190]. 
Possessing a significant resource potential, as well as a unique geographical 
location that allows transporting hydrocarbons to both European and Asian energy 
markets, the Caspian region occupies a special place in the system of national 
priorities of both coastal states and other great powers.  
Coastal countries realizing their national interests in the Caspian, first of all, 
were guided by geopolitical motives, which exacerbated the issue of determining the 
international legal status of the reservoir.  
According to the Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 
2014-2020 [45] and its national interests, the main foreign policy efforts focus on 
strengthening peace, regional and global security, further integration in the system of 
regional and international trade and economic relations, and a phased transition of the 
country to ‘green’ development path.  
In this regard, in resolving the issue of the status of the Caspian Sea, 
Kazakhstan has been committed to the principle of legality and legitimacy. Resolving 
such a disputable issue was possible only through such fundamental principles of 
conducting middlepowerman foreign policy as equality, respect for sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, mutual trust, and aversion to actions that violate international 
legal norms [191].  
For example, on July 6, 1998, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian 
Federation concluded an Agreement on the delimitation of the bottom of the northern 
part of the Caspian Sea in order to exercise sovereign rights to subsoil use and on 
May 13, 2002 a Protocol to this Agreement. 
On November 29, 2001 and February 27, 2003, an Agreement was signed 
between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Republic of Azerbaijan on the 
delimitation of the bottom of the Caspian Sea between the Republic of Kazakhstan 
and the Republic of Azerbaijan and its Protocol, respectively. 
71 
 
Also between Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Russia, on May 14, 2003, an 
agreement was reached on the point of junction between the lines of delimitation of 
adjacent sections of the bottom of the Caspian Sea. 
On December 2, 2014, an agreement was signed between the Republic of 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan on the delimitation of the bottom of the Caspian Sea 
between the two countries (entered into force on July 31, 2015). 
The Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of 
the Caspian Sea, which entered into force on August 12, 2007, was signed on 
November 4, 2003. It contains the main provisions for regulating the anthropogenic 
impact on the marine environment, the protection of biological resources and the 
general interaction between the parties with regard to measures for the protection of 
the Caspian ecosystem. 
Following the four Summits of the Presidents of the Caspian states, many 
declarations, agreements and protocols were signed, enshrining a wide list of 
principles in accordance with which coastal states will operate at sea. These 
principles are taken into account to draft Convention on the Legal Status of the 
Caspian Sea. 
To prevent any disputes regarding the ownership of oil fields and / or territories 
between countries, in August 2018 the presidents of the five Caspian states have 
signed the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, which put an end to 
the issue of the separation of the seabed and surface of the sea. The signing ceremony 
was held in Aktau: Nursultan Nazarbayev, Ilham Aliyev, Hassan Rouhani, Vladimir 
Putin and Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov signed the historical document. They agreed 
that the main surface area of the Caspian Sea will remain in the common use of the 
states. It was decided to divide the bottom and subsoil between neighboring states 
into areas on the basis of international law. The parties also agreed on the rules of 
shipping, fishing, scientific research and laying of main pipelines. At the same time, 
all work is to be carried out taking into account environmental safety. According to 
the Convention, the presence in the Caspian of the Armed Forces of non-regional 
powers is not allowed. Responsibility for the maintenance of maritime security and 
the management of its resources lies with the countries parties to the Convention. The 
parties agreed to adhere to fundamental principles, including the transformation of 
the Caspian Sea into a zone of peace and good neighborliness, friendship, its use for 
peaceful purposes, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-presence of 
armed forces not belonging to the parties in the Caspian Sea. 
In this regard, one might notice that Kazakhstan’s foreign policy is directed at 
finding the optimal balance of interests, harmonizing the main directions of foreign 
policy, foreign economic, military policy, assessing the real possibilities of all 
participants involved in cooperation. This is done through achieving compromises on 
the basis of long-standing good-neighborly relationship at the regional and 
interregional level.  
International System 
Currently, Kazakhstan has sufficient economic potential and international 
reputation, allowing it to play a more active role not only in Central Asia, but also far 
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beyond its borders. Kazakhstan’s foreign policy initiatives are world renowned. The 
reputation of Kazakhstan as a member of influential international organizations is 
growing. The Republic initiated convocation of the CICA and holding congresses of 
leaders of world and traditional religions, as well as an active supporter of the 
development of dialogue between East and West.  
However this has not always been so. In the beginning of independence, many 
states and international organizations did not have reliable information about 
Kazakhstan and were often misled by outdated information regarding its capabilities, 
its people and economic potential. It was necessary to make Kazakhstan recognizable 
in the international arena, and create a positive image of the country within the entire 
world community. 
In these difficult conditions, the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
assumed all the burden of responsibility for the development of the international 
policy of the state. As many foreign and domestic experts admit, N. Nazarbayev 
played a huge role in introducing Kazakhstan in the global political space. 
In particular, a new foreign policy strategy was developed to incorporate the 
principle of multi-vectorism, which still remains to be the main guideline for the 
country’s international activities. The First President N. Nazarbayev defined multi-
vectorism as the development of friendly and predictable relations with all states that 
play a significant role in world affairs. To be exact, he stated: “Kazakhstan, due to its 
geopolitical position and economic potential, cannot focus only on narrow regional 
problems. This would reflect neither the will of multinational population, nor the 
entire world community’s. The future of Kazakhstan is in Asia, and in Europe, and in 
the East, and in the West. Only by pursuing this kind of policy, we will be able to 
secure ourselves from a threat. We will be able to strengthen favorable external 
conditions for economic and political transformations in our country [192]”. 
It is widely known that Central Asia is of strategic interest from the United 
States, China, Russia and other great powers. Particular attention is shown by the 
United States, which has significant financial resources and potential influence on the 
international community. The United States view Central Asia as an established zone 
of their national interests therefore they are making significant efforts to develop 
cooperation with Kazakhstan [193].  
Washington is interested in cooperation with Nur-Sultan on mutually beneficial 
conditions, especially in the oil business and the military-technical sphere. The policy 
of the leadership of Kazakhstan is aimed at increasing the flow of foreign investment 
in the country. The main investor in recent years is the United States, which has 
invested more than $ 5 billion in the economy of Kazakhstan and plans to provide 
investments in the oil and gas industry up to $ 200 million. The increased economic 
influence of the West on the country [194], in particular Turkey, may lead to the fact 
that a new “southern axis” may emerge in the region, cutting off Russia from 
promising sales markets.  
At the same time, China, since the early 90s, is deliberately moving towards 
Central Asia. Since 1993, the PRC has been a major importer of oil, and the 
successful reforms of the Chinese economy increasingly strengthen its dependence on 
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energy supplies [195]. Hence, the expression of interest in the exploration of oil 
reserves in Kazakhstan. 
Common interests of the PRC and the countries of the region led to the signing 
in 1996 between Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan the Agreement on 
confidence-building in the military field in the border area, in 1997 the Agreement on 
mutual reduction of armed forces in the border area. Further development of relations 
in the region contributed to the formation of the Shanghai Five, which was then 
transformed into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Beijing considers 
the SCO as a reliable tool for strengthening regional security and developing 
multilateral relations [196]. 
It can be said that the organization can form the basis of the collective security 
system of the entire Central Asian region, organically fit into other regional 
organizations operating in close cooperation with the UN. The PRC strengthens 
cooperation with Russia and the Republic of Kazakhstan, other countries of the 
region not only through the special services, but also the Ministries of Defense. Proof 
of this are the successfully conducted multilateral joint military exercises ‘Anti-
terror’ with the participation of China, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and 
Tajikistan, which have shown that many armies in the world today have common 
threats, including terrorism and extremism. 
At present, China’s efforts are aimed at strengthening security in the CARs, as 
this is in its interests and in line with new areas of national security policy. The 
penetration of USA into Kazakhstan is perceived by Beijing not only as a factor of 
aggravating economic competition, but also as an attempt of military-political and 
economic deterrence. As for Russia, Chinese diplomacy is based on the recognition 
of the traditional political and economic interests of the northern neighbor in the 
region and its leading role in the field of regional security. 
The Russian direction in the foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan has 
always been one of the most important due to the geopolitical neighborhood, political 
weight in the system of international relations, the economic potential of the Russian 
Federation and other factors [197]. The traditional positions of Russia in Kazakhstan 
are based on factors that are long-term in nature and are determined by such 
categories as geography, geopolitics and history; they are also united by their 
historical community, spiritual, cultural interpersonal connections. 
The Russian factor largely determines the foreign policy situation around 
Kazakhstan at the regional and international levels. Russia occupies a special place in 
the military-political sphere, serving as a leader and guarantor of regional security. It 
is important for Kazakhstan to be not a stake in the external political game, but a 
factor in Russia’s geopolitics. It is also obvious that the nature of bilateral relations 
between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan at the present stage 
will be determined by the new complicating geopolitical situation in the region of 
Central Asia, which was formed as a result of the antiterrorist operation in 
Afghanistan and the American military-political presence in the region. 
The transformation of the Central Asian region into a new field of political and 
military confrontation contradicts the interests of Russia and bears a direct threat to 
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its security. For Russia, it is important that the CARs be a zone of stable dynamic 
development, not burdened by any internal or external sources of tension, open to 
mutually beneficial cooperation. Therefore, the Russian Federation is concentrating 
its efforts on key areas, primarily on ensuring regional security and stability in 
Central Asia. This contributes to the strengthening of stability and security in the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, the creation of favorable conditions for the recovery of its 
economy. 
Unlike past eras, Central Asia is no longer an area for the Great Power Games, 
Central Asia and its member states now play a number of serious positions. This is 
not a ‘platform’ for the clashes of other, more powerful powers, but an independent 
party with its own interests, which are articulated openly in the public. As Laumulin 
[198] once stated that ‘Kazakhstan has become a player who imposes on others, more 
powerful external players, to a certain extent, of course, their own rules of the game.’ 
Kazakhstan is a partner that tries not to bind with excessive promises and 
preserves maximum space for geopolitical maneuver both in bilateral and multilateral 
relations, and within the framework of international organizations. That is, the 
countries of the region are increasingly perceived by the Western expert community 
as independent political units, rather than ‘objects of influence.’  
Kazakhstan pursues a balanced policy of constructive and predictable relations 
with all the major powers of the modern world. It is obvious that to a large extent, the 
security of Kazakhstan depends on relations with such neighboring states as Russia, 
China and our neighbors in Central Asia. Kazakhstan is committed to developing a 
strategic partnership with the United States, strengthening cooperation with the 
European Union. 
Thus, Kazakhstan is increasingly becoming a factor of stability for the whole 
region. Security is also important for economic success. This is the main priority of 
its foreign policy. There are various mechanisms for containing threats to security 
and stability, but, nevertheless, none of them have a comprehensive nature and do not 
provide for the full participation of all states. 
Thus, foreign policy of Kazakhstan is now immersed in initiating ideas for the 
concept, nature and structure of international security. The initiatives of Kazakhstan 
are taken into account in conceptual approaches to resolving problems of regional 
and international security. 
In addition to bilateral relations, Kazakhstan pays a great attention to the 
establishment of dialogue with universal and regional international organizations 
[199], introducing the country to world economic relations, ensuring the security in a 
complex multilateral environment, achieving compromise on mutually-respected 
interests, and creating favorable international conditions for transformation. 
For example, Kazakhstan, being a responsible UN member, fully supports 
peacekeeping activities and the efforts of the United Nations to strengthen its 
peacekeeping capacity. Evidence of Kazakhstan’s active participation in this activity 
is the creation of the Kazakhstan Peacekeeping Battalion (Kazbat), whose units 
served in the stabilization forces in Iraq, Afghanistan and other hot spots of the 
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planet, participating in peacekeeping operations. In 2017-2018 Kazakhstan served as 
a non-permanent member of UN Security Council. 
Being a member since 1992, Kazakhstan had a chance to chair the OSCE in 
2010, holding a Summit for all 56 member countries of the largest regional 
organization currently involved in security and conflict prevention. This is evaluated 
as a milestone of recognition of Kazakhstan as a middle power. First, the 
chairmanship of Kazakhstan to this organization was voted ‘for’ by unanimous 
decision. Second, the Summit was attended by all the major heads of states, which 
showed how respected Kazakhstan is. Third, Kazakhstan managed to set its own 
unbiased agenda to the Summit.  
Constant diplomatic work of Kazakhstan in the frame of Commonwealth of 
Independent States, Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in 
Asia, Collective Security Organization, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 
Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation, Council Cooperation of Turkic speaking States, and other international 
organizations and forums, envisions to put forward the following: 
− ensuring protection of national interests in the process of development and 
making decisions of regional and global character in various spheres; 
− constructive participation and contribution to regional and global security; 
− promotion of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy initiatives; 
− establishment of optimal and mutually acceptable ways of cooperation 
between regional and international organizations and forums in order to provide 
stability and security in the region; 
− advancement of political – legal and organizational – administrative 
functions of regional and global organizations in order to increase effectiveness of 
their work. 
To sum up, one might note that the gist of the influence of international system 
on the transformation of Kazakhstan into a middle power can be traced as follows. 
First, the steady improvement of the country’s position is based on it being an 
active, yet impartial, actor in regional events. Second, building solid bilateral 
relations based on mutual trust and solidarity. Third, Kazakhstan has gained entry to 
several international organizations of large importance. The country’s recent track 
record is as follows: in 2010, it became the first Central Asian, post-Soviet and 
predominantly Muslim country to chair the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the world’s largest security oriented 
intergovernmental organization, and chaired the Council of Foreign Ministers of the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation the following year. By leading nuclear arms 
reduction efforts, Kazakhstan is poised to play an even larger role by presenting 
‘Manifesto. The World. XXI Century’ at the Washington Summit. Finally, it joins the 
UN Security Council as a non-permanent member which is evaluated as the highest 
international recognition. 
International Issues 
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Last but not least Kazakhstan has managed to transform into a middle power 
because of pressing international issues such as globalization, terrorism, and 
transportation.  
Kazakhstan, as any other country, is forced to face the challenges from a 
globalized world. The state is now involved in large-scale integration into the world 
community, various partnerships and close cooperation in global affairs, including 
economic, environmental and social.  
One of the major issues is globalization, featured as a process of unification of 
traditions, cultures, religion and ideology. This is directly related to Kazakhstan, 
because the multiethnic and multiconfessional nature of the republic raises the 
question of maintaining the linguistic and cultural identity and originality of the 
traditional culture of the Kazakh and other peoples of Kazakhstan. The country takes 
the course of revival and development of the Kazakh culture, so that it is competitive 
with Western culture. In particular, the state necessitates a constructive dialogue of 
the values of the traditional culture of the peoples of Kazakhstan and the liberal-
democratic society. 
It is widely agreed that Kazakhstan has several possible options for further 
historical development, one of which is the transformation of culture into the Turkic-
Islamic world, with which the original community has national roots in language, 
traditions and customs. At the same time, there is a Muslim culture which attempts to 
dominate, although secular views often hold stronger significance [200]. Finally, 
‘Eurasian cultural space’ [201], which is actively being promoted these days,  may 
turn out to be the most likely promising way of developing Kazakhstani culture in the 
XXI century. This is because it suits the geopolitical position of the country and 
chosen path of foreign policy. 
Another major point into consideration is co-existence of cultures with 
diametrically opposite values, ideologies, historical traditions. Although the world 
has recently been experiencing a number of inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts, 
Kazakhstan has managed to build unique model of a society of interethnic and inter-
confessional accord, known as ‘Kazakhstan’s way’.   
Moreover, at the beginning of the 21st century, at the time of internally 
clashing religions and terrorist attacks, Nursultan Nazarbayev, the First President of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan initiated holding the Congress of Leaders of World and 
Traditional Religions in Kazakhstan.  
The first ever Congress welcomed the Leaders of World and Traditional 
Religions from 13 countries of Europe, Asia and Africa. Since 2003 the number of 
countries and participants has increased exponentially. Over the years, Kazakhstan 
has welcomed six Congresses with the total of 366 delegations.  
The Congress has established its institutional structure, which includes 
Working group and the Secretariat as well as Council of Religious Leaders 
identifying the agenda of the Congress. To keep the historical memory of the 
Congress, the Museum of Peace and Reconciliation was opened and Astana 
International Prize for Contributing to Interfaith Dialogue was established. 
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The initiative of the Republic of Kazakhstan to hold the Congress of Leaders of 
World and Traditional Religions in Kazakhstan generated great interest among the 
world community. At the Sixth Congress as a part of the Declaration, the participants 
proposed the establishment of Center for Interfaith and Inter-civilization Dialogue in 
recognition of outstanding contribution of the First President of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan to global efforts to foster peace and harmony. 
Among all international issues, countering terrorism has always been one of 
the top priorities in ensuring Kazakhstan’s national security. Kazakhstan strongly 
condemns terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and stands for the adoption of 
the collective efforts of the world community to combat this phenomenon [112,                       
р. 115]. 
Kazakhstan strictly fulfills the requirements of the UN Security Council 
Resolution and submits an annual National Report on the work done to the UN 
Counter-Terrorism Committee. The creation and active participation in the activities 
of the International Counterterrorism Coalition has been supported. 
Kazakhstan believes that international cooperation in the fight against terrorism 
should be carried out in full compliance with the norms of international law, and also 
supports the further improvement of anti-terrorism treaty mechanisms, including the 
adoption of a Comprehensive Convention on Combating International Terrorism. 
In December 2003, by order of the First President of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan in order to improve the efficiency of the work of all security agencies in 
the fight against terrorism and religious extremism the Anti-Terrorism Center was 
created. The ATC focuses on coordinating the activities of all special, law 
enforcement and other agencies in the fight against terrorism [112, р. 116]. 
Organizations that involved in or support terrorism are prohibited in 
Kazakhstan. Organizations are recognized as ‘terrorist’ if their goals and activities 
contradict the Constitution and the Laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan and 
international treaties to which the Republic of Kazakhstan is a party; if there is a 
potential danger of enhancing the functioning of these organizations to destabilize the 
situation in the states of the Central Asian region. 
The national list of terrorist and extremist organizations whose activities are 
prohibited on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan includes 16 foreign 
structures (Al-Qaeda, Asbat al-Ansar, Muslim Brothers, Boz Gurd, Zhamaat 
Mujahideen of Central Asia, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Party of 
Eastern Turkestan, Kurdish People’s Congress, Taliban, Lashkar-i-Taiba, Hizb-ut-
Tahrir, Tablighi Jamaat and Society for Social Reforms, AUM Shinrikyo, 
Organization for the Liberation of Eastern Turkestan, Jund-al-Khilafat (Caliphate 
Soldiers) [112, р. 117]. 
Understanding that the fight against international terrorism and extremism 
requires the interaction of states at all levels (global, regional and bilateral), the 
republic has signed a number of international and interstate treaties and agreements in 
this area. 
Great importance is attached to the development of regional cooperation 
currently represented by the activities of the Antiterrorist Center of the 
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Commonwealth of Independent States, the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, as well as in the framework of measures taken in 
the fight against terrorism and extremism of the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization. 
Practical interaction is employed among the CIS member states that are part of 
the Anti-Terrorism Center established at the initiative of the First President of 
Kazakhstan in 2000 [190, р. 57]. The procedure for organizing and conducting joint 
anti-terrorism measures in the territory of the Commonwealth countries has been 
determined. The mechanism of its operation was successfully tested during the large-
scale joint exercise of special services and security agencies of the Commonwealth 
countries ‘Caspian-Anti-terror 2005’ held in Kazakhstan in August 2005. 
The IV Special Meeting of the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the UN 
Security Council held in Almaty on January 25-28, 2005, with the support of the 
initiative of the heads of the CIS states, evidences the recognition by the international 
community of the important role played by the Commonwealth countries in the fight 
against international terrorism.  
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is becoming a significant 
component of ensuring security and stability, a regional and global political factor. 
Within the framework of regional and subregional counterterrorism cooperation, 
measures have been taken to strengthen the legal framework for countering terrorism 
in the SCO format. The SCO Convention Against Terrorism was signed, as well as 
the SCO Agreement on the training of personnel for anti-terrorist formations and on 
cooperation in the fight against trafficking of weapons, ammunition and explosives. 
The Statute on Political-Diplomatic Measures and Response Mechanisms of the SCO 
to Situations Threatening Peace, Security and Stability in the Region has been 
ratified. The program of cooperation of the SCO member states in the fight against 
terrorism, separatism for 2010-2012 has been approved [111, р. 40]. 
Since January 1, 2004, the SCO operates the Executive Committee of the 
Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS) in the city of Tashkent. Since the 
establishment of the SCO Regional Antiterrorist Structure, interaction has been 
established with the regional office of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime in Central 
Asia. 
In the format of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), an 
Agreement on Collective Rapid Reaction Forces (CRRF) was signed, the tasks of 
which include the fight against terrorism. The relevant regulatory legal acts regulate 
the organizational aspects of the creation of the CORF. The list of organizations 
recognized as terrorist and extremist in the territories of the CSTO member states has 
been adopted [105, р. 151].  
In 2010, Kazakhstan chaired the OSCE having vast experience in the military-
political field and great potential for its implementation in concrete actions. As part 
of the military-political dimension, more than 60 events were held. On October 14-
15, 2010, a Conference on the Prevention of Terrorism was held in Astana. As a 
result of the conference, the Astana Declaration was adopted, confirming the 
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commitment of the OSCE participating States and partner states to the fight against 
terrorism [105, р. 151]. 
In addition, the issues of cooperation in the fight against terrorism on an 
ongoing basis are raised in the framework of the Subcommittee on Justice and Law 
‘of the Republic of Kazakhstan - the European Union.’ 
Kazakhstan participates in the implementation of counter-terrorism activities in 
the framework of the Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO. Cooperation 
with the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council is expanding. An indicator of confidence 
in Kazakhstan was the holding of the 3rd NATO / EAPC Security Forum and the 
Rose-Roth Inter-Parliamentary Workshop in Nur-Sultan on June 24-26, 2009. 
The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism was launched by the 
Presidents of Russia and the United States in July 2006 with the aim of creating an 
international multi-level protection system and is aimed at strengthening the 
interaction of the world community to prevent nuclear weapons from falling into the 
hands of terrorists. Ensuring reliable control over the use, storage and trafficking of 
nuclear materials, physical protection of nuclear facilities, the development of 
effective means to reduce the risk of the consequences of possible terrorist attacks 
using nuclear materials, improving the legal framework for international cooperation 
and domestic systems for the suppression of any type of crime, related to the illicit 
movement of nuclear materials. 
Kazakhstan was one of the first to join this initiative and was among the 
original partners along with Australia, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Canada, China, 
Russia, the USA, Turkey, France and Japan. RK took an active part in the first two 
meetings held in October 2006 in Rabat (Morocco) and February 2007 in Ankara 
(Turkey). The third meeting took place on June 11-12, 2007 in Nur-Sultan. To date, 
88 countries are already participating in the Global Initiative [112, р. 120]. 
In accordance with the initiative of the First President of Kazakhstan, 
announced at the Global Summit on Nuclear Safety in Washington in April 2010, the 
holding of a conference of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism 
(GICNT) in Kazakhstan from 28 to 30 September 2010. The GICNT Conference on 
Counteracting the Financing of Terrorism and the First Meeting of the 
Implementation and Evaluation Group (GROG) were held in Nur-Sultan [112,                                      
р. 121]. 
Kazakhstan, which voluntarily renounced possession of the fourth largest 
nuclear arsenal in the world, regards the Initiative as a new effective step in 
countering nuclear terrorism. The support of the Russian-American initiative 
confirms our country’s firm commitment to strengthening international security and 
the collective efforts of the world community in the fight against terrorism. 
Kazakhstan supports the efforts of the international community in the fight 
against terrorism, as well as develops comprehensive cooperation and interaction in 
practice. 
For example, the tense military-political situation in Afghanistan, the threat of 
terrorism and extremism, drug trafficking coming from this country, affect regional 
security in Central Asia.  
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In this regard, Kazakhstan is convinced that the Afghan problem can be solved 
on the basis of three approaches: the interdependence of security and development, a 
regional approach to ensuring security and development, as well as adopting a 
coordinated integrated and regional development strategy in order to increase the 
level of international humanitarian assistance from UN agencies and other donors. 
This intense concern and decisive willingness to solve the problem can be 
explained by several factors. Kazakhstan and Afghanistan are separated by mere 
1,500 kilometers. The two countries have no direct borders, but there are common 
neighbors: Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.  
Over the past few years, Kazakhstan has taken a number of efforts to contribute 
to enhance the situation in Afghanistan. First, it went on to work on bilateral 
cooperation which now can be characterized by positive development dynamics. 
Contacts at the highest and governmental levels have intensified, inter-parliamentary 
and business ties are being strengthened. 
Second, the parties cooperate productively within the framework of 
international and regional organizations. Kazakhstan is a member of the Working 
Group of Collective Security Treaty Organization for Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan. Also, it is a member of a contact group for interaction and coordination 
of efforts of the SCO member countries to recover the IRA. Afghanistan is a co-
coordinator of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in 
Asia (CICA) to control drug trafficking, as well as new challenges and threats. 
Third, the political leadership of Afghanistan and large representatives of local 
business circles are showing interest in further developing trade and economic ties 
with Kazakhstan. To be exact, the key areas of cooperation are agriculture, railway 
construction, attracting investment, military-technical cooperation, land and air 
transport.  
Fourth, according to the Foreign Ministry, Kazakhstan has provided assistance 
to Afghanistan of approximately $75 million. This amount includes training of 
Afghan citizens in Kazakhstani universities, the delivery of food, clothing, essential 
goods and the implementation of the construction of infrastructure facilities.  
In particular, Kazakhstan-Afghanistan state educational program has been 
implemented since 2009 to train thousands of Afghan students in educational 
institutions of Kazakhstan.  
In addition to financial aid, investment projects are also being implemented. 
For example, Kazakhstan is currently considering the proposal of the Afghan side to 
launch a pasta factory in one of the Northern provinces as well as repairing the road 
Talukan - Kunduz - Shirkhan – Bandar. 
Last but not least important international issue is transportation. In this regard, 
it is important to point out that Kazakhstan has made great efforts to integrate into 
international transport networks. Internally, a number of sectoral programs have been 
adopted; the legal basis of the industry has been formed to build the new socio-
economic reality. A competitive environment for the provision of transport services 
has been created. Over the past 10 years, about $ 30 billion has been invested in the 
development of the transport industry. More than 2 thousand km of railways were 
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built, 6.3 thousand km of roads were reconstructed, port capacities in the Caspian 
were increased to 26 million tons, runways for 15 airports were reconstructed. 
Externally, on the border with China, in order to develop international trade, 
the Khorgos-Gateway FEZ has been completed. Along with the industrial and 
logistics zones, the FEZ infrastructure also includes the Dry Port, which was 
launched in 2015 to consolidate and distribute cargo in the east of the country [180,                              
р. 65]. 
Kazakhstan is actively cooperating with China on mutually beneficial 
conditions for the development of infrastructure associated with the new economic 
policy of Nurly Zhol and the ‘One Belt, One Road’ concept. It is China’s 
international initiative to improve existing and create new trade and transport 
corridors connecting more than 60 countries of Central Asia, Europe and Africa, 
which is designed to promote the development of trade relations between them and 
China [180, р. 65]. 
The idea of forming the Silk Road Economic Belt was put forward by the 
leader of China Xi Jinping and was first voiced during his speech in Nur-Sultan as 
part of a state visit to Kazakhstan in September 2013 [180, р. 66]. 
In March 2015, the Concept and action plan for promoting the joint 
construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Sea Silk Road was 
published, which more clearly presented the concept and plan of cooperation under 
the ‘One Belt, One Road’ framework. 
To sum up, perspectives of the further development and intensification of 
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy activities on these and other international issues depend 
on the completion of the strategic tasks set by the government and the President of 
the Republic.  However, one might notice that Kazakhstan having its own unique 
pressing issues has been able to adapt and adequately respond which, in turn, help the 
country not only to survive but to transform into a more influential power.  The way 
how Kazakhstan dealt with problem of multiethnic and multiconfessional society, the 
way it attempts to solve the problem of terrorism and Afghan underdevelopment, as 
well as the way it resolves the problem of landlocked country show the nature of 
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy.  
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3 KAZAKHSTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY PROSPECTS 
 
3.1 Comparing Kazakhstan’s Transformation with International 
Experience 
In the previous chapters it was elaborated on how Kazakhstan has transformed 
from a small to a middle power developing in different area of public policy. To be 
exact, the public policy has worked on to initiate changes in military-political as well 
as socio-economic fields. Along with that, Kazakhstan managed to advance in 
international cooperation both bilateral and multilateral, which benefitted the country 
not only economically but socially and politically as well. This model suggest the 
idea that it is indeed possible for a country willing to transform into a middle power 
to do so in the matter of 30 years depending on availability of certain resources and 
circumstances.  For this reason, we attempt to test this model on the case of following 
countries: Turkey, South Korea, and Malaysia. This is explained by the necessity to 
study various strategies and main driving forces of economic development as well as 
future prospects of such endeavors. The experience of the dynamically developing 
Turkish, South Korean, and Malaysian economy, in particular, their successful 
transition from a raw material to an industrialized economy, can be used both for 
certain theoretical conclusions and in practical terms, including in the framework of 
upcoming strategy of Kazakhstan’s economic development. 
Testing the Model: the case of Turkey 
Turkey today is considered a middle power, attracting increasing attention with 
its way of development as well as political prospects. In this chapter, we will look at 
how, in the course of almost 100 years, Turkey has turned from an undeveloped 
country into a middle power, and also analyze how these changes coincide with the 
transformation model discussed in previous chapters. Although Kazakhstan and 
Turkey are very different, the tasks Turkey faced in 20th and early 21st centuries are 
similar to those challenges met by Kazakhstan in many ways. 
Politics and Society. Turkey has been developing to achieve middle power 
status since mid-1920 s. In particular, the changes concerned two main fields: 
national capabilities and foreign policy. The former includes GDP, population, 
military spending, the clear progress of which can be see right from the initial 
decades (table 3.1)  
 
Table 3.1 – Information on population, GDP and Military Spending of Turkey in 
selected years 
 
Years 
Population 
(people) 
GDP 
(million USD) 
Military Spending 
(million USD) 
1 2 3 4 
1930   N/A 742 49.3 
1940 17 820 950 1 741 147.3 
1950 20 947 188 3 462 236.6 
1960 27 472 331 13 995 1 769 
1970 34 876 267 17 087 3 175 
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Continuation of the Table 3.1 
  
1 2 3 4 
1980 43 975 921 68 789   6 772 
1990 53 921 699 150 676 10 770 
2000 63 240 121 272 980 16 890 
2010 72 326 914 771 902 14 050  
2017 80 745 020 851 549 19 580 
Note – Compiled from source [158, p. 1; 202, 203] 
 
One can notice the similarity of how the states typically attempt to transform. It 
illustrates in what way and in what conditions national capabilities increase 
complemented by respective foreign policy behavior. 
First similarity between Kazakhstan and Turkey’s transformations is state 
modernization and state-focused society. Turkish modernization, which began since 
Mustafa Kemal, was initiated and carried out mostly by the state and the President 
himself [204]. It was first intended as a response to the increasing superiority of the 
West, but eventually turned into a competitive edge against the world community as a 
whole. Unlike Kazakhstan’s modernization, where a much more emphasis was placed 
on the economy, Turkey focused on the cultural transformation of society and its 
westernization. The military-bureaucratic elite focused on building a ‘modern’ 
society through raising the level of education of citizens as well as instilling secular 
values. 
In 1923 the new Turkish state adopted a new form of government with a 
president, a parliament, a constitution. After a long and difficult war for 
independence, Turkey was in a difficult situation. To become a strong state and gain 
world powers’ respect it was necessary to modernize Turkish society, industry and 
agriculture, and as a result, get a strong economy. The President’s reforms are a series 
political, legislative, cultural, economic and social changes that made the Republic of 
Turkey contemporary secular national state. Kemal’s reforms included changes in 
fundamentals of life on the one hand, and on the other, they imposed revolutions on 
domestic behavior of ordinary people. 
Another similarity is political transformations which included the 
implementation of the principles of Kemalism: nationalism, laicism, étatism, 
republican thinking through their continuous development and adaptation to modern 
needs and conditions [204, р. 390]. Political reforms have brought so fundamental 
changes in society that many traditions of the Ottoman society began to disappear, 
and the whole system of the society of the former Ottoman Empire was revised and 
overturned.  
For instance, in 1924, a new Turkish constitution was adopted which replaced 
the interim constitution of 1921. It was formulated in accordance with the European 
norms of the time. In addition, reforms in governance and education were implied to 
secularize the country even more. Shariah court proceedings were abolished, Shariah 
laws were beginning to be replaced by codes and laws from developed European 
countries and adapted to Turkish realities [205]. In addition, Swiss civil, Italian 
criminal and German commercial codes were introduced and polygamy was 
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prohibited. the ban on the wearing traditional, religious clothing was introduced. 
Some of the reforms were objected by the conservative part of society [206]. 
However, thanks to single party system and military control reforms were finally 
implemented.   
The reforms of the political system were incremental. One of the last stages 
took place in 1935, when religion was separated from the state, the state was 
officially proclaimed as secular and democratic. Islam was no longer public religion 
of Turkey. Unicameral parliament (Majlis) was established. The basic principles of 
the constitution were laicism, social equality, equality of all citizens before the law. 
The Republic of Turkey was declared a unitary national state based on the principles 
of secular democracy. For the first time, the government was officially divided into 
legislative, executive and judicial branches. 
Economic Reforms. Like in Kazakhstan, great importance was attached to 
economic policy. Ataturk’s reforms in the economic sphere were aimed at the 
development of industry and entrepreneurship. To maintain the rate of the Turkish 
lira, first a temporary consortium was created, which included the Ministry of 
Finance and the country’s largest banks. Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal and 
the members of the Majlis in 1924, Business Bank was created, whose activities are 
aimed at assisting in the development of industry and the economy [207].  
Social sphere experienced a number of changes as well. Secular educational 
institutions have come to replace religious schools, and all the educational institutions 
were unified under state’s leadership. Along with that, Kemal attached great 
importance to the emancipation of women, fought against wearing religious veil, 
instilled European dances in Turkey, so thanks to his reforms in the field of 
education, women-doctors, lawyers, teachers, etc. started to appear. In 1934, women 
of Turkey received voting rights [204, р. 391]. 
One can find resemblance of Kazakhstan and Turkey’s transformations in the 
reforms of language. As Kazakhstan has planned out to introduce Latin alphabet, in 
Turkey in November 1928 Arabic alphabet was replaced by the Latin as well. All 
citizens between the ages of 16 and 40 were required to attend educational 
institutions to learn the new alphabet. Officials who did not know the new alphabet 
were dismissed. Prisoners who did not master the new alphabet were not released. In 
1934, the Turks got their surnames; the National Assembly gave Mustafa Kemal the 
surname Ataturk which means ‘Father of the Turks.’ By special law it was forbidden 
to carry this name to anyone else. 
As Kazakhstan in the beginning of its independence, Turkey’s foreign policy 
was focused on international agreements of friendship, neutrality, good-neighboring 
policy. Having no means to conduct large-scale goals, the country preferred to refrain 
from active participation in international affairs. Turkey acted through the 
International Court of Justice or settled disputes through negotiations. This gave rise 
to a policy of neutrality, which was carried out up until a new great war. 
Turkey appeared to secure itself with a number of defensive treaties, while 
trying not to spoil relations with the major powers of the anti-Hitler or Hitler 
coalition. On the other hand, the strategic location of the country provided an 
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opportunity to restore sovereignty over the Turkish straits after signing the 1936 
Montreux Convention, lost at the Peace of Lausanne, and also to regain control of 
Antioch-Alexandretta, which the French tried to include as a part of 1939 Syrian 
Mandate. 
Turkey remained neutral throughout the Second World War. When the Allied 
forces seized insisted on using Turkish territory to fight the Nazis, Ankara did not 
consent and demanded the weapons promised in the agreements to take care of its 
own protection. This decision is believed to protect the country from ‘liberation’ by 
Soviet troops, otherwise it would have become the part of socialist world [208]. 
When the war ended, President İnönü realized that in the face of heightened 
rivalry between the Western and Soviet blocs, Turkey should join the West. The 
decision was taken mostly because of security interests rather than ideological or 
spiritual adherence. Turkey was expecting to restructure its domestic policy, so it 
would be better assimilated into the western camp that encourages political 
competition. 
Foreign Policy. Turkey began to receive economic assistance from the United 
States, first in accordance with Truman’s program providing for economic support to 
underdeveloped countries and then with the Marshall Plan. In 1949, Turkey became a 
member of the Council of Europe and other international organizations such as 
NATO and later OSCE [208, р. 274].  
At the height of the Cold War, individual members of NATO had to have close 
relations with the American leadership. For Turkey, this leadership was acceptable 
for two reasons. First, it was vulnerable to the threats posed by the Warsaw Pact 
countries. Second, it was economically weak and dependent on the military and 
economic assistance. Relationship with the alliance gave Turkey an opportunity to 
modernize its military equipment, improve military training and increase defense 
capabilities.  
On January 4, 1980, the Council of Ministers changed the rules protecting the 
Turkish lira introduced during the Second World War. Numerous restrictions on the 
possession, transfer and sale of foreign currency were lifted. Turkey has become a 
‘trading state,’ where economic considerations were taken over governmental 
protectionism.  
The choice was made to favor export-oriented economic growth that caused a 
radical transformation mechanism. Soon, exports went into growth, hard currency 
increased, the economy began to grow by leaps and bounds. These changes marked 
the beginning of the growth on the basis of export, which is still continuing today 
[209]. After a relatively short period of time, the Turkish economy was integrated 
into the international market and turned into the 17th economy in the world and the 6th 
economy of Europe in terms of GDP. Turkey has also become a member of the G-20. 
End of the cold war marked the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw 
Pact. This meant that NATO countries had fewer restrictions on foreign 
policymaking and closer relations with former adversaries, including Russia [210]. 
This was the starting point of a new foreign policy.  
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Focus on trade encourages Turkey to look for new markets around the world. 
In addition to the immediate neighbors such as Russia and the former Soviet 
republics, it also included the Balkan states and the countries of the Middle East, 
Africa, China and the rest of Asia, as well as major Latin American states. All of 
these markets have become important targets for Turkish economic expansion [211]. 
To summarize, it can be noted that Ankara successfully balanced its weaker 
and stronger positions which made it a significant member of international 
community. It can be clearly seen from the relationship built with great powers over 
the years as well as domestic policy.  
Testing the Model: the case of South Korea 
Surrounded by such giants as China, Russia and Japan, adversary North Korea 
as well as having a limited set of natural resources, the Republic of Korea has 
managed to become a middle power. Today, many researchers in International 
Relations not only recognize the country as a middle power [150, р. 23; 212-214], but 
also as a leader in many sectors - cyber security, electronics and IT, transport 
engineering, etc. The developments in the number of population, GDP, military 
spending can be seen in the table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2 – Information on population, GDP and Military Spending of South Korea 
in selected years 
 
Years 
Population 
(people) 
GDP 
(million USD) 
Military Spending 
(million USD) 
1960 25 012 374 3 958 760 
1970 32 240 827 8 999 2 129 
1980 38 123 775 64 981 9 520 
1990 42 869 283 279 349 15 346 
2000 47 008 111 561 633 20 395 
2010 49 554 112 1 094 000 31 117 
2017 51 466 201 1 531 000 37 560 
Note – Compiled from source [158, p. 1; 217] 
 
Politics and Society. In just about four and a half decades, the Republic of 
Korea has demonstrated its rather successful path of foreign-oriented economic 
development. Modern modernization of South Korea is linked with Park Chung-hee, 
who despite having contradictive views on his personal qualities and political 
activities, has played an enormous role as head of state. 
General Park Chung-hee came to power in May 1961 as a result of a coup 
d'état by the military junta. This was the beginning of a 30-year period of reign in the 
history of South Korea. In October 1963, Park Chung-hee retired and was elected the 
President of the country, then he was re-elected twice in 1967 and 1971 [215]. His 
18-year authoritarian leadership was marked by great changes and his main 
achievement was the Korean Economic Miracle or Miracle on the Han River. In his 
three presidential terms, Park Chung-hee went from mainly authoritarian to ‘Korean-
style democracy [215, р. 749].’ 
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Like Kazakhstan, South Korea has focused on the economy. However, this 
economic growth was achieved through the promotion of the national idea and social 
reforms. Park Chung-hee published the book Korea Reborn. A Model of 
Development [216] written in his youth, where he very accurately and specifically 
described his vision of the revival of Korea and the ways of building a strong and 
economically advanced country. 
The national idea was defined as follows: the centralization of power to 
achieve the goals of economic growth, well-being of the citizens and industrial 
development; strong nationalist democracy of world standards based on the revival of 
national identity and independence of the nation through stable economic growth. 
The basis of the economic recovery of the country was chosen mechanism of long-
term strategic planning, rather than daily orders and decrees, and elimination of 
corruption in the government. The President encouraged the nation to cooperate with 
the government and vowed to respect economic freedoms and the material rights of 
the individual. By this he united the nation and ensured the stability of the 
development of society. He urged them to fulfill the ancient Confucian canon, 
according to which everyone must first achieve economic freedom and only then 
think about freedom of spirit [215, р. 745]. 
Thus, seven national development priorities were identified, which were 
included in the first five-year development plan of 1962-1966 [215, р. 746]: 
− development of energy sources for the needs of the national industry; 
− correct, but constant transformation of economy structure; 
− growth of industries affecting the improvement of people’s living standards; 
− education; 
− creation of economic conditions for the growth of individual 
entrepreneurship; 
− improving the balance of payments; 
− advancing technological development based on global advances. 
The state also employed slogans such as:   
− We Koreans are the most industrious nation. 
− We Koreans are the best workers in the world. 
− We Koreans are the most disciplined nation of working people. 
− We are ready to bear any hardship for the greatness of the spirit of the 
Korean nation. 
Economic Reforms. Having taken the path of export-oriented development, 
South Korea pursued a policy of strict import restrictions from the early 1960s to the 
mid-1970s. Its priorities were to protect the interests of national producers and ensure 
the needs of export industries in the necessary industrial equipment, as well as raw 
materials, semi-finished products and other components. 
The ruling circles effectively mobilized the entire potential of South Korean 
society for the development and conquest of worthy positions on world markets, but 
at the same time used the entire arsenal of trade policy for a limited and controlled 
rapprochement of their country with the world community. An important factor 
contributing to the effectiveness of such a strategy was the special nature of the 
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generation of South Korea at the time and the specifics of US-South Korean relations. 
Allied contacts with the United States were and continue to be extremely important 
for Republic of Korea not only for economic processes (including the creation of all 
elements of a market economy), but for providing the key condition for the 
development of an export-oriented economy as well as the possibility to use United 
States as the main market for South Korean industrial products [218]. 
It should be noted that in the 1950s – 60s the economy of South Korea 
depended on the inflow of American aid, which in those years accounted for up to 
40% of the budget (in 1970 there was a decrease to 5%). The main part of this aid 
was directed to create infrastructure and heavy industry enterprises. From 1946 to 
1976 Korea received $ 4 billion as gratuitous aid and $ 1.2 billion in the form of 
concessional loans [218, р. 179]. 
Established with the cooperation with American TNCs, the companies, 
manufacturing electrical and electronic products, were mainly aimed at the 
manufacture of goods for export. In the 70-80s, about 70% of the products produced 
at these firms were exported abroad. Thus, American TNCs, using South Korean 
manufacturing enterprises as links of their global economic structure, within the 
framework of intra-firm trade and the system of subcontracts, ensured the inflow of 
South Korean electrical products to the United States. As a result, the share of South 
Korean products in US imports for 1965-85 increased 10 times (from 0.3% to 3%). In 
1985, imports from South Korea accounted for 13% of all textiles and clothing 
import into the United States, 12% of consumer electronics, and almost 9% of steel 
[219]. 
Having signed the agreement on accession to the GATT in 1967, South Korea 
managed to preserve significant import restrictions until 1975. But since the second 
half of the 1970s foreign economic policy has come to a new stage based on gradual 
liberalization of imports. However, the process was uneven, having occasional 
setbacks. Thus, the oil crisis of 1979-80 forced the government to suspend the 
adjustment of import policy [220]. At the same time, the level of import liberalization 
by 1983 has grown to 80.4%. In 1984, the government adopted a three-year program 
of foreign trade liberalization. All this allowed the country to achieve to 95% by mid-
1990s. 
The next stage in the liberalization of the South Korean import policy was the 
preparation of national economy to modify the rules of international trade in the 
transformation of the GATT in the WTO in 1989-94. Government measures 
suggested streamlining tariffs, that is, eliminating import preferences for individual 
companies, reducing the average tariff burden on importers. By lowering quantitative 
restrictions on the import of foreign goods, South Korea closed the thirty-year stage 
of protectionist policies and adopted an economic strategy for greater openness. 
In the 1990s, South Korea had to accept the loss of the preferential regime of 
access of its goods to the American market. In December 1996, the Republic of 
Korea, after three and a half decades of successful economic development, with the 
entry into the club of the world’s leading economies, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) acquired the status of a developed country. 
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At the same time, it also had its negative consequences such as the loss of preferences 
that developing countries get in foreign markets. As a result, in the 1990s, there were 
significant changes in the geographical distribution of South Korean foreign trade. 
The share of the United States was almost halved (from 35.5% in 1985 to 14.4% in 
2004) in exports and (from 22% in 1985 to 11.9%) in imports of South Korea. At the 
same time, the share of East Asian countries and, mostly, China, in the foreign trade 
turnover of Korea has almost doubled. Thus, the share of the East Asian region in 
South Korean exports increased from 27.2% in 1985 to 47.6% in 2006, including 
China and Hong Kong from 5.2% to 28%. During these years, South Korean 
exporters began to feel increasing pressure from Chinese and other competitors from 
developing countries in the American market [221]. The trend was marked when the 
share of light industry products and assembly production from South Korea in 
American imports of products from these industries was successfully superseded by 
products from China. For example, the share of South Korean consumer electronics 
has declined over the years from 6% to 4.6%, whereas the share of similar products 
of the PRC grew in US imports from 5.5% to 7.5%. 
Contrary to the concerns expressed, the gradual liberalization of foreign trade 
not only did not harm the national industry, but also pushed for progressive changes 
and competitiveness, for example, in such industries as ferrous metallurgy and 
shipbuilding. In 2001, South Korea became the world’s largest shipbuilding power, 
concentrating on the production of specialized vessels for transportation of liquefied 
gas (70% of world production), large tankers and container ships. 
With the exception of the remaining limits on the import of agricultural 
products, import restrictions now apply only to a small segment of goods and services 
(medicine and cosmetics). Still, South Korea is accused by foreign trade partners in 
the hidden support of the domestic automotive industry by countering car imports. 
However, these cases represent only the latest relapses of state protectionism and do 
not affect the government’s strategic course towards import liberalization. 
Another important tool to regulate foreign economic policy was currency 
regulation. After using the multiple exchange rates until the early 1960s, South Korea 
adopted export-oriented course of development. Korean Won was fixed at a single 
exchange rate which exporters sold the currency to the Central Bank. In 1965-74 a 
policy of floating exchange rate was pursued. However, in order to maintain the 
preferential balance between export and import for the economy, a devaluation of 
Won was carried out several times during these years. In 1975-80 securing the 
exchange rate to the dollar allowed on a significant scale to attract from abroad short-
term loans to finance export industries. Since January 1980, South Korea began to 
use the principle of maintaining the exchange rate on the basis of a ‘currency basket.’ 
This made it possible to maintain the stability of the national currency and take into 
account the diversification of foreign economic relations. Since March 1990, South 
Korea has set Won at market rate at is keeping its monetary policy unchanged since 
then [222]. 
90 
 
Foreign Policy. In this regard, it is worth mentioning the pillars of South 
Korea’s foreign policy. While transforming into a middle power, South Korea’s 
foreign policy has been shaped around next internal and external constraints [223]: 
1 North Korea: North Korea has always been an issue in South Korea’s foreign 
and security policy. The constant threat from Pyongyang has affected Seoul’s public 
policy since the end of Korean War.  
2 Cooperation with the United States: The role of United States defending 
South Korea from North Korea has been an important factor in country’s defense and 
foreign policy.  
3 The economy: The development of the South Korean economy was an 
important factor that influenced relations between South Korea and the outer world, 
as it led Korean companies to look for markets outside of Korea. Another factor was 
the rising need for energy, which caused Korea to depend on Persian Gulf’s oil and 
gas.  
4 Changing status: South Korea has transformed in political, economic, and 
military power, which has affected its regional and global status. Since the 1990s, 
South Korea has debated the meaning and essence of its new global role as a middle 
power.  
5 China: Since China and South Korea have established relations in 1992, the 
economic relations have improved. China has become the biggest trade partner of 
South Korea and it became leverage on Korea’s economic policy in Asia.  
Thus, the emerging need to modernize the South Korean economy prompted 
the government to pursue a liberal course in foreign economic policy. However, one 
can notice that Korea did not curtail state participation in the development of foreign 
economic relations straightaway. Although the state rejected methods of direct 
intervention in the economic activities of private commercial structures, as well as 
avoiding direct forms of export support and import restrictions, it involved in using 
other mechanisms of influence. The priority was to maintain partnerships with large 
businesses, which determined the scale, dynamics and nature of the development of 
foreign economic relations of the country. Another important place was occupied by 
economic diplomacy, which was actively pursued both at the bilateral and 
multilateral level. Information and analytical support for the foreign economic 
activity of private businesses also took a large place in state policy [224]. 
To sum up, for South Korea, openness and desire to integrate with the regional 
economy has become part of a strategy to preserve sovereignty. It went along with 
large South Korean businesses. Joining international business alliances has become 
an important condition for strengthening their position in the competitive struggle on 
world markets. At the same time, in its relations with outer world, South Korea seeks 
to find a balance of interests, based on the prevailing nature of the development of 
bilateral trade and economic relations. In an effort to preserve the diversification of 
its foreign economic relations, South Korea, from the beginning of the 21st century, 
initiated negotiations and signing free trade agreements with a number of countries, 
including Chile, Singapore, the United States, Mexico, India, Japan, China, and 
Canada. 
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Testing the Model: the case of Malaysia 
Currently, 40% of Malaysia’s total exports are electronic and electrical 
products. With the growth of industrial exports, its raw material component decreased 
from 95% in 1957 to 30% in 2010. According to 2017, the country’s GDP amounted 
to 314. 7 billion US dollars, while population achieved substantial 30 million people 
and military expenditure accounted for 3.5 billion US dollars (table 3.3).  
 
Table 3.3 – Information on population, GDP and Military Spending of Malaysia in 
selected years 
 
Years 
Population 
(people) 
GDP 
(million USD) 
Military Spending 
(million USD) 
1960 8 157 106 1 916 205 
1970 10 803 978 3 864 727 
1980 13 798 125 24 488 1 513 
1990 18 038 321 44 024 1 488 
2000 23 185 608 93 790 2 010 
2010 28 112 289 255 017 3 447 
2017 31 624 264 314 700 3 505 
Note – Compiled from source [158, p. 1; 225] 
 
Politics and Society. Like in Kazakhstan, the effectiveness of the economic 
development strategy of Malaysia is determined by many factors: political stability 
and continuity of economic policy, political will and high professionalism of the 
leader Mahathir Mohamad, flexibility of social and economic policy and the creation 
of a system of economic partnership between the state and business. The strategic 
approaches of the state were based on the quick response to changes in the external 
and internal conjuncture, professional measures that correspond to the broader goals 
of economic development, modern approaches, taking into account the specifics of 
the country. 
Having become prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad began the practical 
implementation of his ideas, which turned Malaysia into a modern state with a highly 
developed economy, independent domestic and foreign policies, and building a 
society based on ‘Asian’ and ‘Malaysian’ values [226]. He pursued an active policy 
of positive ethnic discrimination, which significantly increased the role of Malays in 
all spheres of the country’s life, and most importantly, the economy. Over the period 
of 30 years, thanks to his efforts, the New Economic Policy (1971-1990) and the 
National Development Policy (1991-2000) were successfully implemented in 
Malaysia. 
Economic Reforms. In order to track the transformation of Malaysia into a 
middle power, we shall take a closer look into strategic priorities of Malaysia from 
the moment of independence and up until now. This is because strategic priorities 
changed following progress of Malaysia’s economy and society and can be divided 
into three main defining stages. 
At the first stаge of development of Malaysia (1957-1968), a policy of import 
substitution was carried out. Like Kazakhstan before independence, the national 
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economy of Malaysia was almost entirely dependent on its metropolitan state, British 
capital, which was primarily interested in investing in natural rubber production (32% 
of world production in 1957), tin (37% of world production in 1957), extraction of 
forest resources and their further export abroad. For labor support of this activity, 
migrants from India and China were attracted. This had turned the country into a 
multinational society [227].  
After independence was gained, the government concentrated its efforts on the 
rapid development of labor-intensive industrial enterprises (those with low capital 
intensity and high labor intensity, and using local raw materials) and diversification 
of agricultural production produced in Malaysia at that time. For example, there was 
a shift of emphasis from the production of natural rubber to the production of palm 
oil and other crops.  
As a result of the efforts made to diversify agricultural products, the share of 
natural rubber in Malaysian GDP fell from 38% in 1952 to 15% in 1967. Palm oil 
production increased significantly: from 90 thousand tons in 1960 to 396 thousand 
tons in 1970.  
Also significant success was achieved in industrial development. The share of 
agriculture in Malaysia’s GDP declined in constant 1960 prices from 46.5% in 1955 
to 36.1% in 1966. By creating infrastructure at public expense and then transferring 
these plots to private capital, the government began to create industrial centers such 
as Petaling Jaya, located close to Kuala-Lumpur. 
The share of manufacturing in GDP grew from 11.2% in 1955 to 15.4% in 
1966. From 1964 to 1968, GDP increased by 38%, increasing annually (at current 
market prices) by 6.5%. As a result, the volume of GDP from 1965 to 1970 increased 
from 8,637 million to 11,190 million ringgits [227, р. 440]. 
During the second period, from 1968 to 1982, unlike Kazakhstan, Malaysia 
had to cope with ethnic problems. Therefore, the country attempted to enter a new 
phase of economic development by accelerating manufacturing industry. To change 
the country’s economic course, the government introduced New Economic Policy 
(NEP) since 1971.  
The main goal of the NEP was to eradicate poverty of certain ethnic and 
increase the participation of the indigenous population, Malays (Bumiputera) in the 
corporate sector, where in 1970 only 2.4% belonged to the Bumiputera, 33% to the 
non-indigenous population (Chinese, Indians) and 63 % - to foreign investors. The 
goal was to achieve by 1990 the ratio of 30-40-30, respectively [227, 450]. The 
government began a policy of nationalization, buying and transforming companies 
with foreign capital, creating companies whose equity capital belonged to the 
indigenous population. 
The new economic policy envisaged an active, essential role of the state in the 
economy of Malaysia. On the one hand, state intervention in the economy through the 
granting of all possible licenses and quotas (the Industrial Coordination Act of 1975) 
and state regulation of prices limited the development of the market. On the other 
hand, the state pursued a policy of comprehensive support of the private sector and 
the promotion of private investment in export-oriented sectors of the economy.  
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In the 1970s Malaysia’s GDP increased by an average of 8% per year, largely 
due to high commodity prices on world markets. The previous policy of import 
substitution, due to the natural limitations of the domestic market, was already 
holding back the growing potential of the national industry. Malaysia has embarked 
on export-oriented industrialization, a gradual transition to the production of 
industrial products with higher value added. 
The third period (1982–1999) was directed at export growth. The 
government’s policy on FDI at this stage was caused by a number of factors, 
including the economic downturn of the mid-1980s, a sharp appreciation of the 
Japanese currency in 1985, which led to the opening of enterprises in Malaysia 
(mainly focused on production of electronics) thanks to investment flows from Japan 
and Taiwan. The investment attractiveness of Malaysia for foreign investors was 
greatly promoted by the labor policy pursued by the government, the main focus of 
which was placed on the creation of new jobs, giving the protection of workers’ 
rights and the development of labor legislation a secondary role. Malaysia in this 
period occupied one of the leading places in attracting foreign FDI.  
At present stage (2000 - present), the strategy of turning Malaysia into a 
modern, high-tech state by 2020 is being successfully implemented. ‘Doctor M’ has 
established himself as a tireless critic of double standards in the international policies, 
policies of Western countries and the IMF, a fighter for the rights of developing 
countries, Asian countries and Islamic states. 
The new economic policy and the National Development Policy have built the 
main core of the development strategy of Malaysia. For example, the state provided 
various fiscal and non-fiscal benefits to enterprises only if 30% of the corporate 
capital belonged to the indigenous population [228]. In the light of the instability of 
the world economy and the dependence in this connection of the export-oriented 
economy of Malaysia on the world situation, certain liberalization is being carried out 
at the present. 
The key role of the economic development strategy of Malaysia at the present 
stage is played by Vision 2020, with the goal to achieve Knowledge Economy by 
2020. The implementation of the concept of building Knowledge Economy is 
considered logical, consistent step towards enhancing the competitive advantages of 
the national economy.  
Summing up the economic development, it can be noticed that Malaysia has 
successively gone through the phases of import substitution, export orientation, has 
created an industrial economy and is currently developing the concept of building 
Knowledge Economy. Thanks to the import substitution strategy implemented in the 
first years of independence, it was possible to create the country’s industrial base. 
The development of exporting has become a continuation of import substitution. The 
main focus was on attracting foreign investment in the export-oriented industry. The 
result of export-oriented growth was changes in both the export structure and the 
Malaysian GDP structure. Implementing a policy of stimulating the inflow of foreign 
investment, specialists, and technologies to the development of export-oriented 
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sectors of the economy, Malaysia managed to change the raw material nature of the 
national economy, becoming a new industrially developed country [229]. 
Foreign Policy. As for the international affairs, Malaysia’s foreign policy is 
based on its strategic position in Southeast Asia, which contributes to the 
development of trade relations. Since the country’s independence, foreign policy has 
undergone some changes under the influence of internal and external factors, but this 
has not affected the basic principles [230]. For Malaysia, participation in the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations as well as the development of relations with 
the states of this intergovernmental organization is important. Since 1970s, foreign 
policy of Malaysia is characterized by a far-sighted and pragmatic view, as well as 
the focus on attracting additional foreign investment in the economy of the country. 
Malaysia has become a member of the United Nations, supports the policy of 
multilateralism in promoting global freedom and security. Malaysia is actively 
involved in UN peacekeeping operations. The country actively cooperates with 
developed countries in the development of production. Since the majority of the 
population in the country is Islam, it is important for Malaysia to participate in the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Malaysia pays special attention to the 
development of relations with its neighbors: Brunei, Thailand, Indonesia and the 
Philippines.  
Malaysia has gradually expanded its foreign representation. For example, it 
now has 110 diplomatic missions in 84 countries of the world, which include 
embassies, high commissions, consulates general and consulates. The Malaysian 
government believes that international relations should be based on respect for 
independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, the peaceful resolution of disputes 
and close cooperation to achieve common goals [231]. 
In summary, it should be noted that Malaysia’s experience in becoming a 
middle power confirms the aforementioned patterns. The country focuses its 
development on social as well as human capital development, economic growth 
directed at export, and finally peaceful foreign policy. Malaysia’s development 
strategy is based on advanced techniques for qualitative and quantitative assessment 
of the commercial success of innovations.  
Analyzing and testing various aspects of the new idea for the main success 
factors, ranking them by importance for a particular industry, sub-sector, individual 
region, country as a whole, the Malaysian government succeeds in implementing 
large-scale economic construction projects. At the same time, assessment, monitoring 
and reaction are carried out taking into account internal and external changes in the 
situation, development factors, social environment, and also taking into account the 
analysis and systematization of the component selection criteria: marketing, 
technological, economic, and human [232]. 
In general, Malaysia managed to create political, economic and legal 
conditions for business activities and a modern institutional form of economic 
partnership between the state and business. In most rankings Malaysia is considered 
one of the most favorable countries for the development of innovation, international 
investment and cooperation. 
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It can be clearly seen from the case studies that Kazakhstan’s transformation 
resembles in most features of political, economic and social development of Turkey, 
South Korea and Malaysia. For example, Kazakhstan has employed taking on a 
strong political leadership to secure the statehood and power, considerable focus on 
the economic reforms, governmental regulation of the economy, attempts for social 
or human capital transformation etc.  
However, Kazakhstan’s economy can still learn from the experience of these 
countries in choosing development trajectory, identifying determining factor in 
comprehensive modernization of its core industry and infrastructure. To be specific, 
international experience shows particular importance of involvement of new 
technologies, new knowledge, and new investments. The successful experience of 
Turkey, South Korea and Malaysia encourages Kazakhstan to modernize and reduce 
dependence on the export of raw materials, to diversify both the economy as a whole 
and country’s exports. All three countries have used export-oriented growth which 
led to a substantial development in their respected economies. 
Another feature to point out is planning and control. International experience 
shows that main factors contributing to the successful diversification of the economy 
is usually developed through national planning and strict control system. State 
development programs of the country are determined by five-year, ten-year and long-
term twenty-year plans developed by the government. However, it is vital to monitor 
the proper use of financial and infrastructural means and control the implementation 
of state programs in its full capacity. 
Last but not least, what Kazakhstan may also employ in its own development is 
constant improvement of the system. Over the years of existence, the governmental 
systems of leading economies of the world have been constantly improving. The 
development of information technology, knowledge economy as well as financial 
transactions has brought the system of business and trade to a whole new level. Using 
these opportunities would allow Kazakhstan to maximize the effectiveness of its 
economy structure and public investment. It seems that the introduction of such a 
system would be useful for Kazakhstan. 
 
3.2 Priorities of Foreign Policy of Kazakhstan as a Middle Power 
In the previous chapters it was elaborated on how the experience of Turkey, 
South Korea and Malaysia relate to the transformation of Kazakhstan and lessons to 
be learnt. Learning the experience of middle power international behavior one might 
predict the core directions of foreign policy of a state. In particular, the most recent 
addresses and initiatives of the President of Kazakhstan have sent a clear message 
that the state is going to be focused on social and economic well-being of its citizens. 
These issues along with international agenda are to set the priorities for foreign policy 
of Kazakhstan.   
Since sovereignty and independence, Kazakhstan embarked on the difficult 
path of entering the world community, determining its place and role in modern 
international relations, identifying priorities in the foreign policy of the state. The 
young state had to solve a number of problems: to show what our state really is, to 
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ensure international recognition, its security and territorial integrity. Foreign policy 
challenges facing the Republic of Kazakhstan were outlined by N. A. Nazarbayev in 
a number of his works: On the Threshold of the 21st Century, Five Years of 
Independence, In the Stream of History, Strategy of the Formation and Development 
of Kazakhstan as a Sovereign State, Strategy of Independence, The epicenter of the 
world, Critical Decade, Era of Independence etc. 
In these works, the First President of Kazakhstan always prioritizes 
predictability and consistency in its foreign policy. It is well known that Kazakhstan’s 
foreign policy’s main objective was formulated as to create and maintain favorable 
conditions for steady development of the Kazakhstan based on political and economic 
reforms. The nature of these reforms determines the nation’s foreign policy priorities, 
impartiality, and a desire to be fully involved in both international and regional 
events [233]. 
In a short historical period, Kazakhstan achieved noticeable success in the field 
of foreign policy: the sovereignty of Kazakhstan was recognized practically by all 
countries of the world and the international organizations, the multi-vector foreign 
policy has brought investments, the reputation of the country has increased in the 
world community.  
As implication of the theory of middle power behavior it can be claimed that 
one of the highest priorities for Kazakhstan as a middle power is expected to be its 
role in international relations. It has now completed the process of entering into all 
respected and influential international organizations. At present, the task is to 
immerse into practical implementation the strategic interests of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan in the international arena according to the following priorities. 
1 Kazakhstan is interested in the politically stable, economically sustainable 
and safe development of Central Asia. Realizing its responsibility and role in the 
region, Kazakhstan makes comprehensive efforts to ensure regional stability and 
security, and to counter new challenges and threats, including those emanating from 
neighboring territories. 
Kazakhstan strives to develop intraregional integration in Central Asia in order 
to reduce the conflict potential, solve socio-economic problems, decouple the water 
and energy node and other contradictions. 
A promising goal is the transformation of the region into a single integrated 
subject of international politics and economics. 
Kazakhstan prioritizes the defense the common interests of the states of Central 
Asia and Afghanistan. It is guided by the need for a harmonious combination of the 
interests of all countries in the region, building a model of a regional zone of peace, 
security, cooperation and development. 
The priority on the “economization” of international efforts to stabilize 
Afghanistan, with the active role of the Central Asian states in this process, has 
become an innovative approach proposed by Kazakhstan [168, р. 34]. 
The expression in the Security Council of the common interests of Central 
Asia, regular consultations on topical issues on the UN Security Council agenda have 
been highly appreciated by the neighbors in the region.  
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As for security diplomacy of Kazakhstan, it is important to take into account its 
various levels. The first level includes the countries of Central Asia: Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. The second level, except for 
five new independent states, includes China and Russia. The third level assumes the 
CICA participants, and the fourth level includes European countries and the USA. In 
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, there are five key priority areas which include: 
− development of integration processes; 
− optimization of bilateral cooperation; 
− implementation of functional tasks of foreign policy; 
− rationalization of cooperation with international organizations; 
− institutional and personnel development of the Foreign Ministry, its central 
and overseas offices [169, р. 57]. 
In this regard, N. Nazarbayev stressed that there is no alternative to the idea of 
multi-factorism in international relations. Only by combining the potential of all 
countries can we meet the challenges of our time and create effective mechanisms for 
combining national interests and international efforts. This approach will allow 
diplomats to solve the most important tasks of our time. 
2 Considering Eurasian economic integration as one of the effective ways to 
promote the country to sustainable positions in the system of world economic 
relations, Kazakhstan strengthens it work on Eurasian Economic Union. 
As part of this process, such fundamental principles as the inviolability of 
political sovereignty, the economic feasibility of decisions, pragmatism and mutual 
benefit, equal representation of the parties in all integration bodies and consensus at 
all levels of integration is respected. 
Eurasian Economic Union aims at facilitating regional economic integration. 
Since 2015 freedom of movement of goods, services, capital and labor is ensured in 
the EAEU. Kazakhstan is a part of the organization along with Armenia, Belarus, 
Kyrgyzstan and Russia. At the moment, the population of the Union exceeds 182.7 
million people, and the territory occupies 14% of world land - more than 20 million 
square meters [234]. 
As N.A. Nazarbayev, noted, this union is a long-term vector of peace, 
harmony, mutual consent and benefit. Because all economic changes in one country 
directly affect changes in the economic indicators of another, this organization 
ensures the implementation of a coordinated, unified policy. 
3 Kazakhstan continues to work on strengthening stable and friendly relations 
with the coastal states of the Caspian Sea based on generally accepted principles and 
norms of international law. 
On August 12, 2018, in Aktau, during the Fifth Caspian Summit, the Presidents 
of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Russia and Turkmenistan signed the Convention on 
the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea. This document is a fundamental international 
treaty that defines and regulates the rights and obligations of the parties with respect 
to the Caspian Sea, including its waters, bottom, subsoil, natural resources and 
airspace [103, р. 46]. 
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The convention regulates the issues related to the delimitation of national 
zones, jurisdictions and sovereignty; the exercise of mineral rights; transit and 
transportation; laying underwater pipelines and cables; protection of the natural 
environment and biological resources of the Caspian Sea. Special attention is paid to 
security issues in terms of countering modern challenges and threats, preventing and 
eliminating emergency situations, and military activities of the Caspian states. 
According to the Convention, the sea area of the Caspian Sea is divided into 
zones with different regimes. The parties establish territorial waters not more than 15 
nautical miles wide, while their external borders acquire the status of state. Ten-mile 
fishing zones adjoin the territorial waters, where each state has exclusive rights to 
fish. 
In order to preserve a unique population of biological resources, fishing 
throughout the entire water area is carried out on the basis of agreed national quotas. 
Outside the fishing zones, a common water area is preserved. Outside the state’s 
maritime boundaries, there is freedom of navigation for ships under the flags of 
coastal countries. 
4 Kazakhstan, as a responsible participant in the activities of the United 
Nations, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Conference on Interaction 
and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Cooperation 
Council of Turkic-speaking States and other international organizations and forums, 
with their main tasks in the framework of their activities, consider [45]: 
1) ensuring that national interests are taken into account in the process of 
developing and adopting decisions of a regional and global nature in various fields; 
2) constructive participation and contribution to international efforts to 
strengthen regional and global security; 
3) promotion of Kazakhstani foreign policy initiatives; 
4) the establishment of optimal and mutually acceptable forms of cooperation 
between regional and international organizations and forums in the interests of 
ensuring stability and security in the world; 
5) improvement of political, legal and organizational-administrative functions 
of regional and international organizations in order to increase the efficiency of their 
work. 
Kazakhstan participates in the work of regional and international organizations 
whose activities are in its national interest and brings practical benefits. 
First of all, Kazakhstan recognizes the leading role of the UN in solving the 
most important issues of the modern world. On March 2, 1992, at the 46th session of 
the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Republic of Kazakhstan was 
unanimously admitted to membership in the UN. Since 1992, Kazakhstan has 
managed not only to successfully integrate into the international community of states, 
but also to occupy a prominent place in it. Kazakhstan’s participation in the work of 
the UN system is one of the main directions of Kazakhstan’s multilateral diplomacy, 
which contributes to strengthening the sovereignty and independence of our country, 
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creates favorable international conditions for the implementation of further 
transformations in the socio-political, economic and other spheres of public life. 
Over the years of independence, it has made an enormous contribution to the 
maintenance of international peace and security [235]. The rejection of nuclear 
weapons, the creation of confidence-building measures in Asia, the strengthening of 
integration processes in the Eurasian space, the promotion of a dialogue of 
civilizations and religions are the steps taken by Kazakhstan to further the goals and 
principles of the UN Charter. The Republic has earned wide recognition in the UN as 
a state that has a balanced and constructive approach to solving world problems. 
On December 31, 2018 Kazakhstan completed the biennial membership to the 
Security Council, the main organ of the United Nations responsible for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. 
The work was built in order to fully implement the Political Address of the 
President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev to the members of the 
Council ‘Kazakhstan’s conceptual vision of strengthening the global partnership to 
build a safe, just and prosperous world’, which was based on the Manifesto ‘Peace. 
XXI Century.’ 
The main message of Nur-Sultan was an inclusive dialogue between the 
leading powers which is necessary to overcome the so-called ‘bloc thinking’ and 
reach a consensus on key issues on the world agenda. 
The culmination of the Kazakhstan’s work in the UN Security Council was a 
thematic briefing on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Confidence-
Building Measures chaired by the First President of Kazakhstan, held on January 18, 
2018 [236]. 
It was the first time when the First President of Kazakhstan chaired the UN 
Security Council and spoke in the Kazakh language in the hall of the official 
meetings. Based on the experience of Kazakhstan, the President dedicated his speech 
to a particularly important role of confidence in strengthening the non-proliferation 
regime, thereby underlining the attainability of the strategic goal of building the 
world free of nuclear weapons. 
The meeting chaired by the leader of Kazakhstan was one of the few Security 
Council events that took place in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and allowed 
to consider pressing contemporary challenges, including the situation on the Korean 
Peninsula, in a new light. 
As a result of the discussion, Kazakhstan was able to achieve the adoption of a 
presidential statement, which included the topic of non-proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction in the UN toolkit on conflict prevention and resolution. 
Second of all, Kazakhstan has been actively working to resolve conflicts and 
crises in the Middle East, Africa and other regions of the world. Kazakhstan fully 
supports peacekeeping activities and the efforts of the United Nations to strengthen 
its peacekeeping capacity. Evidence of Kazakhstan’s active participation in this 
activity is the creation of the Kazakhstan Peacekeeping Battalion (Kazbat), whose 
units served in the stabilization forces in Iraq, Afghanistan and other hot spots of the 
planet, participating in peacekeeping operations. 
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It is worth recalling that in 1992, during the 47th session of the UN General 
Assembly, during its first speech at the UN, our President proposed using confidence-
building measures to ensure peace and security in Asia [168, р. 12].  
Not all countries at that time accepted the initiative of convening a Conference 
on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia. Today, the CICA has 
acquired particular relevance and has received support from the majority of Asian 
states, who are convinced that this structure is the imperative of the time. 
The reputation of an honest and unbiased mediator has become one of the 
characteristic features of Kazakh diplomacy. Vivid evidence of this was the practical 
results of the Astana process to resolve the situation in Syria. 
Joint efforts with the guarantor countries ensured a cessation of hostilities and 
the operation of de-escalation zones, conditions were created for the safe return of 
refugees. Through strengthening confidence-building measures between the warring 
parties, significant work has been done to create a solid foundation for a political 
settlement of the Syrian conflict in Geneva under the auspices of the UN. 
Kazakhstan has also managed to achieve tangible results in peacekeeping. In 
October 2018, the Kazakh peacekeeping company of 120 military personnel in the 
Indian peacekeeping battalion joined the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). 
Due to this, Kazakhstan has become the largest supplier of peacekeepers in the 
Eurasian region. 
Together with the Ministry of Defense, MFA obtained the UN certification of 
the Kazakhstan Peace Training Training Center (KAZTSENT) in Almaty. In fact, it 
is building a regional peacekeeping hub, the demand for which will only increase in 
the coming years.  
Next is countering international terrorism, according to which a proposition to 
create a global counter-terrorism coalition of states under the UN auspices was made 
at the 70th session of the UN General Assembly in September 2015. 
As a basis for the formation of such a coalition, the Political Address of First 
President to the UNSC member states was proposed to adopt a Code of Conduct 
Towards Achieving a World Free of Terrorism. 
In January 2018, the presentation of the Code was held at the UN, and in 
September of the same year, this document was signed by representatives of seventy 
states. Today it brings together 78 countries. 
The main objectives of the Code are to achieve a world free of terrorism by 
2045 and to create a broad international coalition of counterterrorist partner countries. 
Many countries see the initiative of Kazakhstan as an important basis for 
strengthening international instruments and cooperation in the fight against terrorism 
amid a lack of trust [237]. 
Kazakhstan has skillfully built the work of the most important Security Council 
sanctions committees on countering ISIS, Al-Qaida and the Taliban. It managed to 
adequately cope with the task, bringing dynamism to the work of these structures of 
the Security Council. 
Separately, it is worth noting that Kazakhstan has joined all nineteen 
international instruments in the fight against terrorism. The activities of Kazakhstan 
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in the UN Security Council in the field of counterterrorism allows to work 
successfully in practical operations. Clear evidence was the recent operation called 
‘Zhusan [112, р. 128].’ 
At the same time, Kazakhstan pays a great attention on cooperation with the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which is rightfully 
considered to be the largest regional organization currently involved in security and 
conflict prevention. 
The basic principle of the OSCE is a broad and comprehensive approach to 
security with close connection of three main areas: military-political, economic-
environmental and humanitarian. Protection of fundamental human rights and 
freedoms, cooperation in the field of economics and environmental protection are 
considered as the most important components of peace and stability. 
Kazakhstan joined the OSCE on January 30, 1992. On July 8 of the same year, 
the Republic signed the Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE, and on September 23, the 
Paris Charter for a New Europe [238]. 
In the first years of independence, Kazakhstan needed the support of world 
powers and reputable international organizations, including the OSCE. At the same 
time, the world community was also interested in the owner of the fourth largest 
nuclear arsenal to have a constructive foreign policy line. Given this, the country has 
made an informed choice in favor of balanced approaches in foreign and domestic 
policy.  
In November 2007, at the Madrid meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, a 
decision was made on the chairmanship of Kazakhstan in the Organization in 2010. 
The candidacy of Kazakhstan was unanimously approved by all 56 member countries 
of the organization, which recognized the real achievements of Kazakhstan in 
building a democratic society and a liberal market economy. The OSCE 
Chairmanship is largely a consequence of the high prestige of the First President      
N. A. Nazarbayev, whose active international, reforming and peacemaking activity 
was a significant asset to the Kazakhstani application. At the same time, the new 
international status provides an opportunity to more successfully promote Kazakhstan 
initiatives of interest to the entire international community. 
Within the framework of the military-political dimension, Kazakhstan 
continues to support multilateral efforts to ensure Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian 
security, strengthen confidence-building measures, and resolve protracted conflicts. 
Special attention is paid to the OSCE activities in connection with the situation in 
Ukraine and the work of the Special Monitoring Mission. 
The development of transcontinental transport corridors connecting Asia and 
Europe, sustainable development, the fight against corruption, and good governance 
remain an important priority on the OSCE economic and environmental track. Work 
continues on the use of the OSCE’s potential in the field of environmental protection, 
including in addressing the Aral problem and effective water management in Central 
Asia. 
In the human dimension, issues such as the fight against all forms of 
intolerance and discrimination, tolerance, protection of human rights, the rule of law, 
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the independence of the judiciary, the promotion of gender balance and the fight 
against human trafficking remain important for Kazakhstan. 
Work continues to support the OSCE member states in their efforts to reform 
the OSCE / ODIHR, to establish uniform requirements for the implementation of 
election observation, as well as the adoption of the Organization’s title document. 
Kazakhstan has built a trusting relationship with the Organization of the 
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) as well. The accession of the Republic of Kazakhstan on 
December 12, 1995 to the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC) as a full 
member was a significant event in the foreign political life of the country. 
Membership of the Republic of Kazakhstan in this international organization, 
which unites 57 Muslim states, including all Arab and Turkic-speaking countries, 
making up one third of the UN members, was aimed at integrating Kazakhstan into 
the Muslim community. At the same time, the political and economic and financial 
and investment potential of the OIC was taken into account. The goals and objectives 
enshrined in the OIC Charter are fully consistent with the principles of the UN and 
international law [239]. The organization has earned respect for itself from the world 
community balance, restraint and objectivity of its policies. 
This organization demonstrates a serious attempt by Muslim countries to 
establish themselves as an independent force in the system of modern international 
relations. The principle of Muslim solidarity on the public consciousness of both the 
Muslim and the Western world has a significant propaganda effect. Participation in 
the OIC allows many Muslim states to solve their specific economic, domestic and 
foreign policy tasks. 
Kazakhstan’s participation in the OIC’s work and a positive image of the 
republic in the Muslim community is in turn an important prerequisite for further 
strengthening bilateral relations with the leading countries of the Islamic world: 
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Egypt and the Persian 
Gulf countries. 
Membership in the OIC provides an opportunity to verify the position of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan on such key issues of international life as the situation in the 
Middle East, the situation around Iraq, the issues of post-conflict reconstruction of 
Afghanistan, the fight against terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking. 
In the context of the increasing urgency of the problems of the convergence of 
cultures and the dialogue of civilizations, the transformation of the OIC towards 
democratization and liberalization, both within the organization and in its relations 
with the outside world, appears to be important. In this process, due to its geopolitical 
position, Kazakhstan could play a positive role, being at the crossroads of Europe and 
Asia. 
A significant event was the chairmanship of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the 
38th session of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (OIC Ministerial 
Council), which met on June 28-30, 2011 in Nur-Sultan. One of the main outcomes 
of this event was the decision to rename the organization to the Organization of 
Islamic Cooperation. 
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In the framework of the 38th session of the OIC Ministerial Council, the 
President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev announced the creation of 
the Islamic Organization for Food Security (ILI). The main goal of this initiative is to 
consolidate the capabilities of the OIC member states in the field of food security. 
Currently, 32 OIC member states have signed the Charter, and 12 of them have 
already ratified it. In March 2018, the IOPS Charter entered into full legal force. The 
headquarters of the Organization is located in Nur-Sultan [240]. 
Another major event in the line of cooperation between Kazakhstan and the 
OIC was held on September 10-11, 2017 in Nur-Sultan on the initiative of the First 
President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev the First in the history of the 
OIC Summit on science and technology on the theme Science, Technology, 
Innovation and Modernization of the Islamic World. The main outcome of the 
Summit was the adoption of the Astana Declaration and the OIC Program for the 
Development of Science, Technology and Innovation until 2026. 
In this regard, the Republic of Kazakhstan nominated Ambassador A. Musinov 
for the post of Deputy Secretary General of the OIC for Science and Technology, the 
election of which took place on May 5-6, 2018 in Dakka, Bangladesh, during the 45th 
session of the OIC Ministerial Council. Ambassador A. Musinov won the election 
and officially takes up his duties since July 1, 2019. 
At present, the current agenda of cooperation between Kazakhstan and the OIC 
is formed by the initiatives of the First President of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev for 
the Islamic world: 
- Strengthening the capacity of the Islamic Organization for Food Security; 
- Promotion of Islamic reconciliation (Islamic Rapprochement); 
- Promotion of Islamic Infrastructure Integration (Triple ‘I’) [241]. 
Also, work is underway to include on the agenda of a new initiative of 
Kazakhstan to create an OIC-15 platform in the field of science and technology. 
Cooperation with member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) is one of the strategic objectives of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy. It is carried 
out both at the level of bilateral relations and in a multilateral format within the 
framework of the Commonwealth. 
Within the CIS, there are about 70 sectoral bodies that coordinate cooperation 
of interested states in the areas of economy, military cooperation, border protection 
and the fight against organized crime, in the field of transport, ecology, culture, 
tourism, the press, etc. 
To sum up, Kazakhstan has fully realized its potential as a ‘fair and honest 
broker,’ connecting countries on a common platform of mutual understanding and 
cooperation in solving complex international problems. 
Respectful attitude towards the country, First President of Kazakhstan, building 
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy on the basis of trust, respect and partnership, allows to 
ensure the full implementation of all priorities in international arena and to take 
important actions and final documents reflecting the initiatives of the young state. 
In general, the non-permanent membership of Kazakhstan in the UN Security 
Council has allowed to strengthen the authority of Kazakhstan as an active and 
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responsible international player; strengthen international security cooperation; to give 
new impetus to solving problems in our region; gain unique practical experience and 
bring the professionalism of Kazakhstan diplomacy to a qualitatively new level; 
promote our specialists in the UN structures; get access to current information on 
important international issues. 
 
3.3 Ways to Improve Efficiency and Economic Effect of Kazakhstan’s 
Foreign Policy 
Currently, having defined its development priorities as a middle power, the 
Republic of Kazakhstan is striving to build an effective foreign policy that will bring 
favorable conditions for further economic development of the country.  
At the present historical stage, politics, including international, has been 
substantially economized, and the economy has become politicized. Diplomatic 
activity in the field of foreign economic policy has begun to increasingly take on the 
features of interstate regulation of the economy [242]. A so-called ‘economic 
diplomacy’ is to take a priority position for Kazakhstan as well. 
The main purpose of economic diplomacy is the creation of favorable 
conditions for access and promotion of domestic goods and services to foreign 
markets, the protection of national strategic and economic interests abroad, as well as 
the promotion of means and methods of this diplomacy to the country’s social and 
economic development, increasing its competitiveness in the world, ensuring its 
national and economic security. 
In the conditions of a globalizing world, increasing international competition 
and deepening regional integration, economic diplomacy at the present stage has 
acquired a number of new features, which affected its content, forms and tools. 
Various forms of state support identify the success of domestic companies and 
the country as a whole, on the world market. This is not to say the government should 
change the market principles, but it should increase the competitiveness of national 
producers working in a tough competitive market environment. Strengthening 
national competitiveness implies a set of interrelated and complementary measures in 
the field of domestic economic (facilitating technological development and 
innovation) and in the field of foreign economic policies (promoting exports, 
improving access to foreign markets, attracting foreign investment, technology). 
Therefore, economic diplomacy is expected to occupy a special place in the future 
foreign policy of Kazakhstan, creating a favorable external environment for the 
practical solution of the tasks of increasing competitiveness.  
Сonfirming this course of action, at the extended meeting of the Government 
on January 30, 2019, the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nursultan 
Nazarbayev set the task of attracting investments in fixed capital at the level of more 
than 30% of GDP per year [243]. 
To achieve this goal, the government is building a set of measures to contribute 
in the stimulation of export-oriented production by increasing the productivity of the 
economy, attracting foreign capital by actively implementing the development 
potential of the regions, increasing and diversifying the kind of investments. 
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In order to strengthen the policy of promoting domestic goods to foreign 
markets, as well as increase the efficiency of protecting the domestic market from 
low-quality goods, Ministry of Trade and Integration was created in Kazakhstan in 
June 2019. The new Ministry incorporated some of the functions of the Ministry of 
National Economy in terms of domestic and foreign trade, trade promotion, as well as 
the functions of the Technical Regulation Committee from the Ministry of Industry 
and Infrastructure Development as well as the function of coordinating export 
promotion was transferred from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
The importance of investments, diversification of the economy, growth of 
productivity, exports and creating jobs has been noted in several documents of the 
State Planning System (including Kazakhstan-2050, Strategic Development Plan of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan until 2025, State Infrastructure Development Program 
Nurly Zhol, Plan of the Nation ‘100 Concrete Steps,’ State Program for Industrial-
Innovative Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan, State Program for the 
Development of the Agro-Industrial Complex of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 
2017-2021, ‘Modernization 3.0.’). 
Attempts to improve the economic effect of foreign policy have already been 
made in the frame of the First President’s Address to the Nation: Growth of the 
Welfare of Kazakhstanis: Increase in Income and Quality of Life [68, p.1]. 
According to this Message, promotion of export-oriented products of domestic 
enterprises, attracting foreign investment and innovative technologies in the priority 
sectors of the Kazakh economy as well as enhancing investment climate are stated as 
a key element of Kazakhstan’s foreign economic policy and one of the fundamental 
priorities of trade and economic diplomacy. 
To implement this job, heads of Kazakhstan’s agencies overseas conduct a 
direct dialogue with the foreign business community, hold meetings and negotiations 
with heads of foreign companies, organize round tables, business forums, exhibitions 
and presentations, visits of business delegations. 
With the direct assistance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, hundreds of trade, 
economic, and investment events are held annually in the country and abroad, as well 
as visits of foreign business circles to Kazakhstan and Kazakh economic delegations 
abroad are organized. All available resources of the Ministry are involved, including 
foreign agencies, investment, economic and trade advisors, the WTO, trade missions, 
front offices, and honorary consuls of Kazakhstan abroad [197, р. 12]. 
Promotion of export-oriented products. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Ministry of Investment and Development (now Investment Committee of Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs) signed Joint Action Plans to strengthen cooperation in promoting 
exports of Kazakhstani products, as well as the Ministry of Agriculture to strengthen 
cooperation in attracting foreign investment in the agro-industrial complex of 
Kazakhstan and the development of trade for 2017-2021, and the Ministry of Defense 
to strengthen cooperation in promoting the export of Kazakh defense products and 
attracting investment. 
In particular, one of the most important priorities in the work of the MFA is the 
issue of protecting and supporting the rights of Kazakhstan’s business abroad. In 
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2017, the MFA assisted a number of Kazakhstani companies which requested to 
promote export or attract investments: Kaynar-AKB, Kazakhstan Garysh Sapary, 
Kazspecexport, Aktobe Oil Equipment Plant, KazGerKus, Semey Engineering, Milk 
stories and others [47]. 
A striking example is the first in the history of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
transportation of wheat with a volume of 720 tons to Vietnam via the new transport 
corridor Kazakhstan - Lianyungang (PRC) - Vietnam. This delivery was organized by 
a subsidiary of NC Kazakhstan Railways - KTZ Express together with Chinese-
Kazakhstan International Logistics Company Lianyungang.  
Attracting foreign investment. N. Nazarbayev personally pays special attention 
to the development of economic diplomacy. Virtually all official visits abroad and 
visits by foreign heads of state to Kazakhstan include its separate meetings with the 
foreign business community, commercial agreements are signed. 
For example, in 2016, during the visit of the First President of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan to Iran, 48 agreements were signed for a total of 1.4 billion US dollars, to 
Turkey - 20 documents for 520 million dollars, to Saudi Arabia - 10 agreements for 
200 million, to Japan - 13 documents for 1.2 billion, to South Korea - 24 contracts for 
640 million dollars. 
As part of the visits in 2017 to Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Belarus and other 
countries, investment and trade agreements were signed for more than $ 1 billion. 
At the same time, during the visits of heads of foreign states to Kazakhstan in 
2017, a large number of commercial agreements were concluded. For example, 
during the visit of the President of Germany F.-V. Steinmeier signed 21 agreements 
totaling $ 1 billion, during the visit of the President of Turkey R.-T. Erdogan 9 
commercial documents were signed worth $ 590 million [244]. 
In addition, local authorities (Akimats) organize international investment 
forums aimed at presenting the economic potential of the regions of Kazakhstan and 
attracting foreign investors. In 2017 over 50 documents worth about $ 5 billion were 
signed within the framework of regional business forums (Aktobe Invest 2017, 11 
memoranda worth 209 billion tenge were signed; Almaty Invest 2017, contracts for $ 
15 million; Kostanay Invest 2017 - 26 documents for 200 billion tenge; Atyrau Invest 
2017 - 9 memoranda of 3.3 billion dollars. 
To improve interaction between investors and interested entities, a specialized 
national investment company Kazakh Invest was created, which is endowed with 
broad authority and functions in operational and technical field, including relevant 
public services. 
This company acts as a ‘single negotiator’ with TNCs and large investors on 
behalf of the Government, including support when interacting with government 
agencies and solving emerging issues. 
To enhance the work on attracting investment from abroad, investment 
advisers from Government have been seconded in 10 priority countries such as 
Germany, France, China, Great Britain, South Korea, Japan, USA, Italy, Iran, India 
as well as opening Front Offices of JSC Kazakh Invest for targeted work with 
investors. 
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Enhancing investment climate. Today, Kazakhstan has created a favorable 
investment climate: a simplified tax regime, national legislation prioritizing 
international agreements, and investment preferences being expanded. For those 
investors implementing investment projects in priority sectors of the economy the 
stability of tax legislation is guaranteed. 
However, Kazakhstan is now focused on carrying out radical transformations 
to create an investment climate in accordance with the best standards and practices of 
OECD countries. 
In accordance with the Entrepreneurship Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
[245], the following investment benefits and preferences are provided for investors: 
- exemption from payment of customs duties when importing equipment, 
components, raw materials and spare parts necessary for the implementation of the 
investment project; 
- public natural grants (land, buildings, structures, machinery and equipment, 
computer equipment, measuring and regulating devices, vehicles, with the exception 
of cars, production and household equipment). 
Additionally, for investment projects which worth at least 2 million monthly 
calculation index (about $ 13 million) and implemented in priority sectors of the 
economy, it is possible for the investor to have access to a new package of incentives, 
including:  
- tax benefits for corporate income tax and land tax (for 10 years), property tax 
(for 8 years); 
- stability of tax rates (except for VAT and excises), environmental charges and 
payments (for 10 years); 
- investment subsidy - compensation up to 30% of the investor’s capital 
expenditures; 
- simplified procedure for importation of foreign labor. 
Also, there are 11 special economic zones (SEZ) in Kazakhstan, which provide 
tax and customs benefits (exemption from corporate income tax, land tax, property 
tax, VAT for goods consumed in the SEZ territory, land lease is free for 10 years). 
However, Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan is working on measures 
to move away from the narrow sectoral focus of the SEZ in order to more flexibly 
respond to investors’ needs [246]. Since the beginning of 2016, all regions of 
Kazakhstan launched a new mechanism for investors to avoid bureaucracy when 
interacting with governmental agencies.  
In order to solve the problematic issues of foreign investors arising in the 
course of investment activities in Kazakhstan, dialogue platforms have been created: 
Council of Foreign Investors under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the 
Council on Improving the Investment Climate under the Prime Minister of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan.  
To ensure the protection of the rights and legitimate interests of the investors, 
an Institute of Investment Ombudsman was created to serve as a platform for 
interaction between investors and the state to solve current problems of investors in 
extrajudicial proceedings.  
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However, all the above-mentioned measures still do not fully allow to reach the 
highest investment level. Despite the fact that in 2017 Kazakhstan launched a new 
investment attraction program, the amount of investment did not grow. According to 
UNCTAD, FDI flows have declined sharply in developed countries and countries 
with economies in transition, while flows to developing countries remain stable 
[247].  
In particular, countries in transition, that is, countries of Southeast Europe and 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), attracted 47 billion dollars, which is 
27% less than in 2016. This is the second lowest since 2005. The recession is 
associated with low flows to the four main CIS recipient countries: Russian 
Federation, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Ukraine. Kazakhstan meets the challenges 
such as weak level of personnel training, lack of new technologies, as well as 
ineffective intergovernmental cooperation. For this reason, the following SWOT 
analysis of contemporary development of the investment field should be taken into 
account (table 3.4).  
 
Table 3.4 – SWOT analysis of contemporary development of the investment field 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
1) favorable business climate supported by 
economic and political stability; 
2) investment attractiveness due to the presence 
of rich natural and mineral resources; 
3) favorable geographical position of 
Kazakhstan to the large consumer markets of 
Central and Western Asia, Russia, India and 
China 
 
1) instability of the legislation and the lack of 
mechanisms to ensure compliance with laws 
and contractual relations; 
2) low competitive conditions for attracting 
investment (foreign exchange regime); 
3) underdevelopment of the infrastructure 
ensuring attraction of investments (special 
zones, financial, banking, information-
analytical, consulting, transport and others) 
Opportunities Threats 
1) positive investment image of the country in 
the global capital markets; 
2) formation of an effective public and private 
infrastructure to attract investment; 
3) ensuring sustainable and balanced economic 
growth due to the redistribution of investments 
from the mining to the processing sector of the 
economy; 
4) formation of specialized institutions such as 
Kazakh Invest, International Financial Center 
Astana aimed at facilitating the inflow of 
investments 
1) loss of investment attractiveness as a result 
of natural resources depletion and increased 
regional competition for investment; 
2) remaining high-risk economy due to 
disproportion of raw material industry over the 
rest of the economy; 
3) loss of existing industrial and production 
potential due to low volumes of investment in 
fixed assets; 
4) corruption and bureaucracy (at the customs, 
when paying taxes) 
 
On top of that, it is necessary to consider the developments in the international 
system. Currently, there are three main players that influence global FDI flows: 
United States, developed countries of Europe and China. Taking into account the 
changes occurring in the global investment capital markets, there are several trends to 
point out that will have a direct impact on the Republic of Kazakhstan and its 
prospects for attracting FDI: 
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1) changes in commodity market prices, primarily oil and gas, are the main 
reason for the decrease in FDI worldwide and the reroute of investment flows; 
2) competitive advantage of many countries providing new investment 
incentives, as well as the simplification of bureaucratic procedures; 
3) access to new economic sectors for foreign investment, including 
privatization tools and public-private partnerships with restrictions on strategically 
important sectors such as defense industry, energy and transport; 
4) singularity of niche markets across developing – developed countries; 
5) increasing role of service sector in investment flows. Although it is inferior 
in absolute terms, the growth rates and shares in the total volume have significantly 
strengthened; 
6) skewed distribution of foreign investments toward strengthening of 
intraregional industrial relations among ASEAN, China and India.  
7) rapid growth of Chinese companies in such areas as high-tech chemical 
products, electronics, cars and aircraft. New Chinese brands, their own innovation 
and global distribution networks are emerging; 
8) cities have become a key point for investment. Not just numerical increase 
of inhabitants, but economic concentration in and around cities (United Nations, 
2019).  
The combination of the listed trends determines the need to develop 
mechanisms that will allow not only to overcome the risks posed by these changes, 
but, on the contrary, to be used to increase the investment potential. Therefore, 
economic uncertainty and a change in the global structure of FDI entails both 
difficulties and opportunities. 
Most states are strengthening their institutional and organizational base, raising 
the status of economic diplomacy in the system of international relations. The number 
is increasing, functions are expanding, and the quality of the countries’ trade and 
economic missions is improving in supporting foreign trade, lobbying the interests of 
domestic companies abroad, trade and political assistance, and mobilizing effective 
external resources for development [248].  
Providing the state with favorable conditions for international economic 
cooperation, which ultimately contribute to improving the level and quality of life of 
its people, is also a priority task of economic diplomacy. A large role in this is played 
by trade and economic missions, which act as ‘islands’ of a state in a foreign country, 
accumulate extensive knowledge of the host country, have direct political and other 
contacts, aiming at obtaining accessible and reliable information about the level and 
seriousness of the interests and priorities of the host country, the degree of objective 
interest in investments and mutual benefit. 
To improve efficiency and economic effect of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, 
diplomatic institutions should be aimed at achieving practical goals. First is setting a 
clear indicator reflecting the level of the contribution (depending on the host country) 
to the assistance in the export of products manufactured in Kazakhstan. Second is 
indicator on the level of contribution in attracting foreign investment, advanced 
technologies and knowledge for the modernization and development of industry and 
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infrastructure in the country. Third, embassies should have key performance indicator 
on the conduct of effective and systematic work to expand the tourist flow to 
Kazakhstan. 
To achieve the first indicator, diplomatic institutions should hold negotiations 
with the authorities of foreign countries on such important issues as: 
- minimizing the use of tariff and non-tariff barriers to Kazakhstani exports;  
- study of optimal transport routes abroad;  
- inclusion in the lists of allowable for the importation of products;  
- signing trade agreements, including on free trade zones;  
- providing favorable conditions for the participation of Kazakhstan business in 
international exhibitions and fairs. 
Another element in the MFA’s instruments may be direct interaction with the 
Kazakhstan export-oriented private sector. It is also necessary to provide the essential 
information on doing business and taxing rules in certain countries, organizing 
meetings with foreign partners, searching for buyers, etc. at the request of 
entrepreneurs. 
As the regards the second indicator, it is important to realize that the work of 
the diplomatic missions is seen as an element in the complex mechanism. Therefore, 
the suggestions are sectored as follows. 
It is proposed to improve the investment climate by (1) creating 
straightforward conditions for attracting investments, (2) increasing the level of 
protection of investors’ rights, as well as (3) improving trade logistics and developing 
production and marketing links between foreign investors and local companies. 
At the same time, implementation of effective operational measures and 
development of new approaches to attracting investments can be done by (4) 
facilitating institutional mechanisms and taking proactive approaches for attracting 
and retaining investments. Along with this, government should (5) prioritize 
attracting foreign investment in public-private partnership projects.  
Also creating an enabling environment for attracting investment involves 
increasing the transparency of investment management. This is an important factor in 
building investor confidence. In this part, improvement of legislation and 
strengthening of mechanisms of interaction with the investment community is 
required. A translation of the regulatory framework governing the state’s investment 
policy into English is also necessary. 
Along with this, it is required to allow full and detailed access to relevant 
information on the official website. The content of the information function of 
diplomatic agencies, as well as other departments on attracting investments, includes 
three aspects: informing foreign partners about the official position of their state, 
receiving similar information from other countries and exchanging views. Direct 
participation in the information support of the foreign policy of the state in the 
countries of accreditation and in strengthening the positive image of your country in 
the international arena, as well as explaining the investment policy of the state are 
important tasks of any overseas representation. Due to the significant intensification 
of the development of mass media, they contribute to the emergence of new forms 
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and methods of influencing international audiences. In this regard, this activity is 
preferably carried out primarily through electronic mass media. 
For this reason, all procedures and conditions for granting investment 
preferences should be transparent and set forth in a generally accessible form. This 
site should become a single window of interaction with investors, where both 
potential and existing investors will be able to get comprehensive information on 
requirements, preferences, offers, as well as answers to complaints. 
In addition, there is a need to create a favorable environment for meetings of 
exporters and their potential partners to define and articulate priorities and show all 
the beneficial aspects of exported goods and technologies. Also it is necessary to 
emphasize the importance of a detailed state export strategy, which should determine 
the main directions of export of goods. This has to be the main task of trade and 
economic missions.  
It is important to work to simplify the regime for issuing visas and work 
permits for foreign specialists, expanding the list of countries for visa-free entry to 
the Republic of Kazakhstan, exemption from quota requirements and work permits 
for foreign individuals working in enterprises that have signed an investment contract 
for the implementation priority investment projects. 
As for the third indicator, one of the most important tasks for diplomatic 
missions is to creating a positive image of the perception of the country, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and professional diplomats in general – although their actual 
capabilities to radically or temporarily influence the change in the existing perception 
of their country abroad are often limited.  
According to recent studies conducted by the World Bank [249], in 72% of the 
cases, the country’s perception is the basis for making decisions on investing or other 
forms of economic cooperation with this country. Even those experiencing political 
issues often keep having intense economic exchange. Moreover, bilateral relations 
based on a positive perception of national identity are the basis for a more dynamic 
and easy development of trade and economic relations. Initiative, innovation and 
ingenuity are the qualities of a successful organization of actions that should be in 
service with diplomatic missions. All methods of conducting diplomatic activities are 
important, including consular and cultural-educational work, relations with the 
media, diaspora and other areas of the work. 
Basic methods of work of economic diplomacy includes diplomatic missions 
which serves as the main structural unit in presenting information about the 
principles, structure and development trends. The work of the mission should include 
collecting information on the economy of the host country, its plans and programs, 
monetary and financial condition, the development of foreign economic relations, the 
conjuncture of goods and services markets; its export and import potential, on 
requests for direct investment in the country’s economy, collected through official 
sources to which the mission has direct access. All this allows to create the potential 
for further economic cooperation. 
As a whole, summing up the above, it can be stated that for Kazakhstan, the 
implementation of a balanced and responsible foreign policy that takes into account 
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the interests of the society and the dynamics of world development is of paramount 
importance. Foreign policy should be built on the understanding of the necessity to 
compromise, including the most sensitive issues. 
Kazakhstan is to continue, guided by the vision of the First President of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, to make efforts to strengthen the security environment and 
expand its influence on international processes. 
In this regard, the tasks of searching for the optimal balance of interests, 
harmonization of the main directions of foreign policy, foreign economic, military 
policy, assessment of the real opportunities of all participants involved in cooperation 
from the Kazakh side to enhance the role of Kazakhstan in international processes are 
becoming very important for the Kazakh foreign ministry. This can be achieved only 
in the framework of multi-vector diplomacy, the development of integration 
processes at the regional and interregional levels. Successful implementation of 
foreign policy priorities will, in turn, be the key to the further stability of Kazakhstan, 
both politically and in socio-economic terms. 
Undoubtedly, today Kazakhstan has taken a strong position in the international 
arena as a middle power, committed to building a stable and secure world, working in 
the foreign policy arena. The growing influence of Kazakhstan in the region and the 
world as a whole is supported by the successful implementation of a number of 
foreign policy initiatives, ensured by the existence of a strategic partnership with 
leading states of the world, active work in international organizations and is based on 
the dynamic growth of Kazakhstan’s economic power, and onward expansion of 
trade and economic relations the world. The perspective foreign policy of modern 
states can no longer wander in the history of everyday life. And the main guideline 
today should be the idea of multi-vector, integration and balanced cooperation. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Since the Republic of Kazakhstan gained independence and it has chosen its 
own unique way of development and so has been built its foreign policy. Over the 
twenty-eight years of the history, the state has led an active and balanced foreign 
policy aimed at strengthening bilateral and multilateral cooperation transforming into 
a middle power. First of all, Kazakhstan has managed to gain the credibility of a 
reliable foreign policy partner and take its rightful place in the system of international 
relations. 
This dissertation has made an attempt to recreate the path of Kazakhstan into 
middlepowermanship showing the specific internal and external variables in the 
formation and realization of state economic and social policy, analyzing the 
characteristics of Kazakhstan foreign policy behavior, highlighting the role of 
individuals in the implementation of state policy, as well as suggesting the ways for 
further development. Summing up the gained experience will help to mind map the 
evolution of Kazakhstan, determine the most valuable, and eliminate the negative 
practice and suggest refined solutions. 
The results of the study allow us to draw the following conclusions: 
1 Mainstream theories of international relations such as realism, liberalism, 
neo-Marxism to one degree or another all imply the stratification of states in 
international arena. Although having formal legal equality, states cannot ignore the 
fact that they differ in their territory, population, natural resources, economic 
potential, social stability, political authority, arms, etc. These differences are 
summarized in the inequality of states in terms of their national power. Thus, there is 
an international stratification, with its characteristic actual hierarchy of states in the 
international arena. For this reason, states may need to act actively or passively in 
international arena. Moreover, every state is forced, in one way or another, to follow 
certain foreign policy strategies depending on their power, role and place. In this 
regard, it is implied that all considered mainstream theories admit the possibility of 
the transformation of states from one category to another (from small state to middle 
power). 
Defining whether a state is small, middle or great power depends not only on 
its political, economic and social development, but also on its foreign policy 
behavior. The study of debates on defining states small or middle involve those who 
believe there are certain parameters in economic and social development with the 
help of which states’ status can be directly measured; and those who suppose it is 
state’s own international behavior as well as perception the world community that 
regards one a smaller or greater state. In particular, there are approaches such as 
hierarchical, behavioral and functional. The hierarchical approach explores 
capabilities, self-positioning and recognized status of a state. The behavioral 
approach takes on ‘agential’ view and looks at how states act and what instruments 
they use to achieve their goals. The functional approach asserts that states exercise 
their peculiar influence in certain areas of interest, serving particular role in 
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international arena i.e. they serve particular function in the world. This dissertation 
takes upon all the mentioned criteria to follow the transformation of states. 
2 Transformation of small states into middle powers goes through 
enhancement of its economic indicators, security matters as well as state’s foreign 
policy scope of operation and internationalization. This is to say, to complete the 
transformation, states need to go through not only quantitative changes, but also 
engage in qualitative changes as well. The study suggests that prospective middle 
powers should undertake actions to change the following areas: demographic policy, 
economic policy, government, education and healthcare, security policy, intelligence 
policy, military policy, foreign policy.  
The results of such changes should be founded on following:  
Socio-economic parameters: increasing population; high adult literacy rate; 
qualified human capital; low infant mortality rate; fully functioning domestic market; 
affordable finance; efficient economy of scale; diversification of economy; higher 
GNP; economic independence.   
Military-political parameters: well-organized bureaucracy; developed 
institutional infrastructure; providing human, energy, economic and institutional 
security; autonomy for the use of natural resources; ability to withstand any kind of 
informational, religious, or other imposition; sufficient military spending; having 
sufficient resources to apply power against or oppose attacks from similar-sized 
states; border protection. 
Foreign policy behavior: expanding foreign services; taking concrete, 
proactive, innovative initiatives; imposing will through building coalitions by using 
media and  political mobilization etc.; focusing on particular ‘niches’; taking leading 
position in resolving international issues;  mediating conflicts and cooperation with 
NGO to affect global security; willingness to accept responsibility and commitment 
to implement international treaties; gaining reputation of ‘a good citizen’ of 
international relations. 
3 Kazakhstan meets the definition of a middle power. Kazakhstan’s territory is 
2 724 900 square kilometers making it the ninth largest state in the world. Although 
in economic terms Kazakhstan’s capacity is still around small state level, as the 
country’s nominal GDP has not yet exceeded the world’s average, accounting for 
9,220 USD per capita compared to world’s average of 11,310 USD per capita, 
Kazakhstan’s PPP GDP is twice as high as emerging market and developing 
economies PPP GDP, making up 26,930 USD against 12,430 USD per capita 
respectively [250]. Kazakhstan has a population of only 18,5 mln people [251], but 
engages on a number of international initiatives from world disarmament process to 
chairmanship in different international organizations including the UN Security 
Council.  In addition, despite the fact that Kazakhstan does not demonstrate its ability 
to maintain as full a spectrum of military capabilities as great powers, it does join 
peacekeeping operations in distant regions of the world [252]. 
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy thoroughly matches all the behavioral 
characteristics of middle states from both a liberalist and realist perspective. On the 
one hand, being a trustworthy partner in world affairs, it contributes to the 
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strengthening of international peace and security by maintaining balanced relations 
with all its neighbors. It has no particular agenda to intervene in the internal policy of 
conflicting states, and therefore is capable of being an impartial broker in solving 
conflicts. On the other hand, Kazakhstan is an actor with a limited influence on 
deciding the distribution of power in the regional system, but is capable of using a 
range of instruments to change the position of great powers and protect its own 
position on issues concerning national or regional security that directly affect it [253]. 
With a historical legacy of multiculturalism, Kazakh mentality of hospitality directs 
the state’s ‘niche diplomacy’ to focus on building trust of both other states and the 
world’s population in order to lay a stable foundation for peace and public consent. 
4 Internal factors that contributed to the transformation of Kazakhstan into a 
middle power are natural resources, political stability and ideology. 
Natural resources and oil and gas in particular have been paramount for the 
development of economy and vital element of transformation of Kazakhstan into a 
middle power. Kazakhstan is one of the richest countries in the world in terms of both 
reserves and diversity of minerals and natural resources. However, this is not to say a 
mere possessing natural resource has guaranteed Kazakhstan leverage. The most 
important was how it was used: increasing the state’s share of ownership in major 
projects; rational use of profits to develop social infrastructure and implement social 
programs; and third, tightening the laws placing more of the burden of cost on the 
international oil companies themselves.  
Another factor that contributed for Kazakhstan to become a middle power is 
political, economic and social stability. It was not enough to win freedom and 
independence, it was necessary to defend and consolidate the statehood. The main 
goal at dawn of independence was national security, territorial integrity, and 
consolidation of statehood and sovereignty. 
The last but not least is ideology. Having experienced a period of deep 
ideological crisis, Kazakhstan’s society is gradually returning to the awareness of the 
importance of national ideology as a socio-political institution uniting the citizens of 
the country into one nation with their goals, values and interests. 
5 External factors that contributed to the transformation of Kazakhstan into a 
middle power are geopolitical position, international system, and international issues. 
Of all the Central Asian states, Kazakhstan appears to be the most equipped to 
integrate into world economic relations. The country occupies a leading position in 
Central Asia in terms of economic growth and accounts for more than 60 percent of 
the entire region’s GDP. A powerful economic foundation, laying the foundations for 
a liberal market economy, timely modernization of the political system and other 
factors allowed Kazakhstan to take a worthy place in the world community and set 
ambitious foreign policy goals. 
One of the reasons why Kazakhstan has managed to transform into a middle 
power is the influence of the international system itself. The highest interest of major 
nuclear powers such as US, China and Russia in the development of the region as 
well as Caspian Sea has made Kazakhstan to take a proactive position. For this 
reason, the foreign policy concept of the Republic of Kazakhstan defines its national 
116 
 
interests and foreign policy efforts focus on strengthening peace, regional and global 
security, further integration in the system of regional and international trade and 
economic interdependence.   
On top of that, international issues such as activity of non-state actors make 
countries like Kazakhstan urge to take collective security actions. Among all 
international issues countering terrorism has always been one of the top priorities in 
ensuring Kazakhstan’s national security. Kazakhstan believes that international 
cooperation in the fight against terrorism should be carried out in full compliance 
with the norms of international law, and also supports the further improvement of 
anti-terrorism treaty mechanisms. 
Transformation model of Turkey, South Korea and Malaysia prove true the 
transformation model of Kazakhstan. It can be clearly seen from the case studies that 
Kazakhstan’s transformation resembles in most features of political, economic and 
social development of Turkey, South Korea and Malaysia. For example, Kazakhstan 
has employed taking on a strong political leadership to secure the statehood and 
power, considerable focus on the economic reforms, governmental regulation of the 
economy, attempts for social or human capital transformation etc. However, 
Kazakhstan’s economy can still learn from the experience of these countries in 
choosing development trajectory, identifying determining factor in comprehensive 
modernization of its core industry and infrastructure.  The successful experience of 
Turkey, South Korea and Malaysia encourages Kazakhstan to modernize and reduce 
dependence on the export of raw materials, to diversify both the economy as a whole 
and country’s exports. All three countries have used export-oriented growth which 
led to a substantial development in their respected economies. 
6 Priorities of Kazakhstan as a middle power are to protect its national 
interests and be responsible international player of international relations. In 
particular, firstly, Kazakhstan is interested in the politically stable, economically 
sustainable and safe development of Central Asia. Realizing its responsibility and 
role in the region, Kazakhstan makes comprehensive efforts to ensure regional 
stability and security, and to counter new challenges and threats, including those 
emanating from neighboring territories. Secondly, considering Eurasian economic 
integration as one of the effective ways to promote the country to sustainable 
positions in the system of world economic relations, Kazakhstan strengthens its work 
on Eurasian Economic Union. Thirdly, Kazakhstan continues to work on 
strengthening stable and friendly relations with the coastal states of the Caspian Sea 
based on generally accepted principles and norms of international law. Lastly, 
Kazakhstan participates in the work of regional and international organizations whose 
activities are in its national interest and brings practical benefits to its economy. 
To improve its foreign policy, Kazakhstan is to focus on export-oriented policy 
and attracting investment. To achieve the most favorable result in implementing 
export-oriented policy, diplomatic institutions are to hold negotiations with the 
authorities of foreign countries on such important issues as: minimizing the use of 
tariff and non-tariff barriers to Kazakhstani exports; development of optimal transport 
routes; getting permits for the importation of products; signing trade agreements, 
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including on free trade zones; providing favorable conditions for the participation of 
Kazakhstan business in international exhibitions and fairs. For attracting investment, 
the state is likely to increase the level of protection of investors’ rights, as well as 
improve trade logistics and develop production and marketing links between foreign 
investors and local companies. 
Summing up, the empirical case of Kazakhstan’s transformation into a middle 
power should be recognized as such by both practitioners and theorists of 
international relations.   
Taking into account the practical result of this transformation, it is important to 
point out that middlepowerness has brought many changes not only to Kazakh 
citizens’ economic and social life, but also to the surrounding countries and 
international system as well. Therefore, being a particle of the international agenda, 
the country is contributing to the development of interstate relations as well as the 
standing international regime. 
Along with this, it is important to note that the transformation of Kazakhstan 
into a middle power as well as its foreign policy behavior, the main feature of which 
is the successive balanced and meticulously thought-out steps, is a major area for 
study by many countries in the world.  
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ANNEX А 
 
Small States and Middle Powers 
 
Table А1 - List of Small States, by Region 
 
 
 
Note - Compiled by source [136] 
 
Table A2 - Commonwealth small states 
 
 
 
Note - Compiled by source [135] 
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Table А3 - Small States by Kurecic, Petar & Kozina, Goran & Kokotović, Filip 
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Note - Compiled from source [39, p. 129-142] 
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Table A4 - Middle Powers by Holbraad 
 
 
  
Note - Compiled from source [21, p.273] 
 
Table A5 - Middle Power by Neack 
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Note - Compiled from source [22, p. 6-11] 
 
 
